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Network troubleshooting is a field where automation is sorely needed.
While the network has grown in many other ways since 1960s, the tools
we use to troubleshoot and manage it have stayed very much the same.
Could we use the programmability of SDN to automate this problem?
In this thesis work, we developed a prototype that would systematically
troubleshoot the network with automation. The prototype automatically
captures network behaviour, matches it against a network policy and cre-
ates its own test packets to troubleshoot the network policy, on a live sys-
tem. When the prototype discovers a policy violation it will troubleshoot
further down the SDN layers and move down a decision tree based on what
the search finds on each layer.
The result showed that by the end of a troubleshooting search, the user
would know what violating packet, packet path, policy rule, devices, flow
entries and ports were the cause of the network problem. The results also
showed that the automation of network troubleshooting could cause unex-
pected behaviour, and that some results were closely tied to timing between
different POX controller applications.
By using the prototype, network operators could observe network wide
traffic, both manually and automatically test that certain policy conditions
were uphold on their network. The developed prototype, sdn_dump,
helps solve network problems with automation by pinpointing violating
behaviour and the network path it takes. Expanding the prototype to in-
clude troubleshooting of more SDN layers, and expanding the scope of the
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Networks and the complexity of the Internet have been expanding since
their creation in the 1960s. While the network has grown in many other
ways, the tools we use to troubleshoot and manage it have stayed very
much the same (e.g. ping, traceroute, etc.).[1] Today’s network opera-
tors/admins solve most of their network problems with what we can call
manual troubleshooting. This involves the use of multiple tools in order
to triangulate the problem area in the network. Manually troubleshooting
a network problem takes time, while solving it can be comparably easy.
A report done by H. Zeng and others, asked experience network opera-
tors about daily occupation activities. Some of these questions regarded
troubleshooting. 24.6% admins answered that tickets take over an hour to
solve[2, 1]. The most common problems were caused by hardware and
software failures, and they were usually manifesting as reachability and
latency problems[1]. Furthermore, the survey showed that when asking
network operators what tool or advancement they most wish for, they an-
swered "automated troubleshooting"[2, 1]. Solving such a problem will
have a high return of investment (ROI) for the company and the opera-
tors that work for it. It could make the human cost of operating a network
more efficient, and simplify how time and energy is spent. Ultimately, let
operators use more time on solving the problem, rather than extensive time
searching for it.
Brandon Hellers paper[2] shows how Software Defined Network (SDN)
layering can be used to solve automatic troubleshooting problem. The pa-
per shows how SDN is divided into multiple state layers that each repre-
sent a certain segment or view of the network (policy view, logical view,
etc.) and how to use it to our advantage. Using this knowledge, they ex-
plain an optimal view of step by step troubleshooting a network. Each state
layer will have equivalence checks that decides which way to go further,
e.g. "A: Does the network Behaviour Match the Policy?"[2]. The fascinating
thing with this approach is that we are left with a binary tree of decisions
we can follow all the way till we identify the network problem.
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1.1 Motivation
Brandon Heller and his fellow associates[2] theorize that using SDN
and its layered approach to networking can be used to automate and
systematically troubleshoot a network. This thesis will show how
implementing their troubleshooting logic will handle common network
problems, and the report will try to answer some of Heller’s unanswered
questions[2], including some of my own.
1.2 Problem Statement
This report focuses on leveraging the layered structure and programmabil-
ity of SDN networks[2] for developing a troubleshooting tool. The report
will demonstrate how this solution will reduce the number of actions a
network operator must take before finding the source of a network prob-
lem, while also measuring such a solution’s overarching performance. The
thesis attempts at developing a troubleshooting tool that implements the
troubleshooting logic based on Heller[2] previous work. This logic is im-
plemented by incorporating already known debugging tools and concepts
such as NDB[3], ATPG[1] and match them against a descriptive policy lan-
guage developed during this thesis.
Keeping the above in mind, then the following are the problem statements
of this thesis work:
How can we automatically troubleshoot networks using the layered structure of
SDN?
This report tries to address the following research questions to further reach
an answer to the main problem statement:
• How can we automate troubleshooting using SDN Layering?
• How can we minimize or pinpoint the trouble/search area of a network
problem using automation?
• Analyse the qualities of such a solution
– Gauge the correctness of the solution output




This chapter will introduce specific literature, tools and concepts related
to solving the above mentioned thesis problem as well as the tool
implemented.
2.1 Software Defined Networks
2.1.1 Internet History
The tremendous growth of networking has contributed to constant expan-
sion of Internet applications and services. We can instantly share video,
audio, messaging and much more. The growth at the top layer of the OSI
model has been tremendous. To keep up with this progress, our hardware
has improved (Moore’s law). We develop more powerful servers, routers,
cables and switches. While this growth is great and the internet wouldn’t
be the same without it, the problem that remains is that the network, the
fundamental thing keeping it all alive has stagnated. We still use the same
internet protocols and technologies developed decades ago: TCP (1974),
UDP (1980), DNS (1983), OSPF (1998). The main issue is that implement-
ing, coming to a consensus and distributing a new network technology is
multitudes more complicated than installing a new application or hard-
ware to your site.
2.1.2 How Networks Work
In order to comprehend how networks function, below I will provide
definitions of terminology used in this thesis work.
Hosts
A host is a network device that the user can access. Hosts are assigned an
IP address which is used to communicate with other hosts on the network.
We can distinguish between hosts and virtual hosts where the former is a
hardware device and the latter a virtual machine.
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Packet
Packet is structured data sent and received over the network. The data
structure is divided into header, payload and trailer[4]. The header shows
vital information such as destination, source, protocol, length and more
depending on the protocol[4]. The payload is the actual data sent over the
network with this packet[4]. The trailer is used to signal an end of the
packet[4].
Switch
The switch device forwards packets between a LAN[5] (grouped hosts) and
trunks multiple LAN together. The switch works on the second layer of the
network (data layer)[5], while more modern switches, such as L3 learning
switch incorporate the third layer (link layer) and use multiple protocols[5].
Router
The router is a device located between different networks[5]. It uses the
packet header information and its routing table to decide the next hop the
packet should take[5]. The routers work as a gateway between networks
and calculate the best route a host should take to reach other hosts[5].
Network Policy
A network policy is a set of conditions, settings and constraints which
can be viewed as policy rules that tells us when a network connection
is allowed or not on the specified network[6]. The conditions (e.g. time
condition) can be viewed as a property that must be true or false for the
policy rule to apply, and the constraints can be additional variations (e.g.
only apply for TCP connections) to each condition[6]. The combination of
the two will create a policy rule (e.g. Time condition that only applies to
TCP connections).
2.1.3 Traditional Networks
The problem with traditional networks lies at a few key places. Today’s
network hardware is usually what we call closed equipments with hetero-
geneous vendor specific devices. The software comes bundled in with the
hardware, and the hardware uses vendor-specific interfaces[7, 8, 9]. The
next issue is standardization. For the internet to work, we need to have
standardized protocols, so that we know what behaviour we can expect
from the other entities in the network. This is why we have organizations
like ISO and IEC whose task is come to an agreement and decides what the
standard should be. However such a process ensures a slow protocol stan-
dardization in the network. This stagnates network innovation. In practice,
hardware creators write equipment code, and protocols have long vetting
periods before they can be implemented across the network. Routers and
routing protocols are not only hard to design and develop, but also need
4
to be verify for correctness[8]. This is what we call a vertical development
approach and it has an impact across the network[10, 11]. The vertical de-
velopment approach leaves us with very few people who innovate at the
network level.
Traditional networks are also hard to maintain. We need network opera-
tors to manage the network and this is very expensive. This human element
in maintaining the network also brings with it what we call human errors
which can create network downtimes. Software and hardware bring with
them a certain number of bugs and vulnerabilities which transfers over the
different layers of the network. This can make them so much harder to de-
bug than just traditional software bugs.
To summarize, slow network side innovation is identified by, but not lim-
ited to:
• Closed Hardware and Equipment.
• Long Standardization Process.
• Difficult Management/Maintaining Process.
• Bugs concatenate and transfer over multiple layers.
2.1.4 SDN History
SDN is part of a long history of trying to make the network more open
to innovation by making it more programmable and friendly to network
operators. In order to achieve this, the main goal has been to separate the
control plane and data plane[7].
Main Goals
SDN has developed over a timespan of more than 20 years[7]. It started
with the vision of a programmable and centralized network and has kept
evolving. SDN has throughout its history had two main goals and features
in mind. Firstly to separate the control and data plane, and centralize the
control plane[7]. This way the control plane will handle routing network
traffic, and the data plane will forward traffic based the control plane
settings, restraints and conditions. Secondly, the goal has been to centralize
the control plane that will then control multiple distributed data plane
devices[7] such as switches and routers.
2.1.5 History and Time line of SDN
The young time line of SDN:
• Early 1990s - Started with Active Network.
• Early 2000s - Working on separating Control and Data plane.
• 2007 - OpenFlow API and Network OS were developed.
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Active Network
The Active Network in the 90s was where we first saw the insurgence of
programmable interfaces and network API[7].
Separation of Control and Data Plane
In the early 2000s we incorporated lessons learned from the 90s. At the
same time and in increased network traffic, and search for higher network
performance and reliability spurred the development of a better network-
ing solution[7].
The network landscape of the new millennia initiated the search for that
solution. Researchers and network operators saw the increased use of de-
vices that combined the two planes, but at the same time increased the
complexity of managing the network[7]. They started by looking for a way
to separate the control and data plane. This led to developing progress in
three fields; an open interface between the two planes, centralized network
control and distributed state management[7].
OpenFlow API
In 2007 the OpenFlow API and network OS were developed[7]. OpenFlow
(OF) was immediately deployable and launched SDN development for-
ward. Later, controller platforms like NOX made it easy to expand and cre-
ate new controller applications, while using familiar high level languages
like C++ and Python. NOX has since diverged into NOX (c++) and POX
(python), while other like Ryu, Floodlight and Beacon have come forward.
The significant difference with OpenFlow is that a switch using Open-
Flow tables with packet handling rules come with pattern matches and
appropriate actions[7]. OpenFlow actions are drop, flood, forward to inter-
face, modify header, packet/traffic tracking counters and rule priorities[7].
When a OpenFlow switch reviews a packet, it will match it against a pat-
tern, decide which rule to apply based on match and priority (highest first)
and then perform appropriate action, while of course increasing the track-
ing counters. With OpenFlow the network operators and researchers had a
solution for separation of control and data plane, by centralizing the control
plane while keeping the data plane distributed.
2.1.6 History: What is SDN?
Today’s traditional network has two functions. The data plane is responsi-
ble mainly for forwards traffic, while the control plane mainly routes traf-
fic. Often these two function are integrated into the same hardware device
(Figure 2.1), which increases the configuration complexity for a network
operator.
In order to route traffic, the control plane needs to compute the routes and
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Figure 2.1: Traditional Network
update routing tables. These two functions are done in distributed routers.
We often also talk about a management plane, this is done by a network
operator. Here we specify what network policy and behaviour we want.
On a traditional network this may be very tedious and slow work where
the operator has to interface with each machine individually and decide
its behaviour. However, on a SDN network the control plane is centralized
into one controller[8, 11, 7], which has system wide control to each network
node (Figure 2.2). This feature gives the network operator network wide
control over how to build and configure the network[8, 11, 7]. It also cen-
tralizes and streamlines the management plane process we had to do on
the traditional network. This takes us from a vertically integrated network,
with slow innovation to a horizontal/open-interface network with relative
faster innovation and better control[10, 11].
2.1.7 History: How SDN works
The OpenFlow protocol gives us a way to simply handle packets using
events and rules[12, 13]. We can match a packet using patterns, then give
the switch an action (forward, drop) for that match[12, 13]. OpenFlow also
gives us the ability to prioritize different matches and monitor the traffic
using different counters provided by the protocol(number of packets)[12,
13].
The programmable controller gives us an unique ability. The controller
is built upon a network OS that receives events from switches (packet in,
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Figure 2.2: Central Control Plane
device up) and can give new commands to switches (install new rule, send
packet)[12, 13]. We distinguish between reactive and proactive SDN[14]. A
reactive SDN is closer to the experience I have had using POX controller.
The controller passively listens to events. When an event is triggered an
action takes place in your code. The proactive SDN programs and controls
switches using global knowledge of the network through discoveries and
updates from the switches. An example could be to program the switches
before the traffic comes and anticipate an action for each traffic match pos-
sible that could take place on that switch. The proactive solution looks
and performs more like the routing tables of today’s networks[14], with
higher performance on high frequency networks, while the reactive solu-
tion is more flexible in how it can handle traffic. That would mean that
if no rule in the forwarding table can apply, the reactive solution would
be to create a rule for that packet, which of course means more process-
ing time[14]. Perhaps a hybrid[14] solution may combine the flexibility of
reactive and performance of the proactive one.
2.1.8 Horizontal Development Approach
The key ingredient as to why SDN is such an exciting new technology, is
the move from a vertical developed network onto a horizontal one.
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2.1.9 Exciting SDN Technologies
The possibility of an SDN platform that is running network applications are
numerous. We have seen applications that improve bandwidth manage-
ment to a network utilization of 90-95%[8]. Applications that produce eas-
ier tenanted networks[8], by simplyfing the interaction between physical
VLANs and virtual networks. Applications that reduce latency on gaming
applications while the device (this case a laptop) is mobile and switching
multiple subnets[8].
2.1.10 Advantages and Challenges with SDN
The advantages that follow from this paradigm shift is that now we can
program the control plane in high level languages like C++, Java and
Python. This means a more programmable network.
Moore’s Law - We could move the computing power (CPU, RAM) from
the routers onto the centralized controller. Having a powerful controller
that routes the traffic could give us a Route Compiler In The Sky(RCITS)[8],
and leaves us with more cost effective hardware that focus more on just for-
warding traffic.
Global optimization - Using the controller and the programmable network
we could possibly one day have a global optimization of routing[8], with
one central controller for the entire network.
Hardware as a Commodity - Taking the software out of the hardware
leaves us with less expensive and more comparable hardware[8], where we
compare on CPU, RAM and not on the software the vendor includes with
the hardware. The ideal hardware should be simple, vendor-neutral and
future proof[9]. This shift takes network hardware closer to the PC market
where we look at hardware and software as more separate entities[10, 11].
SDN still holds a few key challenges:
• Scalability - A network can keep hundred to thousand switches.
• Consistency - Ensuring the same view for the multiple different
network operators and controllers over the same network topology.
• Security - A compromised controller is a danger to the whole flow of
the network.
• Performance - A controller can’t outperform a switch in speed and it
uses time to process packets coming in to the controller, which leads
to delays.
• Software bugs - Controller application are programmable and this
eventually leads to software bugs.
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2.1.11 MininNet
MiniNet is an OpenSource project that creates a SDN using OpenFlow[15].
It is easy to use, understand and program a wanted network topology.
The thesis used the provided Mininet VM from their web page during
this project[16], where we tested and developed the troubleshooting
application.
2.1.12 SDN Controllers
The controller is controlling the entire network. It uses OpenFlow
protocol[13] to communicate with the network switches and routers. The
controller will have different applications that perform network task. These
applications can be combined, it is this that makes the SDN look so flexible
and programmable. For instance we can run an application that makes
the network switches behave as l2 or l3 learning switches, network logger,
network load balancer, and much more. But first you have to choose a
controller. As mentioned before there are many variants now such as NOX,
POX, Ryu, Floodlight and Beacon. In this thesis POX was chosen.
2.1.13 POX
POX is a controller platform that is used to develop controller applications
using the OpenFlow protocol and API[12, 17]. POX is now the python
equivalent of NOX[17, 18]. The legacy version of NOX used to support
both languages[19], but they have since diverged into the two different
controller platforms we have today.
2.1.14 POX and Python
In this thesis work Python and POX were chosen as the language for the
implementation. POX uses Python, NOX uses C++, so the decision was
easy given my relative knowledge of Python vs. C++. Python is often
regarded as the simpler language to both write and read, for non and
programmers alike. Python has a rich library of online documentation
and helpful guides, while POX is less documented and it was harder to
find helpful resources. In the end Python and POX were chosen as to not
allocate more time in learning a whole new language.
2.2 Troubleshooting Networks
2.2.1 Traditional Troubleshooting
Traditional network troubleshooting is usually done through use of various
different software that cover different areas of the network. These tools
are often as simple as ping, traceroute, tcpdump, netstat and many more[1].
The network operator needs experience with each of these different tools
so as to learn how they work and interact. An operator will usually try
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to triangulate the error by issuing specific commands with two different
tools which pinpoint the error. This part of troubleshooting is the most
tedious and time consuming process. While a network fix could be to
change a line, on a given device, in a given configuration file, finding that
line could take hours [1, 2]. Seeing as how the human cost is one of the
biggest expenses in managing a traditional network, a great cost saving
opportunity emerges as well as making the troubleshooting process easier
for the network operators. When asking experienced network operators
what tool they most wanted to be developed, they answered "automatic
troubleshooting"[1, 2]. Going from using multiple different tools and
spending extensive periods of time in finding the problem, to just start
a automatic debug tool searching for you, allows the operators to fix
problems rather than searching for them.
2.3 SDN State Layers
SDN segmentations give us the advantage of having a layered representa-
tion of the network (Figure 2.3). Each layer represents and controls its own
domain over the network. The interesting part is that "bugs" created in
one layer will manifest/trigger an error between itself and another layer[2].
E.g. A "bug" in physical view would show erroneous behaviour in the con-
nection between ’logical view <-> physical view’ and/or ’physical view
<-> device state’.
2.3.1 Policy Layer
A network policy outlines certain conditions and settings which describe
how we want the network to behave. It describes network access and
authorization, when one can connect or disconnect from it and much more.
The errors we find here are more often than not human errors. This means
that the errors are related to configuration and parsing[2].
2.3.2 Logical View
This is the abstract topology as we, the users, see it. The logical and
physical topology do not have to be the same. For instance two virtual
switches can actually represent one physical switch, or one virtual switch
can represent hundreds of physical switches. The possibilities here are both
numerous and complicated at the same time, especially when a network
has multiple controllers. The question we need to answer here is: "How
do we ensure the same logical view to both controllers at all times?" Errors
found here can be policy mistranslation[2].
2.3.3 Physical View
This is the physical topology of the network. It consists of switches,
routers and connections between them. This should be the accurate view
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Figure 2.3: SDN Layers [2]
of the physical network. Errors found here can be fail-over logic and
synchronization bugs[2].
2.3.4 Device state
This is the firmware on our devices. This is usually where forwarding
tables are mapped out. Errors found here are often low level issues. Things
like memory corruption on hardware and register misconfiguration[2]
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2.4 State Equivalence Check and Decision Tree
Using state layer knowledge of SDN allows us to systematically perform
step by step troubleshooting of a network, through a number of equiva-
lence checks that in the end create a binary tree of decisions (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4: Decision Tree of Questions
Each equivalence check, checks between two state layers. If the layers
match, then the problem is outside the scope of the two layers. However if
they don’t match we search a subset of the two layers[2].
2.4.1 Question A
"A: Does the Actual Network Behaviour Match the Policy?" If yes, then the
policy itself is the problem, and a human must resolve the discrepancy.
If no, we continue." [2] We need to check actual packets passing through
the network against the network policy that the operators have set. By
the end this question, we should know what policy rule is being violated
and from what network behaviour this violation stems from. Suggested
existing tools: ATPG and NDB can partially solve this check, but cannot
check directly against a high level network policy[2].
Relation to thesis
This will be the starting point of the thesis design and implementation. By
distinguishing if actual behaviour and intended behaviour match, we can
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automatically move down the next step in the decision tree. We should
also inform the user what policy rule is being violated, and what network
behaviour is causing the violation (devices, packets and packet paths).
2.4.2 Question B
"B: Does the Device State Match the Policy?" If yes, then the control plane
is behaving properly; the problem must be lower in the stack, either
in firmware code, or a hardware component itself (e.g., a link, port, or
table)"[2] Here we are searching for common network problems such as
forwarding loops, black holes and disconnectivity issues[2]. If the answer
is yes, go to question D. If no, then go to question C. Suggested existing
tools: Anteater, Header Space Analysis and VeriFlow[2].
Relation to thesis
Once our program finds a discrepancy in the previous question, the
automation will start searching between device state and policy.
2.4.3 Question C
"C: Does the Physical View Match the Device State?" If yes, the actual device
state is correctly synchronized with the physical view, then the problem
must be above"[2] If yes go to question E. If not, then the problem lies
between Physical View and Device State (Network OS). This is the least
researched question of them all, and will require new tools for a proper
solution[2]. Suggested existing tools: OFRewind[2]
2.4.4 Question D
"D: Does the Device State Match the Hardware?"[2] If yes, then hardware is to
blame, and we will need a human to diagnose and resolve the problem. If
no, then its a firmware problem. Suggested existing tools: SOFT[2].
Relation to thesis
If the troubleshooting process ends here, it has reached an end point,
the leaf of the decision tree. We want to show the user how the high
level policy has been implemented across the network on the different
network devices. This entails showing the user low level configuration of
the problem causing devices (devices that violating packets have travelled
trough), that would mean showing policy violating devices, flow entries
and port sets(inport and outport) on those network devices.
2.4.5 Question E
"E: Does the Logical View Match the Physical View?"[2] If yes, then the
applications running are to blame. If no, then the problem is between the
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logical and physical view (network hypervisor) Suggested existing tools:
Some way to do a correspondence check logical vs. physical topology[2].
2.5 Troubleshooting Automation
To automate troubleshooting of a network we need 3 things. a) The actual
behaviour of the network, b) the ability to simulate creation of behaviour
and c) we need to know the operators intent with the network[2], i.e. the
intended behaviour of the network.
2.5.1 Actual Behaviour
We can define this as the observable network and how it behaves. How
each packets get sent, forwarded, dropped and received. If we send a
ping from Host1 to Host2, and we observe that it jumps from Switch3 and
Switch4, and back again we have observed a little piece of the networks
actual behaviour. All network communications combined provides us with
bigger sample of the actual behaviour. With tools such as NDB[3] we can
observe the actual behaviour of the network as described above, and have
the ability to see the step by step path the packet takes. With actual network
behaviour we have reference point to use when we are troubleshooting the
network.
2.5.2 Intended Behaviour
This is how a network operator intends for the network to behave. It
can also be called the network policy. It should be a clear description of
how the networks should behave and deviation from this would usually
be unwanted behaviour. In the traditional network, the network policy
would be a combination of low level configs across the different network
devices. For instance drop all packet from and to Facebook could be such a
configuration and therefore a part of the policy. However, with the shift to
SDN we have the ability to centralize the network policy in one place. "In
an SDN, policy can be a fist-class citizen; intent can be explicitly expressed
at the policy layer, while the code compiles the policy description in lower-
level configuration."[2] With the actual and intended behaviour we have
two reference points of the network. Using the two we can compare one
against the other, and see if the actual behaviour violates the intended one.
2.5.3 Automating Behaviour
Automating or rather simulating behaviour for troubleshooting is compli-
cated. We need some form of description to reference and then create be-
haviour from. We can use the policy description itself as the reference to
automate intended behaviour by translating policy rules into network traf-
fic using automation, however this brings with it some problems. What if
the policy is the problem, meaning what if the described intention of the
15
operator isn’t really what he intended for, e.g. the policy itself is the cause
of network problems.
2.6 Troubleshooting Tools and Concepts
2.6.1 ATPG: Automatic Test Packet Generation
An ATPG reads router specifications and generates tests packets to test each
link and table rule of the network[1]. This way it can triangulate the bug
into a single node, link or forwarding table entry at the network[2]. ATPG
excels at finding both functional(forwarding rules, link rules, drop rules)
and performance(congestions, bandwidth, reachability) based problems on
the network[1]. ATPG can verify reachability and performance by testing
nodes through sending of test packets[1, 2]. It does this by learning the
full list of the forwarding tables, creating a model of this and producing a
set of test packets that will test all of the forwarding rules[2, 1]. It locates
and pinpoints problem areas by looking for packet drops that can indicate
software and hardware errors[1]. This tool can be used to test a network’s
low-level configurations and see if problems can be created. Using this tool
we could partially solve the first equivalence check of the binary tree Heller
proposed[2]. However it does not have the ability to check against a high-
level policy as Heller noted[2]. On the other hand, ATPG or a similar tool
could solve the issue of automating network behaviour that we can use for
testing, thereby lessening the burden on operators further.
2.6.2 NDB: The Network Debugger
NDB is meant to debug a network in much the same way as how gdb[20]
works. It monitors your network, similarly to a network wide tcpdump[2,
3], but implements two interesting features: you can add breakpoints and
backtrace your packets on the network[3]. This way it can pinpoint the
sequence of events that lead to network errors, much in the same way you
would use gdb in for instance C-programming. Using NDB or a similar tool
would enable automatic capturing the actual network behaviour, which
we could later match against a network policy, thereby partially solving
the automation of question A: "Does the Actual Network Behaviour Match the
Policy?"[2].
NDB: Breakpoints
NDB followed with the gdb fashion of breakpoints. They implemented
control actions such as breakpoints, watch, backtrace, single step and
continue[3] The result from this is that the user can view a packets path
to the network error that it is creating.
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2.6.3 Tcpdump
Tcpdump is a monitoring tool at end-hosts. It captures packets as they enter
and leave the hosts, and prints the packet content with a timestamp at the
time of capture[21]. Tcpdump is often used by network operator because
of the utility it provides. The operator can assign and combine boolean
expressions (tcpdump src 10.0.0.1 and dst 10.0.0.2) so to filter specify packet
properties that you are interested in. Having a network wide tcpdump,
such as NDB[2, 3] is a way of capturing actual network behaviour.
2.6.4 Ping
Ping is one of the most used tools in network administration[1]. A
ping packet uses the ICMP protocol[22]. It works by sending a
ECHO_REQUEST to a destination and waiting for a reply such as
ECHO_REPLY or error messages such as TIME_EXCEEDED, DESTINA-
TION_UNCREACHABLE and more. This is the simplest way for an oper-
ator to check if it can reach a certain destination from his ping location.
2.6.5 Traceroute
Tracroute works similar to a ping and is also one of the most used tools by
network operators for troubleshooting[1]. You give it a destination and it
sends packets to that destination. The big addition to tracroute is that it
uses a small TTL[23] to know and show the operator the packet path that
is being taken from this source to that destination host.
2.6.6 OFRewind
OFRewind set out to supply a tool that network operators were severely
lacking. While software developers have good debuggers and varied tools,
the network operators are left to use crude and limited tools[1, 24]. With
the help of SDN and the OpenFlow protocol, the developers of OFRewind
set out to give operators the ability to have: "scalable, multi-granularity,
temporally consistent recording and coordinated replay in a network, with
finegrained, dynamic, centrally orchestrated control over both record and
replay."[24] This way operators can reproduce errors and the packet paths
that created them.
The Main Advantage
The main advantage OFRewind has over similar recoding tools (Netflow,
tcpdump) is that it can cast a wider net[24]. Tcpdump and Netflow are
usually recording on a single interface or switch port. OFRewind also has
the advantage that you can follow the packet path to see the starting point
of the problem, while not significantly affecting the scalability of OpenFlow
in a negative way[24]. Heller states that of all the equivalence questions, C
"Does the Physical View Match the Device State?" is the least researched[2].
However he states that OFRewind provides us a start on answering it[2].
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OFRewind similareties with NDB
OFRewind is in many ways similar to the NDB[3] tool, and is internally
using it in collecting traffic from the dataplane[24]. OFRewind does have
a few limitations. It does not support flow and packet sampling, partial
packets forwarding in traffic, flow cut-offs when reaching a certain traffic
amount and safeguards against replay inaccuracies[24].
2.6.7 Anteater
Anteater leaves diagnosing the control plane for other tools and focuses
on diagnosing problems through static analysis of the data plane[25]. By
focusing on the data plane it can find bugs that we cannot directly view
from the configuration files[25]. By looking on the data plane state of
network devices it can analyse close to the actual network behaviour[25].
Its main aim is to find broad network problems by analysing forwarding
tables across the networks devices, and then looking for problems by
checking the tables against invariants such as[25]:
• Loop-free forwarding
• Connectivity/Reachability
• Consistency in network behaviour
Using Anteater we can solve equivalence question B "Does the Device
State Match the Policy?" since it checks connectivity against the data
plane states[2] and find other device state issues such as black holes and
forwarding loops.
2.6.8 Header Space Analysis
Header Space Analysis is a general framework for analysing packet
headers[26]. The main goal is to reduce the complexity of troubleshooting
common network problems by providing network operators an easier
way to analyse their live production networks[26]. It is done by giving
the operator answers regardless of the network protocol in use on the
network, answers on problems such as host/tenant isolation, reachability,
loop detection and traffic leakage[26]. By using Header Space Analysis or
its developed tool Hassel[26], we could solve question B "Does the Device
State Match the Policy?"[2] since it will find errors such as loop detection and
reachability. Then it checks for correctness problems at data plane through
a few steps. Firstly it models packets in the form of header space[27].
Then it models network devices as functions that change header spaces, for
example a router will in addition to forwarding packets, reduce the TTL in
the packet header[27]. Finally, through a set of header space algebra we
can compute header spaces that result in intersections, complementation,
difference and checking for subsets and network equality conditions[27].
So through tools such as Header Space Analysis we can discover problems
in the data plane state. Nick Feamster[27] notes that the tool only gets the
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current snapshot of the data plane, and will not tell you what may happen





This chapter will provide a step-by-step approach, showcasing the actions
taken in order to answer the given problem statement in the introduction
chapter. We will go through three different phases in this thesis: design,
implementation and experimentation. This chapter aims to give an
overview of each one.
3.1 Approach Waypoints
The thesis has a number of waypoints and will go through three phases to




i. Identify the three different behaviours needed for trou-
bleshooting automation
ii. Design and model:
A. Capturing intended behaviour
B. How to match actual behaviour against intended be-
haviour
C. Creating automatic testing behaviour
iii. Show Question A model overview
(b) Question B
i. Look for disconnectivity issues
ii. Search for common network reachability problems
(c) Question D
i. Show the user lower level configurations that are causing
network problems
ii. Show how they are related to the higher level policy





i. Implement a solution for:
A. Capturing actual behaviour
B. Capturing intended behaviour
C. Creating automatic testing behaviour
D. Decision maker to move down the tree
(b) Question B
i. Check for disconnected network devices
ii. Search for forwarding loops with spanning tree protocol
iii. Decision maker to move down the tree
(c) Question D
i. Request flow tables from network devices
ii. Compare and filter out irrelevant entries
3. Experiment with prototype:
(a) Measure and Demonstrate System Behaviour
(b) Analyse adequacies and strengths
(c) Evaluate prototype
3.2 Design
The design is intended to show the concept and model of how the thesis
intends to automate using the systematic layering of SDN. Heller has
previously provided us with a set of equivalence checks which need to
be answered for this to work[2]. This thesis will primarily focus on the
two first checks given by Heller[2] Question A: "Does the Actual Network
Behaviour Match the Policy?" and Question B: "Does the Device State
Match the Policy?". This means that both the design and implementation
will be two parted, and each part devoted to one or the other equivalence
check.
3.2.1 Question A: Design
Question A: "Does the Actual Network Behaviour Match the Policy?"[2].
This part will focus on explaining the approach in automating the solution
to question A. It will specify what the system does and and how it will
perform the tasks assigned. Meaning how do we capture packets, check
them against rules and even create packets that will test these rules? These
questions will be covered in this section.
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3.2.2 Question B: Design
Question B: "Does the device state match the policy?"[2]. How do we show
the user if the device state matches the policy? How do we go about
finding errors such as forwarding loops, black holes and disconnection
issues. These questions will be answered in this section.
3.2.3 Question D: Design
Question D: "Does the Device State Match the Hardware?"[2]. The aim here
is to show the operator the low level switch flow entries that are a cause of
a higher level network policy violation, such as we find in Question A.
This would entail showing the operator what devices, port sets (inport,
outport) and flow entries are causing the network problem from the device
standpoint.
3.3 Implementation
The implementation will show how the design was implemented in Python
using POX[17] and tested on different Mininet[15] topologies. Though this
section will list a few code examples, the full code source will be listed
in appendix C of this thesis and the public repository will be available at:
https://github.com/HarisSistek/public_sdntroubleshoot.
3.3.1 Question A: Implementation
The implementation of Question A will need 3 python classes. One that
is the decision maker and network wide listener, the second one should
be able to read a policy description and check it against the packets that
the previous class is listening and capturing, and the third should create
automatic packets from the policy description and test if they create policy
violations or not. By the end of Question A, the operator should be
informed about what policy rule is being violated and on what network
devices these violations are occurring.
3.3.2 Question B: Implementation
Most of Question B will be handled by the network wide listener class
deigned during Question A, since it is already closest to the problem at
hand. We will also use a pre-made POX module/application that will
execute a spanning tree protocol that removes loops on the network. After
the spanning tree we will initiative a connection check on the switches to
look for disconnectivity issues.
3.3.3 Question D: Implementation
Question D is also handled by the network wide listener. Once we reach
this part of the decision tree the controller will request the flow statistics
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from the network switches, and we will use that information to reduce the
scope of the problem. By the end of Question D, the user should know what
rule, packets, packet paths (Question A), what switch (Question A/D), and
what switch ports and flow entries (Question D) are creating a network
problem.
3.4 Experiments
The aim with the experiment is to test the features of the prototype. The
experiment should be constructed as such that we can test each equivalence
check (Question A, B and D) finding and not finding a violation, and what
we extract from information the tool provides in these situations.
3.4.1 Experiment with the monitoring feature
These experiments should aim to test the prototypes ability to capture
network traffic across the network. The experiments should aim to use
both different packet types (packet protocols), and different network sizes
(number of network devices).
3.4.2 Experiment with the violation finding feature
These experiments should aim to test that the prototype can capture
violations to different policy rules. Firstly, this means that Question A
should discover network behaviour that violates policy rules related to
time, date and data sent/received. The experiments should also show the
violations found on Question B and D, and not just the top layer.
3.4.3 Experiment with the automating feature
The experiments here should aim at testing the prototypes ability to create
different kinds of packets to test the described policy rules.
3.4.4 Experiment with tools that alter network behaviour
This experiment should show how the tools interacts with another POX
controller applications. These applications should in essence be enforcing
the policy we are describing with our policy language. From the
experiments we expect to see violations occur when the applications are




This chapter will explain the design decisions taken during this thesis. It
will show how we use SDN technologies to troubleshoot a network, and
will serve as a road map for implementing the prototype. We start at the
top of Hellers[2] binary decision tree(Figure 2.4) and work our way down.
4.1 Question A: Design
The first equivalence check at the top of the tree is "A: Does the Actual Net-
work Behaviour Match the Policy?"[2] To answer this question we will need 3
things. The actual network behaviour, the intended behaviour, and to fully
automate this check we would also need to automate/simulate network
behaviour. Once we have the first two (actual and intended behaviour) we
can match them against each other and look for policy violations. If we
find one, notify the operator and program to move a step down the tree. If
non are found, then we will need a human to diagnose the problem. With
this design the operator will have the ability to just describe intended be-
haviour and let the program troubleshoot the network automatically from
there. Ultimately we want the operator to start the sdn_dump (Figures4.1
and 4.2) module on the controller and let the network troubleshoot itself.
Once a violation is found the operator should be notified where it is, and
sdn_dump should move one step down the decision tree until the loca-
tion of the problem is pointed out. Each step in the tree should grow the a
trace stack. In the trace, Question A will notify the user about what type of
violation (e.g. Forwarding Violation) it is, what behaviour (devices, pack-
ets and packet paths), and policy rule was the violating cause. Question
B would then troubleshoot its search area and add significant information
to the stack and move us left or right down decision tree. Then if we are
at Question D, which is an leaf of the tree (end node), Question D would
add violating devices, device ports and flow entries to the stack. Using this
trace stack, the operator can follow the trace down to the location of the er-
ror, from high level policy to low level configuration setting on the network
device.
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Listing 4.1: Example Violation Found
1 ## P o l i c y V i o l a t i o n Found : V i o l a t i o n−Type ##
2 > Packet : Packet Info
3 > Packet : Packet Info
4 v i o l a t e s :
5 > Rule : Rule−t e x t
6 . . . Next Stage . . .
4.1.1 Question A - Part 1: Capture Actual Behaviour
The approach in capturing the actual behaviour is pretty simple. Have a
passive listener at the controller and forward all network packets to the
listener. It is a network wide tcpdump similar to what the NDB[2, 3]
provides, but without the path awareness, packet backtracing and traffic
breakpoints, my app will be called sdn_dump. Once the sdn_dump starts
to receive packets it will print out relevant packet data for the operator to
see, similarly to tcpdump. Then it will forward the packets to the the next
module in the system (violation_checker)(Figure 4.2). This module will
check the packet against the intended network behaviour. The sdn_dump
will be a separate module from the other two (Figure 4.1), in order to
capture packets and device stats independently from checking violations
or automatic packet generation. By separating these functions we can give
the tool multiple functionalities that the operator can use. The operator can
command the tool to use a certain operation mode (modes = 1 - listen for
packets, 2 - listen and check packets, 3 - 2 + automate packets). This way the user
should be able to leave out the generation of test packets by command, and
have the ability to create his own network behaviour to test using the usual
external tools such ping and iperf.
Listing 4.2: Example Listening Function
1 def _handlePacketIn ( event ) :
2 packet = event . parsed
3 i f packet == some_packet_type :
4 handle_that_type
5 e l i f packet == some_packet_type2 :
6 handle_that_type
7 e lse :
8 Unknown_packet_type
Since the packets that sdn_dump receives will enveloped differently
depending on packet type we will need different methods to handle
different type of packets with different methods and outputs. For instance,
receiving an ICMP, ARP and UDP packet, would mean that three different,
but similar outputs that we will later parse differently in the next section.
Listing 4.3: Example Outputs
1 <time > DevID : <devID> ICMP : pkt <hw−src > > <hw−dst > ,
ip <src > > <dst > : <icmp−type >
26
2 <time > DevID : <devID> ARP: pkt <hw−src > > <hw−dst > , hw
<src > > <dst >: <arp−type >
3 <time > DevID : <devID> UDP: pkt <hw−src > > <hw−dst > , ip
<src > > <dst >: srcp <sport > dstp <dport >
Once we have read a received packet we should send it for checking at
the violation_checker.
Extracting device statistics
We should regularly request port statistics from the connected network
devices. We can set it to be done after a certain number of packets have
been sent and received on the network. As the network is sending and
receiving packets, we should also map IP-PORT-DEVICE relationships
such that we can later derive data used by each host. Once we have the
relationship mapped and the port statistics for each device, we can send
this information to the violation_checker to ensure that a data violation
has not occurred.
Question A - Part 1: Summary
• Listen for new packets
• Parse the packets
• Print packet information
• Send packet information to violations_checker
• Map IP-PORT-DEVICE relations
• Extract port statistics per device
• Send port statistics to violation_checker
• Decide what to do based on response from violation_checker
4.1.2 Question A - Part 2: Describe Intended Behaviour
We now need a simple way for the operator to describe intended behaviour
(policy), but that can later be used both for matching and generating auto-
matic test packets. The approach would be to let the operator describe
conditions and constraints at which point a host would be blocked on this
controller controlled network. It is important to notice that we are simply
talking about a descriptive language, it should describe the operators in-
tent with the network and thereby also intended network behaviour. This
means that the language will never change how the actual network be-
haves other than create test packets from the description, i.e. lower level
configurations will stay intact. With this approach we can insure that actual
network behaviour and the networks intended behaviour are completely
independent and separated for the program.
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The descriptive language should be close to human speech, but also make
the syntax modular and reusable, and simple to parse later on. The policy
document should start with the network operator assigning hosts to IP ad-
dresses that it can later use to refer to the policy rules, this part shouldn’t
be necessary, but should simplify the reading of policy rules.
H1 = 10.0.0.1
H2 = 10.0.0.2
Then each line starts with a major constraint, like Time, Date, Vlan, Data.
The constraint comes with a description specific for that type of constraint:
Time 20:00 to 21:00
Date Fri to Sun
After the major constraint we need an additional description on what host
or host-to-host specific connection we want to block.
Time 20:00 to 21:00 block H1
Time 20:00 to 21:00 block H1 to 10.0.0.2
We also need the ability to add constraints to rules by specifying proto-
col and port numbers that should be blocked on that condition.
Time 20:00 to 21:00 block H1 prot UDP sport 1000 dport *
Time 20:00 to 21:00 block H1 to H2 prot TCP sport * dport 22
Finally, provide the user the ability to make comment in the document us-
ing #-sign. The other major constraints should work in a similar fashion:
Date MON to FRI block H1 - similar function as time constraint
Some primitives won’t have need for protocol and port specification:
Data 100 MB to H1 - H1 can’t receive more than 100 MB
Data 100 KB from H2 - H2 can’t send more than 100 KB
Vlan 10 has H1, H2, H3 - Vlan 10 has tree hosts H1, H2 and H3
Using the language we can capture the network operator intent and parse
it into usable data, store it into python dictionaries and then later com-
pare them against packets that are forwarded from sdn_dump to viola-
tion_checker. This way we can find packets that violates the intended be-
haviour.
Listing 4.4: Policy Example
1 # Hosts
2 h1 = 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 0 0
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3 h2 = 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 0 1
4 h3 = 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 0 2
5
6 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block h1 to h2
7 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 0 0 prot UDP
8 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block h2 prot TCP
9 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block h3 to 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 6 prot TCP
sport 1000 dport 22
10 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 6 to h3 prot TCP
sport 22 dport 1000
Checking Time
Allows the user to check if the network blocks a connection or host during
a certain time period. For instance ensure to block all connections to
Facebook during work hours. We can check this by looking at the time
the packet is received against the Time-rules time interval.
Checking Date
Similar to the Time primitive, check if the network blocks a connection or
host during a day or interval of days. We can check this by looking at the
day the packet is received against the Date-rules.
Checking Vlan
Checks that the tenant relationship for this VLAN is intact. We can check
this by looking for behaviour that would violate this VLAN. For instance
check that packets request and replies do not jump from one VLAN to
another.
Checking Data
Check that a host or connection does not transmit or receive over a certain
data amount threshold. Openflow keeps many counter including packets
and bytes sent/received for each switch port and flow table[13]. Using
this we can match the amount against the limit set by the operator in the
description policy.
Question A - Part 2: Summary
• Describe conditions and constraints in the form of policy rules
• Parse and store the policy rules to be used for checking and
automating packets
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4.1.3 Question A - Part 3: Match Actual against Intended Be-
haviour
Once the sdn_dump (Figure 4.2) is running, it will listen for incoming
packets. Once one is received, it is then forwarded to violation_checker.
The packet should then be parsed into usable data, that we can match
against rules in the policy files. We want to check as few rules as possible to
minimise the time for finding a violation since the number of packets can
become great. This can be done by disqualifying rules based on protocol
type (TCP, ICMP, UDP). The next step would be to look at source and
destination IP address and port numbers. Then finally to look at the major
primitive (Time, Date) and see if they are violated.
Listing 4.5: Matching Example
1
2 def c h e c k _ i f _ l e g a l ( p a c k e t _ s t r i n g ) : # s t r i n g from
sdn_dump
3 i f proto_type in p a c k e t _ s t r i n g :
4 packet_data = e x t r a c t _ p a c k e t _ d a t a (
p a c k e t _ s t r i n g )
5 b o o l _ v i o l a t i o n = check_ i f_proto_type (
packet_data )
6 i f b o o l _ v i o l a t i o n :
7 s tored_packets . append ( packet_data )
8 i f c h e c k _ f o r _ v i o l a t i o n ( packet_data ) :
9 return True
10 e l i f proto_type2 in p a c k e t _ s t r i n g :
11 . . . .
12 e lse :
13 . . . .
When a packet has been checked by rules and found to violate the policy,
we remember that packet by storing it in a list. If the next packet
violation_checker received also violates one of the rules, we need to
examine if that packet could either be a reply or a forwarding of that
packet to another switch. This is important, because if a user is running a
controller application that would drop a certain packet the application will
have to see the packet be received to the switch from a host, but the packet
should not be forwarded to or be replied to by another host. In practice,
we would only see one instance of that packet on the network for the user
application to work correctly. Any more instances of that packet on the
network would create violations between actual and intended behaviour.
Matching port statistics against policy
The violation_checker can also receive mapped port data from sdn_dump.
The function check_if_ports_legal() will be used to check the mapped IP-




If a violation is finally found, notify the user which packet and host violates
which rule, and return a boolean value to sdn_dump so that we can move
down the decision tree. This means that even if there are more violations to
be found, print out the stack trace of this packet violation rather than all the
possible rule violations at once. This way the operator will need to solve
one problem at a time.
Question A - Part 3: Summary
• Parse packets received from sdn_dump into useful data
• Match an already stored policy rules against the parsed packet
• Remember packet that can create a violation in the future
• Check port data against Data rules
• Return boolean value to sdn_dump if two packets or port data have
created a violation
4.1.4 Question A - Part 4: Automate Test Packets
This module is the last piece of question A. It should use the already parsed
rules from violation_checker and create packets and conditions that would
violate these rules. For instance if H1 should not communicate with H2,
create packets from H1 to H2 in the controller, send it and see if sdn_dump
captures these packets. If the packets get caught with a reply from a host or
forwarded through the network by violation_checker, then we have pro-
duced policy violating behaviour that the description of the the intended
behaviour says is not allowed, but that we can show works on the actual
network. This means that they don’t match and that we should continue
our search down to Question B. While inspired from ATPG[1] the differ-
ence here is that we are creating the packets from the policy description
itself, and not from forwarding rules on the network devices. We are ulti-
mately just doing static checking on certain rules the user wants to test on
a live network.
When the automator starts it will be given each parsed policy rule by vio-
lation_checker. The automator will wait until the last network switch has
turned on and then it will traverse each of these policy rules and attempt to
create violations by creating a matching packet for that rule and then send it
out to the network. It is important to mark this packet with an action called
(port=OFPP_CONTROLLER=)[12] so that all other control applications on
the network that are listening for new incoming packets also receive this
packet, essentially we are sending the packet back to the controller through
the last switch that turns on.
Listing 4.6: Automate Packet Creation
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1 def c r e a t e _ p a c k e t s ( ) :
2 for r u l e in p o l i c y _ r u l e s :
3 i f some_protocol_type in r u l e :
4 packet = crea te_packet_ type ( r u l e . src , r u l e .
dst )
5 send_packets ( packet )
During the creation of the packets the automator should first look at
what protocol type the rule is describing. It should always choose the sim-
pler version possible of the rule. That would mean that a rule doesn’t have
a prototype constraint in it e.g. Time 10:00 to 12:00 block H1, should be
tested with an ICMP rather than a TCP.
Note that the automator can only test Time and Date rules since they are
directly packet related, which means that Data rules are rather a check on
the network done by sdn_dump to see if certain conditions are true on each
network device.
Question A - Part 4: Summary
• Learns the number of switches
• Learns the policy rules
• Once the last switch has started it will create packets
• Create packets by using the parsed policy rule
• Ensure that the controller also receives the sent packet
4.1.5 Question A - Model Overview
This subsection aims at showing the overall model and data flow of
Question A: Design. The UML (Figure 4.1) shows that Question A will have
three major classes sdn_dump (the packet listener), violation_checker (the
packet checker) and automator (the packet generator). In Question A
flow digram (Figure 4.2) we can observe the designed flow. Note that we
have the ability for the user to leave the automator or the automator and
violation_chcker from running using commands to sdn_dump. This gives
the program multiple functionalities such as: just a packet listener, listener
and checker and a full automation of this equivalence check.
4.1.6 Question A: Next Step
As stated previously, if a violation is found then sdn_dump will be alerted,
note what packets and rule it was, then print out first part of the error stack.
Then sdn_dump should start the next step in the decision tree (Figure
2.4) by troubleshooting on Question B: “Does the Device State Match the
Policy?”[2]. We can do this by keeping a boolean value for each check we
do, and if it return True on a violation check, it should mean that we need
to move downward the tree.
32
Figure 4.1: UML: Class Overview
Figure 4.2: Model Data Flow
4.2 Question B: Design
Once we have found a violation on Question A: "Does policy match actual
behaviour?", we need to move on to Question B: "Does policy match device
state?". The important issues to find here are network errors such as
forwarding loops, black holes and disconnectivity issues[2]. Once we are
here we also need to facilitate a way to move further down the decision
tree once we have answer to if there is forwarding loops, black holes or
disconnected devices.
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4.2.1 Question B: Forwarding loops
These forwarding loops occur when we have multiple connections between
two network switches or when two ports on one switch are connected
to each other[28], and this has the potential to cause a circular network
loop[29]. Since there is no TTL, an Ethernet packet has the potential to
loop forever, at least until dropped due to resource exhaustion[28]. We will
thereby use a spanning tree protocol to allow redundant/multiple links,
without network failure[30].
4.2.2 Question B: Disconnectivity issues
After we have started the spanning tree protocol, we need to check
disconnected switches. Since OpenFlow keeps track of all its device
connections, we can count them and compare that to a number of switches
we are expecting the tool to find. If the numbers mismatch, we need to
inform the operator and act accordingly on the decision tree.
4.2.3 Question B: Move down the tree
From Question B we can move to Question C (No) and Question D (Yes)
based on the answer to the question. So before we answer Question B we
should know if the network is experiencing looping behaviour, black holes
or/and have disconnected devices.
4.3 Question D: Design
When we reach Question D, we are at a leaf of the decision tree, meaning
that we are at an endpoint. To recap Question D is "Does the device
state match the hardware?", Heller states that if Yes, then buggy hardware
is to blame, if No, then firmware is the cause[2]. This can be seen in
the forwarding table of the network devices. Either way we request the
forwarding tables from the devices and filter out flow entries based on
the last violating packet we found. The end goal here is for the operator
to know what policy rule, network device, ports and flows are creating a
network problem. Since we then already know the policy rule and packet
that are a policy violation, we can extrapolate the flows, and thereby also
answer to Question D. This means if we find flows that are corresponding
to the policy rule and violating packet, then we have No answer something
is wrong in the configuration. If no flows are found to match then it would
be a Hardware problem. From here, human intervention would be needed
to fully solve the problem.
4.3.1 Question D: Request flow entries
With OpenFlow, we have the ability to know all the flow statistics from
each network device. This is called an ofp_flow_stat_request[12, 13] which
returns valuable information about the flow table of each device. Each
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entry contains values such as packet count, byte count, a timer, a match,
actions and much more. The values we are interested in both for debugging
and functionality are the byte count, match and action.
4.3.2 Question D: Filter out data
In the section above we stated the need for three values from the flow
entries. We use a filter on these values to discern flow entries related to
our policy rule and packet violation, and then present them to the user.
After the filtering the user should have a clear picture of what is causing
an error across the network, both on the high level policy and low level
configuration.
Byte count value
This value is more important when the Data policy rule has been violated,
but has its uses on the other rules too. With it we can show the operator
how much each flow is transmitting. We should show this value for each
flow entry related to the violation.
Match value
The match value varies based on what protocol the flow entry is concern-
ing. E.g. an ICMP flow entry will not have values such as source and
destination ports, while a TCP flow would have. By remembering the last
violating packet we can match its values such as protocol, source, destina-
tion and port vs. the flows protocol, source and destination. The match
also gives us an important value called in_port which tells us what entry
port the flow has. This is the first step in giving the user a port set (in and
out port) on the network device.
4.3.3 Actions
The action value tells us what action to take if a packet matches the flow
match, and on what port to do the action. The most normal action we see
is the OFPAT_OUTPUT which says that if a packet match that flow go out
on this switch port[13]. By using this information we inform the operator
of the action and corresponding port.
4.3.4 Presenting the information
Once we have filtered out the packet, we need to show the user the
violating flow match and in-port, corresponding action and out-port, and
byte count for each network device. The user now not only knows the
violating packet path (from one device to another device until destination),
but also has a path of corresponding flow entries for each jump in the path
showing him/her what is wrong with each low level configuration on each
device. The expected result would look like as shown in Figure 4.3
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This chapter will show implementation of the prototype from the design
in the previous chapter. The section is mainly dived into three parts for
each of Question (A, B, C). This chapter aims at explaining implementation
choices done on the prototype. Snippets of code will also be shown,
the code in its full length will be listed in the appendix C and GitHub
repository https://github.com/HarisSistek/public_sdntroubleshoot.
5.1 Helpful mail archives, sources and wikis
I used a number of helpful guides, sources, mail archives etc. during
this implementation that I would like to reference. These two archived
mailing correspondences were very helpful in understanding how to create
ICMP packets[31] and TCP packets[32] with the POX API. Further the POX
wiki[12] and NOX/POX repo[33] were instrumental in understanding how
events and event listeners worked and could be used.
5.2 Question A: Implementation
The code is divided into three main files, with an additional directory
"policies" for the policy files.
5.2.1 Files and Directory
The tree structure of the tool directory:
Listing 5.1: Directory tree structure
1 .
2 |−− _ _ i n i t _ _ . py
3 |−− p o l i c i e s
4 | |−− pol i cy1 . pol
5 |−− automator . py
6 |−− sdn_dump . py
7 |−− v i o l a t i o n _ c h e c k e r . py
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5.2.2 How to start the controller app
The application uses POX to run, and connects to the Mininet topology if
the user has specified the wish for a remote controller.
Listing 5.2: Mininet example
1 sudo mn −−topo s ing le , 3 −−c o n t r o l l e r remote
After the topology is running we can use POX to run the app on the
network by:
Listing 5.3: Example executions
1 ./ pox . py pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =1 −−
mode=2
2 ./ pox . py pox . forwarding . l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox .
sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =1 −−mode=3
From here the listener at sdn_dump.py will start to monitor, check and
create network behaviour based on what the policy description says.
Sdn_dump parameters
Sdn_dump needs two parameters to start, the switch and mode. Switch
signals the number of network devices and mode sets operation mode for
the tool.
Listing 5.4: Tool Parameters
1 −−switch =2 −−mode=1 # Two switches . L i s t e n f o r packets
.
2 −−switch =1 −−mode=2 # One switch . L i s t e n and check
packets .
3 −−switch =1 −−mode=3 # One switch . Listen , check and
c r e a t e packets .
5.2.3 Question A - Part 1: Capture Actual Network Behaviour
Sdn_dump.py is the main file of the app. It will listen to packets, start the
checking of packets and decide when to move down the decision tree for
Question B.
The launch
Sdn_dump’s launch() function will initiate everything. We start by giving
this function two variables from the command line, switch and mode.
Switch is used in order for the program to know how many network
devices to wait for before starting the creation of packets, as this number
is also used the number during the connectivity check during Question B.
Mode is used by the code to know what operation mode it is in. The three
modes are listen, listen and check, and lastly listen, check and automate.
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Listing 5.5: Sdn_dump.py launch()
1 def launch ( switch = " " , mode= " " ) :
2 global checker
3 global switch_count
4 print "Number of switches expected : " , switch
5 switch_count = i n t ( switch )
6 s t a r t _ s p a n n i n g _ t r e e ( )
7 i f " 2 " in mode or " 3 " in mode :
8 checker = vc . Violat ion_Checker ( switch , mode)
9 core . openflow . addListenerByName ( " PacketIn " ,
_handle_PacketIn )
10 core . openflow . addListenerByName ( " Por tS ta t sRece ived " ,
h a n d l e _ p o r t _ s t a t s )
11 core . openflow . addListenerByName ( " FlowStatsReceived " ,
handle_f low_requests )
We also define what event we are listening to and what function should
handle each event type. Sdn_dump.py has one handler for each of the
three events listed in the bottom of the code snippet. Subsequently, we
should now see how _handle_PacketIn(event) deals with new packets
coming to the controller.
Listening mechanic
Once the adder has marked _handle_PacketIn() to the PacketIn events we
can create a network wide tcpdump. All packets that we receive will
be parsed and printed out on terminal. Since there are many different
packet and protocol types we first have to differentiate between them.
_handle_PacketIn() does the first step of packet differentiation by:
Listing 5.6: _handle_PacketIn()
1 def _handle_PacketIn ( event ) :
2 global count
3 packet = event . parsed
4 i f packet . f ind ( " arp " ) :
5 handle_arp ( dpid_to_s t r ( event . dpid ) , packet )
6 e l i f packet . f ind ( " ipv4 " ) :
7 handle_ip ( dpid_to_s t r ( event . dpid ) , packet )
8 e lse :
9 log . i n f o ( "UNKNOWN packet %s " , packet . s r c )
10
11 count = count + 1
12 i f count == 5 : # e v e r y 5 p a c k e t s r e q u e s t p o r t d a t a
13 send_requests ( )
14 count = 0
We see that _handle_PacketIn(event) takes the PacketIn event, parses
the event into the packet. Once we have this packet we distinguish between
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it being an ARP packet and an IP packet. There is also a count variable there
we use to request port statistics for each 5 packets we have received from
the network. Since handle_arp and handle_ip are similar functions, we
can show the most relevant one.
Listing 5.7: handle_ip()
1 def handle_ip ( dev_id , packet ) :
2 ip_packet = packet . payload
3 s r c i p = ip_packet . s r c i p
4 ds t ip = ip_packet . ds t ip
5
6 add_host ( dev_id , port , s r c i p )
7
8 i f ip_packet . f ind ( " icmp " ) :
9 handle_icmp ( dev_id , packet , ip_packet , s rc ip ,
ds t ip )
10 e l i f ip_packet . f ind ( " tcp " ) :
11 handle_tcp ( dev_id , packet , ip_packet , s rc ip , ds t ip
)
12 e l i f ip_packet . f ind ( "udp" ) :
13 handle_udp ( dev_id , packet , ip_packet , s rc ip , ds t ip
)
Handle_ip() will take a the event.id (meaning the ID of the device
that created the event) and received packet. From there it will extract
packet payload, and the source and destination IP. By looking at the packet
payload we find what kind of protocol the packet is using and forward it
to the appropriate function. We also use the function add_host() to map
IP-PORT-DEVICE that will be used and covered in a later subsection.
Handling protocols
Once an IP packet has been parsed it will be sent to one of the three possi-
ble handle functions: handle_icmp(), handle_tcp and handle_udp. Again
these functions are very similar and covering one of them should be enough
to understand the implementation of the other two.
Handle_udp() will take device ID, the received packet, the packet payload
(ip_packet), source and destination address. From the function will:
Listing 5.8: handle_udp()
1 def handle_udp ( dev_id , packet , ip_packet , s rc ip , ds t ip
) :
2 udp = ip_packet . payload
3 s r c p o r t = udp . s r c p o r t
4 ds tpor t = udp . ds tpor t
5 x = "%s DevID : %s UDP: pkt %s > %s , ip %s > %s :
srcp %s dstp %s " % ( timestamp ( ) , dev_id , packet .
src , packet . dst , s rc ip , dst ip , srcport , ds tpor t )
40
6
7 i f l a y e r 1 _ c o r r e c t :
8 print x
9 i f checker :
10 v i o l a t i o n = checker . c h e c k _ i f _ l e g a l ( x )
11 decider ( v i o l a t i o n , x )
From there it will extract the payload from the IP packet. This payload
(udp) contains the source and destination ports used. From there we create
the string "x" that we then print out and use to check against the network
policy with the checker if we still hold that layer1 or Question A is correct.
This means that we will only print out or check network packet while we
don’t have an answer for Question A.
Forward packet for checking
We check packets by using the checker and the function checker.check_if_legal()
as seen in the code above. Once the function returns a boolean, we will
use it to gauge the next decision for the program, namely keep listening
or move down the decision tree? The function decider() that receives this
boolean value from violation_checker will be covered during Question B:
Implementation.
Mapping IP-PORT-DEVICE
We map this relationship using the add_host() function. The functions start
by checking if we already have the IP inside the dictionary, as we don’t
want to map the same IP address twice.
Listing 5.9: add_host()
1 def add_host ( dev , port , ip ) :
2 global dev_port_ip
3 global known_maps
4 i f ip in known_maps :
5 return
6
7 . . . update host . . .
8
9 i n f o = { }
10 i n f o [ ip ] = port
11 i n f o [ port ] = ip
12 dev_port_ip [ dev ] = i n f o
13 known_maps . append ( ip ) # j u s t map once
Then we map the IP to a port, and port to an IP for that device ID. We




We covered during _handlePacketIn() function that every 5 packets we
request port data. The function send_request() covers this by simply
looping trough the network device connections that OpenFlow keeps and
sends a request message for the port data.
Listing 5.10: send_request()
1 def send_requests ( ) :
2 for con in core . openflow . _connect ions . values ( ) :
3 con . send ( of . o f p _ s t a t s _ r e q u e s t ( body=of .
o f p _ p o r t _ s t a t s _ r e q u e s t ( ) ) )
After the requests are sent we wait for the listener handle_port_stats()
to catch the event.
Handle port statistics
Handle_port_stats() will handle the port statistics sent back to the con-
troller. We use it to update how many packets and bytes each IP has sent
and received.
Listing 5.11: handle_port_stats()
1 def h a n d l e _ p o r t _ s t a t s ( event ) :
2 s t a t s = event . s t a t s
3 for s t a t in s t a t s :
4 i f dev_port_ip . get ( dpid_to_s t r ( event . dpid ) ) : # i f
e n t r y e x i s t s
5 i f dev_port_ip . get ( dpid_to_s t r ( event . dpid ) ) .
get ( s t a t . port_no ) : # i f e n t r y e x i s t s
6 add_port_entry ( dev_port_ip [ dpid_to_s t r ( event
. dpid ) ] [ s t a t . port_no ] , s t a t . tx_bytes ,
s t a t . rx_bytes , s t a t . tx_packets , s t a t .
rx_packets )
7 i f l a y e r 1 _ c o r r e c t :
8 i f checker :
9 v i o l a t i o n = checker . c h e c k _ i f _ p o r t s _ l e g a l (
ip_bytes_sent , ip_bytes_recv ,
ip_packets_sent , ip_packets_recv )
10 decider ( v i o l a t i o n , None )
We first extract the stats from the event and if we already have
mapped this device, port and IP in the IP-PORT-DEVICE relationship,
we keep and update that stored relationship with the new port stats
using add_port_entry(). Again if we are still looking for a violation to
layer1 or Question A, we check the new port data against the rules with
violation_checker, and take the response to the decider to see what to do
next.
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5.2.4 Question A - Part 2: Describe Intended Behaviour
This section covers how the policy is read, parsed, stored and how it
will be interpreted by the program. These things are handled by the
Violation_Checker class violation_checker.py. We can start by explaining
the key variables that violation_checker.py (hereby referred to as VC). VC
keeps track of a few things from the init() phase; policy hostnames and IP,
the relationship between the two, the policy rules in string type and the
same policy rule parsed and stored into python dictionaries.
Reading policy files
Once the correct variables have been created, the VC init() will call
read_policy_folder() function that will read all the policy files in the
policies directory. The function reads every file with .pol extension in
the directory and for each line in the file it will distinguish between host
declaration line or policy rule, and will ignore comment lines.
Listing 5.12: read_policy_folder()
1 def r e a d _ p o l i c y _ f o l d e r ( s e l f , pol icy_path ) :
2 . . .
3 for l i n e in l i n e s :
4 i f re . match ( r ’ ^.+\ s+=\s +.+ ’ , l i n e ) : #
i n t e r p r e t h o s t s
5 match = re . match ( r ’ ^ ( . + ) \s+=\s + ( . + ) ’ , l i n e
)
6 s e l f . p o l i c y _ h o s t s _ i p [ match . group ( 2 ) ] =
match . group ( 1 )
7 e l f . policy_hosts_name [ match . group ( 1 ) ] =
match . group ( 2 )
8 e l i f re . match ( r ’^Date ’ , l i n e ) or re . match ( r ’
Time ’ , l i n e ) or re . match ( r ’^Vlan ’ , l i n e ) or
re . match ( r ’^Data ’ , l i n e ) :
9 s e l f . p o l i c y _ r u l e s . append ( l i n e )
10 s e l f . p o l i c y _ r u l e s _ v a l u e s . append ( s e l f .
in terpre t_b lock_and_opt ions ( l i n e ) )
The host declarations will be mapped into the appropriate dictionaries, it
will be bidirectional so that we can extract the hostname from IP and vice-
versa. If the line is a policy rule, it will both store the string and store
the parsed version of the rule by calling the interpret_bloc_and_options()
function that will parse each rule according to its type.
The flow of interpreting policy rules
We can visualize the parsing of each line read by read_policy_folder()
through the use of a flow chart such as that on (Figure 5.1)
Once the program reaches one of the end interpret_ruletype_rule() it
will return its result back down to read_policy_folder() which will append
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Figure 5.1: Flow for parsing each rule
the parsed rule to the stored list we keep, policy_rules_values.
Interpreting Time policy rules
Since Time, Date and Vlan rules are parsed and stored very similarly it will
be enough to cover how Time is parsed, and thereby also explaining the
method of parsing for the other two. We can see the structure of the Time
policy rule again for reference:
Listing 5.13: Time rule examples
1 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2 prot TCP
sport 4000 dport 5001
2 Time 09 :30 to 20 :00 block host1 to host2 prot UDP
3 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block h2 prot TCP
4 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block h3 to 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 3
Once interpret_bloc_and_options() receives policy rule line it will
parse it at different stages. The stages are:
Decide protocol type:
The first thing the function does is check what protocol the rule may be
referring too, i.e. what has been specified in the rule? The function accounts
for many different protocol types (TCP, UDP, ARP, ICMP) and even some
self defined ones for tool specific uses.
Listing 5.14: interpret_bloc_and_options()
1 def in terpre t_b lock_and_opt ions ( s e l f , r u l e ) :
2 prot = { }
3 i f " prot TCP" in r u l e :
4 prot [ " prot " ] = "TCP"
5 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ p r i m i t i v e ( prot , r u l e )
6 . . .
7 e l i f " Data " in r u l e :
8 prot [ " prot " ] = " Data "
9 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ p r i m i t i v e ( prot , r u l e )
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10 e lse :
11 prot [ " prot " ] = "TCP/UDP/ICMP"
12 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ p r i m i t i v e ( prot , r u l e )
Specifying protocol type is most important for the Time and Date rule.
Because we are testing packets and later creating packets, we need to know
what protocol to use when automator.py creates new packets and what
packets to filter out when VC test packets for violations. Also note that if
no protocol is specified in a Time or Date rule, we assume that the rule is
referring to ICMP, TCP and UDP packets, and should trigger at each one of
them.
Decide rule type:
The last thing interpret_bloc_and_options() does before returning is call
the second function in the parsing logic. Calling interpret_primitive() will
distinguish between the different rule types/primitives such as Time, Date,
Vlan and Data, and send them to type/primitive specific rule functions that
will interpret such rules.
Listing 5.15: interpret_bloc_and_options()
1 def i n t e r p r e t _ p r i m i t i v e ( s e l f , prot , r u l e ) :
2 i f " Time " in r u l e :
3 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ t i m e _ r u l e ( prot , r u l e )
4 . . .
5 e l i f " Data " in r u l e :
6 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ d a t a _ r u l e ( prot , r u l e )
7 e lse :
8 pass
Parse Time policy rule:
The interpret_time_rule() function is the second last step in parsing a Time
rule. It will firstly create a dictionary and store both the rule type (Time)
and the policy rule string. After that we will need two regexe matches;
one that specifies connection between two hosts (Time rule 1,2 and 4 in the
Listing 5.8 above) and one that just specifies a host to block (Time rule 3 in
the same Listing).
Listing 5.16: interpret_time_rule()
1 def i n t e r p r e t _ t i m e _ r u l e ( s e l f , prot , r u l e ) :
2 r e t _ d i c t = { }
3 r e t _ d i c t [ " rule_type " ] = " Time "
4 r e t _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ] = r u l e
5 match = re . search ( r ’^Time\s +(?P< s t a r t _ t i m e >.+)\s+
to\s +(?P<end_time >.+)\s+block\s +(?P<from >.+)\s+
to\s +(?P<to >\S+)\s+ ’ , r u l e )
6 i f match :
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7 options = s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ o p t i o n s ( r u l e )
8 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( r e t _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
match . groupdict ( ) . i tems ( ) ) )
9 return s e l f . merge_dicts ( prot , r e t _ d i c t , opt ions )
10 e lse :
11 match = re . search ( r ’^Time\s +(?P< s t a r t _ t i m e >.+)\s
+to\s +(?P<end_time >.+)\s+block\s +(?P<from>\S
+)\s+ ’ , r u l e )
12 i f match :
13 opt ions = s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ o p t i o n s ( r u l e )
14 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( r e t _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
match . groupdict ( ) . i tems ( ) ) )
15 return s e l f . merge_dicts ( prot , r e t _ d i c t ,
opt ions )
16 e lse :
17 return None
As we can see in the code above, the function will extract values such
as time interval (start and end), and specify if it is a connection we want
blocked or just a host. From there we need to extract additional values for
TCP and UDP related rules, this is covered in the next sub section.
Parse Time rule options:
You can also note that we use a method interpret_options(). The functions
will read the line and look for UDP and TCP specific options, this means
ports and flags.
Listing 5.17: interpret_options()
1 def i n t e r p r e t _ o p t i o n s ( s e l f , r u l e ) :
2 match = re . search ( r ’ spor t\s +(?P<sport > .+)\s+dport\
s +(?P<dport > .+) ’ , r u l e )
3 i f match :
4 return match . groupdict ( )
5 e lse :
6 . . .
Once the options are found, we can merge the three different dictionar-
ies we have prot (stored the rule protocol), ret_dict (stored the rule type spe-
cific data) and options (stored TCP and UDP specific data, such as ports).
Lastly we merge these three dictionaries with merge_dicts() which was cre-
ated to merge three dictionaries into one.
Listing 5.18: merge_dicts()
1 def merge_dicts ( s e l f , prot , type_dic t , opt ions ) :
2 r e t _ d i c t = { }
3 i f options :
4 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( prot . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
t y p e _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t ( opt ions . i tems ( ) ) )
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5 e lse :
6 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( prot . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
t y p e _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) )
7 return r e t _ d i c t
Once the dictionary has been merged we return it down the many
returns back to the read policy_file_folder() (read_policy_folder <- in-
terpret_block_and_options <- interpret_primitve <- interpret_time_rule)
function, and append the parsed policy rule to our policy_rules_values list
that stores all the different parsed policy rules.
Interpreting and Parse Data policy rules
Data rules are bit different then the other ones, here we need to convert
the limit and size notation into number of bytes. We need this because port
statistic data from OpenFlow ofp_port_stats message[13] is returned in bytes
and not KB, MB and greater size notations. Everything will be similar until
we reach the interpret_data_rule(). To recap data rules look like:
Listing 5.19: Data policy rules
1 Data 1 KB to host1
2 Data 1000 b from host2
3 Data 10 KB to 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 0
Where "to host1" means how much data host1 can receive and "from
host2" means how much data host2 can send. The parse function for data
rules work by extraction values such as data limit, data notation type and
from/to.
Listing 5.20: interpret_data_rules()
1 def i n t e r p r e t _ d a t a _ r u l e ( s e l f , prot , r u l e ) :
2 r e t _ d i c t = { }
3 r e t _ d i c t [ " rule_type " ] = " Data "
4 r e t _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ] = r u l e
5 match = re . search ( r ’^Data\s +(?P<lim >.+)\s +(?P<
notat ion >.+)\s+from\s +(?P<from >.+) ’ , r u l e )
6 i f match :
7 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( r e t _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
match . groupdict ( ) . i tems ( ) ) )
8 return s e l f . merge_dicts ( prot , r e t _ d i c t , { } )
9 e lse :
10 match = re . search ( r ’^Data\s +(?P<lim >.+)\s +(?P<
notat ion >.+)\s+to\s +(?P<to > .+) ’ , r u l e )
11 i f match :
12 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( r e t _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
match . groupdict ( ) . i tems ( ) ) )
13 return s e l f . merge_dicts ( prot , r e t _ d i c t , { } )
14 e lse :
15 return None
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As in the interpret_time_rule() the function will return a merged
dictionary all the way down to the read_policy_folder() and append the
newly parsed rule into the policy_rules_values list.
5.2.5 Question A - Part 3: Match Actual Behaviour against
Intended behaviour
Once the policy rules have been interpreted and stored into python dictio-
naries we can use them to match rules against live network behaviour. This
would in turn mean matching rules against packets.
Parsing network packets
The first step in matching is to parse a packet into usable data, and we
do this trough the check_if_legal() function. The function has a series of
regexe expressions for different packet types, e.g. ICMP packet.
Listing 5.21: ICMP packet parsing in check_if_legal()
1 def c h e c k _ i f _ l e g a l ( s e l f , dump_string ) :
2 i f "ICMP" in dump_string :
3 match = re . match ( r ’ ^.+\ s+DevID :\ s +(?P<devID >.+)\
s +(?P<prot > .+) :\ s+pkt\s +(?P<pktsrc > .+)\s+>\s
+(?P<pktdst > .+) ,\ s+ip\s +(?P<ipsrc > .+)\s+>\s
+(?P<ipdst > .+) :\ s +(?P<ping_type >.+) ’ ,
dump_string )
4 match_dict = match . groupdict ( )
5 v i o l a t i o n = s e l f . check_icmp ( match_dict ,
dump_string )
Using this method we can also parse the other packet types we need
to match (UDP, TCP and ARP). Once this is done we send them to the
next appropriate function. These functions are check_icmp(), check_udp()
and check_tcp(), which we choose based on what packet type/protocol the
check_if_legal() function received.
Flow chart for checking packets against rules
From check_if_legal() the flow on (Figure 5.2) follows.
We see on the flow chart that each packet tested has two results "True"
or "False". Either the packet will violate a rule or it will not.
Match packet against rules
When the packet has been parsed and sent to one of the three appropriate
functions, we start to match the packet against all the stored rules. Since
the three functions are very similar we will show how check_udp() works
since it covers all of the main issues of matching packets. In matching a
packet against a rule we need to cover 4 things. For each rule we have
stored we need to:
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Figure 5.2: Flow for checking packets
1. Extract correct IP from hostnames
2. Compare if packet IPs match the rule IPs
3. Compare if packet ports match the rule ports
4. Check if packet is inside the rules time or date interval
Step 1: Extract IP from hostnames
In the code snippet we can see the function first distinguishes each rule to
the correct protocol, and then we extract the correct IPs.
Listing 5.22: Step 1: check_udp()
1 def check_udp ( s e l f , packet_dic t , p a c k e t _ s t r i n g ) :
2 for r u l e _ d i c t in s e l f . p o l i c y _ r u l e s _ v a l u e s :
3 i f "UDP" in r u l e _ d i c t [ " prot " ] : # r u l e may miss
t h e s e keys , t h e r e f o r use g e t −> w i l l r e t u r n
None i f k ey i s non e x i s t e n t
4 r _ s r c = None
5 r_ds t = None
6 match = re . match ( r ’\d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d
{ 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } ’ , r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " from " ) )
7 i f match :
8 r _ s r c = r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " from " )
9 e lse :
10 r _ s r c = s e l f . policy_hosts_name . get ( r u l e _ d i c t
. get ( " from " ) )
11 i f r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " ) :
12 match = re . match ( r ’\d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d
{ 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } ’ , r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " ) )
13 i f match :
14 r_ds t = r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " )
15 e lse :
16 r_ds t = s e l f . policy_hosts_name . get (
r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " ) )
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If the policy rule contains an IP we use that, but if we see a hostname we
extract it from our stored hostname to the IP dictionary (policy_hosts_name)
we created from reading the policy file.
Step 2: Compare packet IP vs. rule IP
Once we have the correct IP value for rule source and/or destination
(destination is optional in writing rules), we can match them against that
of the packet. This is done by the check_rule_and_packet() function.
Listing 5.23: check_rule_and_packet()
1 def check_rule_and_packet ( s e l f , r_src , p_src , r_dst ,
p_dst ) :
2 r e t 1 = s e l f . check_two_values ( r_src , p_src )
3 r e t 2 = s e l f . check_two_values ( r_dst , p_dst )
4 i f r e t 1 and r e t 2 :
5 return r e t 1 and r e t 2
6 e lse :
7 r e t 1 = s e l f . check_two_values ( r_dst , p_src )
8 r e t 2 = s e l f . check_two_values ( r_src , p_dst )
9 return r e t 1 and r e t 2
This function has a somewhat complicated logic, but I will try to explain
it below. We can have two situations one the packet matches the rule com-
pletely. Rule source matches packet source, and rule destination matches
packet destination. However, this covers the connections communication
only one way, what about the reply to the communication? In order to
accomplish, we also need to match where rule destination matches packet
source and rule source matches packet destination. We also have to remem-
ber that rule source and destination can be a "*"-value, meaning that it can
be anything, and rule destination can also be a null value, meaning we have
specified a communication between two host, but rather just blocked one
host (source). We handle this by using check_two_values() function:
Listing 5.24: check_two_values()
1 def check_two_values ( s e l f , ru le_val , packet_val ) :
2 i f r u l e _ v a l == " * " or r u l e _ v a l == None :
3 return True
4 e lse :
5 return r u l e _ v a l == packet_val
Both of these functions return a boolean value to the caller, and the
caller (this case: check_rule_and_packet()) will check ports. If True or
check the next stored rule if False.
Listing 5.25: Step 2 and 3: In check_udp()
1 i f s e l f . check_rule_and_packet ( r_src , p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
i p s r c " ] , r_dst , p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " ipds t " ] ) :
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2 i f s e l f . check_ports ( r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " spor t " ) ,
p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " s r c _ p o r t " ] , r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " dport " ) ,
p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " ds t_por t " ] ) :
Step 3: Compare packet ports vs. rule ports
The next function we need to use is one that will compare packet and rule
ports. The function is called check_ports():
Listing 5.26: check_ports()
1 def check_ports ( s e l f , r_sport , p_sport , r_dport ,
p_dport ) :
2 r e t 1 = s e l f . check_two_values ( r_sport , p_sport )
3 r e t 2 = s e l f . check_two_values ( r_dport , p_dport )
4 return r e t 1 and r e t 2
You will notice that while in check_rule_and_packet() we had to
compare these two in two possible situations; the request and reply.
Here, for the sake of simplicity, we will only check if rule and packet
source/destination port match and not cover the other side of the
communication of this connection. This means that the user has to specify
this with two different rules if he wants to cover both way communication
when also matching a connection with ports specified in the rule. Example:
Listing 5.27: check_ports()
1 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block H1 to H2 prot TCP sport
41238 dport 5001
2 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block H2 to H1 prot TCP sport 5001
dport 41238
Step 4: Check time and date intervals
Once we have covered all the similar rule properties such as IPs and ports,
we can look at what differentiates the rules, by taking the time time or date
interval and check if the packet time is between the two ends (start - end).
These to rule types and how we handle them are very similar, so for con-
venience we will only cover the Time-rule.
First we need to distinguish the rule between Time or Date, this is done
by check_time_or_date() function.
Listing 5.28: check_time_or_date()
1 def check_time_or_date ( s e l f , rule , packet ,
p a c k e t _ s t r i n g ) :
2 match = re . search ( r ’ ^(?P<date >\S+)\s +(?P<time >\S+)\
s+ ’ , p a c k e t _ s t r i n g ) # e x t r a c t d a t e and t ime from
p a c k e t t imes tamp
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3 i f r u l e [ " rule_type " ] == " Time " :
4 i f match :
5 mdict = match . groupdict ( )
6 packet_time = time . s t rpt ime ( mdict . get ( " time " )
, "%H:%M:%S " )
7 r u l e _ s t a r t _ t i m e = time . s t rpt ime ( r u l e . get ( "
s t a r t _ t i m e " ) , "%H:%M" )
8 rule_end_time = time . s t rpt ime ( r u l e . get ( "
end_time " ) , "%H:%M" )
9
10 i f packet_time >= r u l e _ s t a r t _ t i m e and
packet_time <= rule_end_time :
11 return True
12 e lse :
13 return Fa lse
14 e l i f r u l e [ " rule_type " ] == " Date " :
15 . . .
Then we extract the day and timestamp from the packet string. Using
this we convert both the time-rule interval and packet time into python
time objects. Now we have a way of comparing if the packet violates a time
or date rule. This takes us to the last step in checking if a packet violates a
rule.
Listing 5.29: Step 4: In check_udp()
1 r e t = s e l f . check_time_or_date ( r u l e _ d i c t ,
packet_dic t , p a c k e t _ s t r i n g )
2
3 i f r e t :
4 return r u l e _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ]
The code snippet above shows that we return the rule text if we find
a violation. We use this later in check_if_legal() to see if a true violation
is found, meaning the packet has been forwarded or replied to. Lastly, we
mark lastly mark this packet in the violation list (v_packet), and finally call
the function check_for_violation() to discover if this packet has created a
violation on the network.
Listing 5.30: Last step in check_if_legal()
1 i f v i o l a t i o n :
2 s t r i n g _ d i c t = { }
3 s t r i n g _ d i c t [ " p a c k e t _ s t r i n g " ] = dump_string
4 r u l e _ d i c t = { }
5 r u l e _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ] = v i o l a t i o n
6 r e s _ d i c t = s e l f . merge_dicts ( match_dict , s t r i n g _ d i c t
, r u l e _ d i c t )
7 s e l f . v_packets . append ( r e s _ d i c t )
8 i f s e l f . c h e c k _ f o r _ v i o l a t i o n ( r e s _ d i c t ) :
9 return True
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10 return Fa lse
You can also note that this will return a True boolean or False to
sdn_dump.py based on what it discovers in check_for_violation().
Discovering a violation
To find a violation we have captured and marked 2 packets for violation.
A violation would be that a marked packet has been forwarded from one
network device to another, or that we see two marked packets on the
same device, a request and reply. We solve this by using the function
check_for_violations(), which receives dictionary of the last violated
packet we found and marked. We use that dictionary to check it against
all other marked packets and look for a relation. We also need to note
if the packet is an ICMP or TCP/UDP. This would involve two different
cases, one where we look at ICMP reply code, and one where we look at
the port numbers. For simplification we will cover how we find an ICMP
violation. First we loop through all the marked packets and look for where
the marked packet we sent in as a parameter and the packet in the list has
equal protocol.
Listing 5.31: Step 1: check_for_violation()
1 def c h e c k _ f o r _ v i o l a t i o n ( s e l f , p a c k e t _ d i c t ) :
2 for vpacket in s e l f . v_packets : # f o r v i o l a t i n g
p a c k e t in v i o l a t i o n l i s t
3 i f vpacket [ " prot " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " prot " ] :
4 . . .
Finding a violating reply
A violating reply is found when we see a marked reply packet on the same
device as we have marked a request packet, but the reply packet should
have switched reply code and IPs (Figure 5.3).
Figure 5.3: Discovering a reply violation
We can see this done in the code listing, for each marked packet we
check the devID matches with our last marked packet. Then we ensure that
the IPs are switched and finally we ensure that this is a reply to a marked
packet.
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Listing 5.32: Step 2.1: check_for_violation() Find Reply
1 i f vpacket [ " devID " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " devID " ] : # p a c k e t
r e p l y on same d e v i c e
2 i f vpacket [ " i p s r c " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " ipds t " ] and
vpacket [ " ipds t " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " i p s r c " ] : # i s
i t a r e p l y
3 i f vpacket [ " prot " ] == "ICMP" :
4 i f " 8 " in vpacket [ " ping_type " ] and " 0 " in
p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " ping_type " ] : # ping t y p e i s a
r e p l y
5 . . . print output . . .
6 i f vpacket in s e l f . v_packets :
7 s e l f . v_packets . remove ( vpacket )
8 i f p a c k e t _ d i c t in s e l f . v_packets :
9 s e l f . v_packets . remove ( p a c k e t _ d i c t )
10 return True
11 e lse :
12 . . . UDP/TCP . . .
13 e lse :
14 . . . d i f f e r e n t device , check forwarding . . .
Once we have found a Reply Violation we print out the data, as shown
in Listing 5.33:
Listing 5.33: Reply Violation Found
1 ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET RETURN ##
2 > Packet : Sun 0 7 : 2 9 : 5 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP :
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
3 > Packet : Sun 0 7 : 2 9 : 5 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP :
pkt ae : 7 e : 2 7 : 1 5 : 9 b : 9 8 > 3e : 8 b : 5 d : 6 5 : 1 1 : d9 , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
4 v i o l a t e s :
5 > Rule : Date MON to SUN block host1 to host2
We want to keep the list small and don’t want to fire a violation one the
same two packets again, so we remove these two packets from the list with
marked packets (v_packets). Finally we return a True or False boolean based
on what the function finds, which will make the function caller signify
sdn_dump.py about the violation.
Finding a violating forwarding
A forwarding violation is found if we see the same packet, but on two
different devices (Figure 5.4).
Listing 5.34: Step 2.2: check_for_violation() Find Forwarding
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Figure 5.4: Discovering a forwarding violation
1 i f vpacket [ " i p s r c " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " i p s r c " ] and
vpacket [ " ipds t " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " ipds t " ] : # p a c k e t
has be en f o r w a r d e d
2 i f vpacket [ " prot " ] == "ICMP" :
3 i f vpacket [ " ping_type " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
ping_type " ] : # ping t y p e i s a r e p l y o f
a n o t h e r
4 . . . print output . . .
5 i f vpacket in s e l f . v_packets :
6 s e l f . v_packets . remove ( vpacket )
7 i f p a c k e t _ d i c t in s e l f . v_packets :
8 s e l f . v_packets . remove ( p a c k e t _ d i c t )
9 return True
10 e lse :
11 . . . UDP/TCP . . .
Again, the action would be to delete the two violation packets from
the marked packet list and return a boolean value to signify what has
occurred, which will make the function caller signify sdn_dump.py about
the violation.
Listing 5.35: Forward Violation Found
1 ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET FORWARDING ##
2 > Packet : Sun 0 7 : 2 5 : 1 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP :
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
3 > Packet : Sun 0 7 : 2 5 : 1 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP :
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
4 v i o l a t e s :
5 > Rule : Date MON to SUN block host1 to host2
Matching a host data transmission against rules
sdn_dump.py also has the ability to check device port data against a net-
work policy. It does this by forwarding its stored and sorted port data to
the VC’s check_if_ports_legal() function. The sorted data comes in form of
dictionaries where a host IP is linked to a byte amount, there are four such
dictionaries byte sent (bsent) and received (brecv), and the same for packet
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sent (psent) and received (precv).
We have two possible rules for the Data-rule, one that says how much we
can send and one that says how much we can receive. They are handled
very similarly so we will show the one with receive restriction for conve-
nience.
Listing 5.36: Data-rule examples
1 Data 1000 b from host2 # How much host 2 can send
2 Data 10 KB to 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 0 # How much 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 0 can
recv
check_if_ports_legal() works by looping through all the rules that are
of the Data-type and firstly extracting the IP address from the rule.
Listing 5.37: Step 1: check_if_ports_legal()
1 def c h e c k _ i f _ p o r t s _ l e g a l ( s e l f , bsent , brecv , psent ,
precv ) :
2 r u l e _ i p = None
3 for r u l e in s e l f . p o l i c y _ r u l e s _ v a l u e s :
4 i f " Data " in r u l e [ " rule_type " ] :
5 i f " to " in r u l e : # what t h e IP can r e c v
6 match = re . match ( r ’\d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d
{ 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } ’ , r u l e . get ( " to " ) )
7 i f match :
8 r u l e _ i p = r u l e . get ( " to " )
9 e lse :
10 r u l e _ i p = s e l f . policy_hosts_name . get ( r u l e .
get ( " to " ) )
From the code above this flow on (Figure 5.5) follows.
Figure 5.5: Flow for checking data transmission
Once we have an IP from the rule we check if it matches any of the IPs
in the stored data in how much bytes has been received by each IP. If we
find one, we extract the limit set by the rule and convert that into bytes.
Listing 5.38: Step 2: check_if_ports_legal()
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1 # We now know t h e r u l e IP , l e t s match i t a g a i s n t
a c t u a l p o r t s t a t s
2 for r e c v _ s t a t in brecv :
3 i f r e c v _ s t a t == r u l e _ i p :
4 r u l e _ b y t e s = s e l f .
conv er t_no ta t ion _ to_byt es ( r u l e . get ( "
lim " ) , r u l e . get ( " nota t ion " ) )
5 i f i n t ( r u l e _ b y t e s ) < i n t ( brecv [ r e c v _ s t a t
] ) :
6 . . . print output . . .
7 return True
8 e l i f " from " in r u l e : # what t h e IP can send
9 . . . handle sent data r e s t r i c t i o n s . . .
We then look at how much bytes the host can receive (rule_bytes) and
how much the host has received (brecv[recv_stat]). If the host has received
more than allowed, print an output on it and return a True boolean.
Converting rule limitation into bytes
The function convert_notation_to_bytes() will convert the rule limitation
into bytes. The rule can have many different size notations (B, KB, MB etc.)
and we need to be able to understand them all.
Listing 5.39: convert_notation_to_bytes()
1 def con ver t_no ta t ion _ to_by tes ( s e l f , lim , nota t ion ) :
2 nota t ion = nota t ion . upper ( )
3 i f nota t ion == "B" :
4 return i n t ( lim )
5 e l i f nota t ion == "KB" :
6 return i n t ( lim ) * 1024
7 e l i f nota t ion == "MB" :
8 return i n t ( lim ) * 1024 * 1024
9 e l i f nota t ion == "GB" :
10 return i n t ( lim ) * 1024 * 1024 * 1024
11 e l i f nota t ion == "TB" :
12 return i n t ( lim ) * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024
13 e lse :
14 return 0
We see that for each increment in the size notation we multiply with
1024 more bytes. In the end if a violation is found at this level, we print out
such an output and notify sdn_dump.py.
Listing 5.40: Data Violation Found
1 ## P o l i c y V i o l a t i o n Found : RECEIVED TO MUCH DATA ##
2 > IP : 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 address rece ived : 1230 bytes
3 > IP : 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 can only r e c e i v e : 1024 bytes
4 v i o l a t e s :
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5 > Rule : Data 1 KB to host1
5.2.6 Question A - Part 4: Automate Test Packets
The last part of Question A: automate network behaviour for the user. Our
automator.py class will handle this section by getting the parsed rules from
violation_checker.py and then creating and sending packets that would
violate such rules.
Starting automation
We start the automator.py giving the __init()__ function the parsed rules
from violation_checker.py, the rule strings themselves, the links between
host and IP address, and lastly how many switches our network contains.
Listing 5.41: Automator.py __init()__
1 def _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , ru les , ru les_values , host_ips ,
host_names , switch ) :
2 s e l f . r u l e s = r u l e s
3 s e l f . r u l e s _ v a l u e s = r u l e s _ v a l u e s
4 s e l f . hos t_ ips = hos t_ ips
5 s e l f . host_names = host_names
6 s e l f . switch_count = 0
7 s e l f . s w i t c h _ l i m i t = i n t ( switch )
8 core . openflow . addListenerByName ( " ConnectionUp "
, s e l f . _handle_ConnectionUp )
We also set a switch count to 0 and assign a listener to ConnectionUp
OpenFlow events. We want to wait with packet creation untill the last
switch has turned on the network, before starting the automation of packet
creation. We solve this by counting is ConnectionUp event until we reach a
the switch limit, at which point we start the type_decider() function which
will create a packet for each rule.
Listing 5.42: _handle_ConnectionUp()
1 def _handle_ConnectionUp ( s e l f , event ) :
2 s e l f . switch_count += 1
3 i f s e l f . switch_count == s e l f . s w i t c h _ l i m i t :
4 s e l f . type_decider ( event )
Decision maker
The type_decider() function will initiate creation and sending of test
packets. It is done by looping through all the rules and looking at what
protocol the rule encompass. E.g. an ICMP packet creation and sending is
done by this code snippet:
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Listing 5.43: type_decider() ICMP creation
1 def type_decider ( s e l f , event ) :
2 for r u l e in s e l f . r u l e s _ v a l u e s :
3 i f "ICMP" in r u l e [ " prot " ] :
4 s r c = s e l f . hostname_to_ip_for_from ( r u l e )
5 dst = s e l f . hostname_to_ip_for_to ( r u l e )
6 ping = s e l f . c rea te_ping ( src , dst )
7 s e l f . send_packets ( event , ping )
8 e l i f "UDP" in r u l e [ " prot " ] :
9 . . .
If a rule can be tested by using ICMP packets, we extract the source and
destination address. We then create a ping payload by using the function
create_ping() and lastly send the packet using send_packets() function.
Creating UDP and TCP packet very similar, but we also need to extract
the source and destination port from the rules, and use their respective
payload creating functions create_udp() and create_tcp().
Create ICMP
Creating the ICMP is handled by create_ping() function. We first create
the ICMP payload and then we need to add it to the IP payload, finally we
return the packet to the caller function for sending.
Listing 5.44: create_ping()
1 def create_ping ( s e l f , src , dst ) :
2 # Make a p ing r e q u e s t :
3 icmp = pkt . icmp ( )
4 icmp . type = pkt . TYPE_ECHO_REQUEST
5 echo = pkt . ICMP . echo ( payload = " 0123456789 " )
6 icmp . payload = echo
7
8 # C r e a t e IP p a c k e t
9 ip = pkt . ipv4 ( )
10 ip . protoco l = ip . ICMP_PROTOCOL
11 ip . s r c i p = IPAddr ( s r c )
12 ip . ds t ip = IPAddr ( dst )
13 ip . payload = icmp
14 return ip
Note that we need to use pkt.TYPE_ECHO_REQUEST as ICMP type
for the packet, and we need to specify the IP protocol on the IP packet as
ip.ICMP_PROTOCOL. The ICMP type and IP protocol specification and no
port numbers are the major differences between this function at the two
other creation functions (create UDP or TCP).
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Create UDP
Creating UDP packets works very similar to creating ICMP packets. We
first create the UDP payload, add it to the IP payload and return this to the
caller function.
Listing 5.45: create_udp()
1 def create_udp ( s e l f , src , dst , sport , dport ) :
2 # C r e a t e UDP p a c k e t :
3 udp = pkt . udp ( )
4 udp . s r c p o r t = i n t ( spor t )
5 udp . ds tpor t = i n t ( dport )
6
7 # C r e a t e t h e IP :
8 ip = pkt . ipv4 ( )
9 ip . protoco l = ip .UDP_PROTOCOL
10 ip . s r c i p = IPAddr ( s r c )
11 ip . ds t ip = IPAddr ( dst )
12 ip . payload = udp
13 return ip
Note that in line 4 and 5 set source and destination port in the UDP
payload and then set UDP as the IP protocol for the IP packet.
Create TCP
TCP packets have a bit more to them, we need to set both port and IP, but
also SYN flag, SEQ and ACK numbers, window size and data offset number.
Listing 5.46: create_tcp()
1 def c r e a t e _ t c p ( s e l f , src , dst , sport , dport ) :
2 # C r e a t e TCP :
3 tcp = pkt . tcp ( )
4 tcp . s r c p o r t = i n t ( spor t )
5 tcp . ds tpor t = i n t ( dport )
6 tcp . _ s e t f l a g ( tcp . SYN_flag , 1 )
7 tcp . seq = 0
8 tcp . ack = 0
9 tcp . win = 1
10 tcp . o f f = 5
11
12 # C r e a t e t h e IP :
13 ip = pkt . ipv4 ( )
14 ip . protoco l = ip .TCP_PROTOCOL
15 ip . s r c i p = IPAddr ( s r c )
16 ip . ds t ip = IPAddr ( dst )
17 ip . payload = tcp
18 return ip
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Again note the IP protocol changes to TCP in the IP packet on line 14 in
the listing.
Sending created packet
Finally after each one of the packet payloads have been created we need
to send the packet. send_packets() function does this for us. Firstly we
create ethernet payload that is marked as an IP packet. Then we add the
IP payload we created (ICMP, TCP or UDP packet returned from creation
functions).
Listing 5.47: create_tcp()
1 def send_packets ( s e l f , event , ip_packet ) :
2 # C r e a t e E t h e r n e t Pay load
3 eth = e t h e r n e t ( )
4 eth . s r c = EthAddr ( " f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f " )
5 eth . dst = EthAddr ( " f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f " )
6 eth . type = eth . IP_TYPE
7 eth . payload = ip_packet
8
9 msg = of . ofp_packet_out ( )
10 msg . data = eth . pack ( )
11 msg . in_port = of .OFPP_NONE
12 msg . a c t i o n s . append ( of . ofp_act ion_output ( port =
of .OFPP_CONTROLLER) )
13 event . connect ion . send (msg)
Note that we use a mac broadcasting since we don’t know each host’s
mac address at this point and we need some way for the network to send
the packets. A result from this is that l2_leaning controller will not create
flow tables from these packets since they don’t contain any usable mac to
create flow table entries. We could look at this as minimizing intrusion
and change on the network when we create automatic network traffic.
After that we use OpenFlow to create a OpenFlow message. We add the
ethernet payload as message data, and set of.OFPP_NONE as message
inport (meaning shouldn’t be associated with a physical port[13]) and we
set message action to be of.OFPP_CONTROLLER (meaning send packet
first to controller rather than an switch outport[13]). By sending first to
controller we can ensure that other controller apps running on the network
will also see the created packet we are sending (all applications listening to
PacketIn events).
Flow chart for sending packets
Creating and sending packets follows the flow on (Figure 5.6).
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Figure 5.6: Flow for automating packet sending
5.3 Question B: Implementation
This section aims to explain the steps taken after a violation on Question
A has been found. To recap, Question B is "Does the device state match
the policy?". This check needs to find if the network contains forwarding
loops, black holes and disconnected switches. This implementation covers
2 out of 3, with a solution to black holes missing.
5.3.1 Question B: Initiation
Once sdn_dump.py gets notified that a violation has occurred on Question
A it needs to set in motion a priority change of what to do next. We start
by stopping the sending of packets to violation_checker.py since its job is
done. We do this with the sdn_dump.py function called decider().
Listing 5.48: Question B: sdn_dump.py decider()
1 def decider ( bool_val , packet ) :
2 global l a y e r 1 _ c o r r e c t
3 global l a s t _ p a c k e t
4
5 i f bool_val :
6 l a s t _ p a c k e t = packet
7 print " ### Stage 2 : S t a r t e d ### "
8 print " Question A: No, Po l i cy does not match
a c t u a l behaviour "
9 print " Searching Question B : ’ Does po l i cy match
device s t a t e ? ’ "
10 l a y e r 1 _ c o r r e c t = Fa l se
11 con_check = check_swi tch_connec t iv i ty ( )
12 . . .
This function is used on all the functions that request a violation reply
from violation_cheker. We add the return value and the potentially
violating packet to the function. And if we have a violation (bool_val
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== True) then we set this packet as the last packet we received, and
layer1_correct variable to False. By doing this we have told sdn_dump to
stop sending more packet and transmission data to violation_checker for
checking, and we take a general connectivity check of all the switches on
the network by using the check_switch_connectivity(). This function will
return us a boolean and give us an answer to Question B. The boolean will
help us decide if we move to Question D (True/Yes) or C (False/No).
Listing 5.49: Question D: sdn_dump.py decider()
1 def decider ( bool_val , packet ) :
2 . . .
3 # R e q u e s t f l o w s t a t s ( Layer 3 Ques t i on D)
4 i f con_check : # i f Yes on q u e s t i o n B
5 print " ### Stage 3 : S t a r t e d ### "
6 print " Question B : Yes , Device s t a t e matches
Pol i cy . "
7 print " Searching Question D: ’ Does device
s t a t e match hardware ? ’ "
8 for con in core . openflow . _connect ions . values ( )
:
9 print " Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from
device " , con
10 con . send ( of . o f p _ s t a t s _ r e q u e s t ( body=of .
o f p _ f l o w _ s t a t s _ r e q u e s t ( ) ) )
If the con_check shows to be True (Yes, Device state matches Policy), we
request the flow tables of each switch on the network so we can show the
user what went wrong. We now wait for the sdn_dump to receive flow
statistics from each network device, but before that we need to cover how
the spanning tree was executed.
5.3.2 Question B: Spanning tree protocol
We also aim to solve or find issues that are frequently happening on
the device state layer, for instance network forwarding loops that would
influence the reachability on the network. As it happens POX has already
implemented a nifty controller application that uses the spanning tree
protocol, notifies and corrects every loop it finds on the network. We can
use this application by importing it from the API.
Listing 5.50: Importing Spanning Tree
1 # spanning t r e e p r o t o c o l from pox
2 import pox . openflow . discovery as discov
3 import pox . openflow . spanning_tree as spanning_tree
However we have to start the spanning tree at launch, because of its
designed and implementation. The spanning tree listens to ConnectionUp
events to graph the network links and then searches and corrects forward-
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ing loops on the network. We use the function start_spanning_tree() to
initiate the search.
Listing 5.51: Start Spanning Tree
1 def s t a r t _ s p a n n i n g _ t r e e ( ) :
2 global yet_to_do
3 i f yet_to_do :
4 print " Searching f o r forwarding loops with
spanning t r e e . . . "
5 # pox . o p e n f l o w . d i s c o v e r y
6 discov . launch ( )
7 # pox . o p e n f l o w . s p a n n i n g _ t r e e −−no−f l o o d −−ho ld−
down
8 spanning_tree . launch ( )
9 yet_to_do = Fa lse
We only want this to be done once, so we keep the yet_to_do condition
there for safety. We call this function at the sdn_dump.py launch()
functions so that it can register the ConnectionUp events from the controller
start.
5.4 Question D: Implementation
To answer Question D: "Does device state match the hardware?" we need
to identify to the user what switch, rule and port sets[2] that are erroneous.
We can do this by using the switch flow entries.
5.4.1 Find violating forwarding table entries
After we have found a violation on Question A, we need to provide the
user what is wrong on the device state layer. One possibility is to give the
operator an overview of the flow table entries that may have influenced the
network behaviour in creating a policy violation. Essentially, this means to
print out the table entries contributing the source and destination IPs that
could have been used. We can print out the flow tables from the network
devices once the flow stat request (we requested this from the decider()) has
been received and return to our handle_flow_requests() listener function.
Print out flow table entries
Once we receive the flow stats from each network device we print out the
related flow entries to our last packet. This way we show the operator what
directly is influencing the wrongful network behaviour at the switch. We
use the functions handle_flow_request() to print out each flow entries per
device.
Listing 5.52: sdn_dump.py handle_flow_request()
1 def handle_f low_requests ( event ) :
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2 s t a t s = f l o w _ s t a t s _ t o _ l i s t ( event . s t a t s )
3
4 . . . F i l t e r vars . . .
5
6 print " ## Flow Table f o r Deivce : " , event . dpid , " ##
"
7 entry = 1
8 for s t a t in s t a t s :
9 print "> Entry %d Match : " % entry
10 print s t a t [ " match " ]
11 print ">> Entry Action "
12 print s t a t [ " a c t i o n s " ]
13 print ">> Byte Count "
14 print s t a t [ " byte_count " ]
15 entry = entry + 1
Imagine we send a ping from 10.0.0.1 to 10.0.0.2 that creates a violation
and we reach Question D after l2_leaning has created a flow entry for it,
we should then find a related flow entire on the network device that show
this violation.
Listing 5.53: Flow table output
1 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 1 ##
2 . . . Other e n t r i e s . . .
3 > Entry 3 Match :
4 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ IP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l _ s r c ’ : ’
e2 : 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 1 , ’ nw_tos ’ : 0 , ’
tp_dst ’ : 0 , ’ t p _ s r c ’ : 8 , ’ d l_ds t ’ : ’ 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 :
a f ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ : IPAddr ( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ )
, ’ in_por t ’ : 1 }
5 >> Entry Action
6 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : 2 } ]
7 >> Byte Count
8 98
We have now shown how the prototype finds what packet, device,
in_port and out_port has created a violation using automation and the





6.1 Capturing Network Behaviour
sdn_dump has the ability to capture network behaviour across the
network. It does this in all three operation modes. For the sake of this
thesis, imagine a network with 2 switches that we run the controller on
and create some manual network traffic.
6.1.1 Hosts, Devices and IPs
The test networks we use will have the standard Mininet hostnames (h1,h2,
etc.), IP-addresses for these hostnames will also be (10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2, etc.)
and the device identification will be (00-00-00-00-00-01, 00-00-00-00-00-02,
etc.).
6.1.2 Capturing ICMP
In this test we are sending an ICMP packet from h1 (10.0.0.1) to h2 (10.0.0.2)
over a 2 switch network. We are monitoring the network behaviour using
sdn_dump in operation mode=1.
Listing 6.1: Monitor ICMP traffic
1 Sun 1 4 : 5 0 : 4 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt
3 2 : 1 5 : 5 4 : e1 : e9 : 8 1 > 9e : e9 : 4 a : cb : c4 : 4 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
> 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
2 Sun 1 4 : 5 0 : 4 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP : pkt
3 2 : 1 5 : 5 4 : e1 : e9 : 8 1 > 9e : e9 : 4 a : cb : c4 : 4 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
> 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
3 Sun 1 4 : 5 0 : 4 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP : pkt 9e : e9
: 4 a : cb : c4 : 4 f > 3 2 : 1 5 : 5 4 : e1 : e9 : 8 1 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
4 Sun 1 4 : 5 0 : 4 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt 9e : e9
: 4 a : cb : c4 : 4 f > 3 2 : 1 5 : 5 4 : e1 : e9 : 8 1 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
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With the monitor we can see that an ICMP request from h1 arrived
at device 1, then forwarded to device 2, which then delivered it to h2 on
Sunday 14:50:49. Using the monitor output we then see an ICMP reply
coming from h2, back the same network path device 2 -> device 1, and
arriving at h1. With the monitor we both see the date, packet path, packet
type, packet source and destination.
6.1.3 Capturing TCP
In this example we manually create TCP traffic that we can monitor using
the iperf command at the mininet terminal.
Listing 6.2: Monitor TCP traffic
1 Sun 1 4 : 5 0 : 5 6 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP : pkt
3 2 : 1 5 : 5 4 : e1 : e9 : 8 1 > 9e : e9 : 4 a : cb : c4 : 4 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
> 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 49432 dstp 5001 , seq 2611028079 ,
ack 0 , f l a g s 2
2 Sun 1 4 : 5 0 : 5 6 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP : pkt
3 2 : 1 5 : 5 4 : e1 : e9 : 8 1 > 9e : e9 : 4 a : cb : c4 : 4 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
> 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 49432 dstp 5001 , seq 2611028079 ,
ack 0 , f l a g s 2
3 Sun 1 4 : 5 0 : 5 6 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP : pkt 9e : e9 : 4
a : cb : c4 : 4 f > 3 2 : 1 5 : 5 4 : e1 : e9 : 8 1 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : srcp 5001 dstp 49432 , seq 3538410437 , ack
2611028080 , f l a g s 18
4 Sun 1 4 : 5 0 : 5 6 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP : pkt 9e : e9 : 4
a : cb : c4 : 4 f > 3 2 : 1 5 : 5 4 : e1 : e9 : 8 1 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : srcp 5001 dstp 49432 , seq 3538410437 , ack
2611028080 , f l a g s 18
As shown in the ICMP example shown above, using the sdn_dump
monitor we can see the network path a packet takes across the network.
Here we can observe that the same is true for the TCP packet with the
addition of showing protocol flags and ports.
6.1.4 Other and UNKNOWN packet types
The monitor also captures ARP and UDP packets, and will work the same
way as the two examples above. If the monitor captures a packet with
another protocol, it will print and mark it as UNKNOWN. These packets
are assumed to be OpenFlow related traffic.
6.1.5 Scalability of capturing
The monitoring mode was also tested on bigger networks. The transcript
file "mode1-10switch-ping.txt" in the appendix shows the tool monitoring
network wide traffic, while pinging from h1 to h10. Here you can see the
ping request and reply jump through 10 switches live.
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6.2 Finding Policy Violation
Using sdn_dump in operation mode 2 or 3 will command it also to check
the captured packets for policy violations. When we find a policy violation,
we will in quick succession check Question A, B and D. The result of each
of these Questions will be covered here. To capture a policy violation we
have to write an example policy we can test.
6.2.1 Question A: Finding Time violation
Let us say we want to block the h1 to h2 connection between 10:00 - 23:00.
Then the policy would read like this:
Listing 6.3: Time policy example
1 host1 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
2 host2 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
3
4 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2
This should mark ICMP, TCP and UDP communication between the
two as a policy violation. We expect the tool to warn the user if such
behaviour has occurred. The output would be like this:
Listing 6.4: Time Violation - file: ping-time-violation-found.txt
1 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
2 Mon 1 5 : 4 0 : 3 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt e2 : 7 9 :
a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 > 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 : af , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
3 Mon 1 5 : 4 0 : 3 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP : pkt e2 : 7 9 :
a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 > 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 : af , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
4 ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET FORWARDING ##
5 > Packet : Mon 1 5 : 4 0 : 3 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP :
pkt e2 : 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 > 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 : af , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
6 > Packet : Mon 1 5 : 4 0 : 3 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP :
pkt e2 : 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 > 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 : af , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
7 v i o l a t e s :
8 > Rule : Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2
We see that the application has seen an illegal packet being forwarded
across the network, and warns the user by specifying what two packets
and rule are being violated, providing us with the policy violation. We also
observe from the two packets, what device(s) the violation occurred on.
After this the tool will initiate a Question B search on the network. We will
cover this in a later subsection.
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6.2.2 Question A: Finding Date violation
Say, we would like to block h1 to h2 connection all week. Then the policy
would read like this:
Listing 6.5: Time policy example
1 host1 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
2 host2 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
3
4 Date MON to SUN block host1 to host2
This should mark ICMP, TCP and UDP packets in that week interval as
violating packets. We expect the tool to warn the user if such behaviour has
occurred. Here is a result of trying to send a TCP packet between the two
on a Sunday.
Listing 6.6: Date Violation - file: tcp-date-violation-found.txt
1 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
2 Sun 1 6 : 5 3 : 4 4 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP : pkt aa : 4 6 :
cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 58421 dstp 5001 , seq 697520508 , ack
0 , f l a g s 2
3 Sun 1 6 : 5 3 : 4 4 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP : pkt aa : 4 6 :
cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 58421 dstp 5001 , seq 697520508 , ack
0 , f l a g s 2
4 ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET FORWARDING ##
5 > Packet : Sun 1 6 : 5 3 : 4 4 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP :
pkt aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 58421 dstp 5001 , seq
697520508 , ack 0 , f l a g s 2
6 > Packet : Sun 1 6 : 5 3 : 4 4 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP :
pkt aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 58421 dstp 5001 , seq
697520508 , ack 0 , f l a g s 2
7 v i o l a t e s :
8 > Rule : Date MON to SUN block host1 to host2
Again the application sees violating behaviour, it warns the user and
points out what is wrong with the behaviour. As mentioned earlier, the
application would initiate a search on Question B.
6.2.3 Question A: Finding Data violation
In order for us to limit the number of bytes host2 can send. Then the policy
would read like this:
Listing 6.7: Time policy example
1 host1 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
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2 host2 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
3
4 Data 1000 b from host2
We expect the application to find a violation if host2 transmits more
data than allowed.
Listing 6.8: Data Violation - file: ping-data-violation-found.txt
1 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
2 Sun 1 6 : 5 6 : 1 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt c6
: 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 > aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
3 Sun 1 6 : 5 6 : 1 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt aa : 4 6 :
cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
4 ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found : SENDING TO MUCH DATA ##
5 > IP : 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 address sent : 21503948 bytes
6 > IP : 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 can only send : 1000 bytes
7 v i o l a t e s :
8 > Rule : Data 1000 b from host2
We see that after a few packets have been sent, the application will
request port data from the devices and check if host2 has transmitted more
data than allowed.
6.2.4 Question B: Checks
With Question B we are looking for loops and disconnected devices.
Checking for disconnected network devices
Following the time violation found from the transcript of "ping-time-
violation-found.txt", we get the transcript on Listing 6.9.
Listing 6.9: Time Violation: Step 2 - file: ping-time-violation-found.txt
1 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
2 ### Stage 2 : S t a r t e d ###
3 Question A: No, Po l i cy does not match a c t u a l behaviour
4 Searching Question B : ’ Does po l i cy match device s t a t e
? ’
5 Checking switch c o n n e c t i v i t y :
6 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−01 2] i s a l i v e
7 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−02 1] i s a l i v e
8 0 device ( s ) unaccounted f o r
9 ### Stage 3 : S t a r t e d ###
10 Question B : Yes , Device s t a t e matches Pol i cy .
11 Searching Question D: ’ Does device s t a t e match
hardware ? ’
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As a result, we see that two devices are alive as expected and 0 are
unaccounted for. The application will take this as a Yes on Question B,
and move down to Question D. If we told the application to expect more
devices than what OpneFlow registered as connected, the result would be
different:
Listing 6.10: Disconnected Device Found - file: ping-data-violation-
found.txt
1 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
2 ### Stage 2 : S t a r t e d ###
3 Question A: No, Po l i cy does not match a c t u a l behaviour
4 Searching Question B : ’ Does po l i cy match device s t a t e
? ’
5 Checking switch c o n n e c t i v i t y :
6 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−01 2] i s a l i v e
7 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−02 1] i s a l i v e
8 1 device ( s ) unaccounted f o r
9 ### Stage 3 : S t a r t e d
10 Question B : No, Device s t a t e doesn ’ t match Pol i cy .
11 Searching Question C: ’ Does phys ica l view match
Device S t a t e ? ’
The application sees a device is missing and moves to Question C rather
then Question D.
Checking for forwarding loops
Finding and solving forwarding loops is solved by using POX’s own
spanning tree module. The resulting output shows the module calculating
the network links, and disabling the ones that would create a loop.
Listing 6.11: Spanning tree - file: ping-data-violation-found.txt
1 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
2 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−02.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−01.2
3 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−01.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−02.2
4 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 4 ports changed
This part hasn’t been tested so extensively since it is already part of the
POX API. The modules ability to solve network loops (disable links that
creating loops), it’s need to be started from the launch() and not from the
place we start the Question B search, and no ability to extract a yes and no
answer from the module, its result isn’t taken into account when deciding
what question to search next in the decision tree.
6.2.5 Question D: Violating flow entries, devices and port sets
Question D is one of the leafs of the decision tree. At the end of it’s search
the user should also learn what flow entries, inport and outport is creating
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violating behaviour on the network.
Expected result
As stated above, the expected result from this is for the user to learn what
flow entry, inport and outport is creating violating behaviour. If we look at
"ping-data-violation-found.txt" extract we can see what an expected result
would look like. At the network device 1, we see two flows, one for each
direction.
Listing 6.12: Spanning tree - file: ping-data-violation-found.txt
1 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
2 ## Flow Table f o r Deivce : 1 ##
3 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
4 > Entry 2 Match :
5 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ IP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l_src ’ : ’
c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 1 , ’ nw_tos ’ : 0 , ’
tp_dst ’ : 0 , ’ tp_src ’ : 0 , ’ dl_dst ’ : ’ aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d :
c9 ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ : IPAddr ( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 ’ )
, ’ in_port ’ : 2 }
6 >> Entry Action
7 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT’ , ’ port ’ : 1 } ]
8 >> Byte Count
9 196
10 > Entry 3 Match :
11 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ IP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l_src ’ : ’
aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 1 , ’ nw_tos ’ : 0 , ’
tp_dst ’ : 0 , ’ tp_src ’ : 8 , ’ dl_dst ’ : ’ c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2
: 7 9 ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ : IPAddr
( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ ) , ’ in_port ’ : 1 }
12 >> Entry Action
13 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT’ , ’ port ’ : 2 } ]
14 >> Byte Count
15 98
However because of the timing issue between which controller applica-
tion’s (l2_learning or sdn_dump) process will finish first, we can get unex-
pected results.
Unexpected results
Once an event such as packetIn arrives to the listener, it will be processed
by the handler linked with that listener and event. If we have two listen-
ers to the same event, such as in this case sdn_dump and l2_learning, it
becomes an issue of timing. Does sdn_dump find a violation, request flow
stats, process the flow stats and print them out, before l2_learning gets the
same packet (same event that triggered a violation at sdn_dump), calcu-
lates a flow entry and sends it to the same device sdn_dump is requesting
flow stats from? If this is the case, then sdn_dump is processing empty
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flow stats or flow stats without the violating entry in them. It is still being
created at l2_learning. This timing issue resulted in irregular results on
Question D.
Irregular results such as these, in this sdn_dump request found a viola-
tion and requested flow stats before l2_learning had time to add any flow
entries. The only thing present is the devices connection to the controller.
Listing 6.13: Only Control Flow - file: tcp-date-violation-found.txt
1 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
2 ## Flow Table f o r Deivce : 2 ##
3 > Entry 1 Match :
4 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP’ , ’ dl_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
5 >> Entry Action
6 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER’ } ]
7 >> Byte Count
8 0
9 ## Flow Table f o r Deivce : 1 ##
10 > Entry 1 Match :
11 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP’ , ’ dl_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
12 >> Entry Action
13 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER’ } ]
14 >> Byte Count
15 41
Most of the times there is a mix between the two, where you see some
flow entries on device or incomplete pairs (flow entry for the request and
reply). But an incomplete pair doesn’t necessary mean the result is wrong.
In the case of "ping-date-violation-found.txt" we have a case of forwarding
violation. This means that we find a violation when it is forwarded to
another device. Because we at this point don’t expect to see a flow for
the reply, we found the violation before it reached its designated host and
no reply packet has been created.
Listing 6.14: No Pair Expected - file: ping-date-violation-found.txt
1 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
2 ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET FORWARDING ##
3 > Packet : Sun 1 6 : 5 2 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP :
pkt aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
4 > Packet : Sun 1 6 : 5 2 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP :
pkt aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
5 v i o l a t e s :
6 > Rule : Date MON to SUN block host1 to host2
7 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
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8 ## Flow Table f o r Deivce : 1 ##
9 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
10 > Entry 3 Match :
11 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ IP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l_src ’ : ’
aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 1 , ’ nw_tos ’ : 0 , ’
tp_dst ’ : 0 , ’ tp_src ’ : 8 , ’ dl_dst ’ : ’ c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2
: 7 9 ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ : IPAddr
( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ ) , ’ in_port ’ : 1 }
12 >> Entry Action
13 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT’ , ’ port ’ : 2 } ]
14 >> Byte Count
15 98
In the transcript above you can notice a violation flow entry (entry
3) on device 1, which is an expected result. However, on the second
device l2_learning still hasn’t processed and created a flow entry for
the application to print out. This is what is creating the irregularities.
The experiments also showed that packets created with the use of the
automator.py, didn’t create flows either. The suspected culprit for this was
the use of "ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff" macs on the Ethernet packet payload, rather than
timing, There was no evidence to indicate that l2_learning would create
flow entries for mac broadcasting address after multiple tests.
6.3 Automate Network Behaviour
The tests shown above have the ability to be fully automated. This means
that the user doesn’t have to create test traffic manually, but let the tool
itself test the policy rules. This done by running the application in the third
operational mode.
6.3.1 Create ICMP packets
In this test we want the tool to create its own testing network behaviour
through the use of policy rules. We have the policy:
Listing 6.15: Example Policy: Create ICMP Packets
1 host1 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
2 host2 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2
3
4 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2
We expect to see the tool create an ICMP packet (since no protocol is
specified in the policy) from host1 to host2 and send it on the network.
We also expect to see a Packet Return violation message on Question A to
appear. The resulting output from sdn_dump on a one switch network:
Listing 6.16: Create ICMP Packet - File: auto-ping-reply.txt
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1 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =1
−−mode=3
2 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
3 Sun 1 7 : 0 7 : 1 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
4 Sun 1 7 : 0 7 : 1 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ARP: pkt f e : 6 7 :
e8 : 4 c : 2 e : 1 2 > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw f e : 6 7 : e8 : 4 c : 2 e
: 1 2 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
5 Sun 1 7 : 0 7 : 1 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ARP: pkt 4e : ce
: 2 0 : 5 4 : 1 b : 9 a > f e : 6 7 : e8 : 4 c : 2 e : 1 2 , hw 4e : ce : 2 0 : 5 4 : 1 b
: 9 a > f e : 6 7 : e8 : 4 c : 2 e : 1 2 : 2 :REPLY
6 Sun 1 7 : 0 7 : 1 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt f e : 6 7 :
e8 : 4 c : 2 e : 1 2 > 4e : ce : 2 0 : 5 4 : 1 b : 9 a , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
7 ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET RETURN ##
8 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 0 7 : 1 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP :
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
9 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 0 7 : 1 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP :
pkt f e : 6 7 : e8 : 4 c : 2 e : 1 2 > 4e : ce : 2 0 : 5 4 : 1 b : 9 a , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
10 v i o l a t e s :
11 > Rule : Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2
We can see the packet ICMP request being sent to Device 1, with
source IP 10.0.0.1 and destination IP 10.0.0.2. We can also see the distinct
use of ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff mac on the packets since the policy only knows the
IP of assigned hosts. Then we see host2 using ARP to figure out mac
addresses and lastly send an ICMP reply to host1. Since the policy states
that this connection should be blocked at this time interval, we also see a
Policy Violation Found message, and the application starts to troubleshoot
downward the tree.
6.3.2 Create TCP packets
In this experiment we wanted the tool to test blocking a TCP connection,
but this time around using the automatic creation of TCP packets. The
policy example is:
Listing 6.17: Example Policy: Create ICMP Packets
1 host1 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
2 host2 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2
3
4 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2 prot TCP
When we test this on a network with two switches, we expect to see a
TCP packet being created from host1 to host2. Another anticipation of this
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experiment is a violation of Question A.
Listing 6.18: Create TCP Packet - File: auto-tcp-forward.txt
1 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =2
−−mode=3
2 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
3 Sun 1 7 : 0 8 : 4 0 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP : pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 48966 dstp 5001 , seq 0 , ack 0 , f l a g s
2
4 Sun 1 7 : 0 8 : 4 0 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP : pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 48966 dstp 5001 , seq 0 , ack 0 , f l a g s
2
5 ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET FORWARDING ##
6 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 0 8 : 4 0 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP :
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 48966 dstp 5001 , seq 0 ,
ack 0 , f l a g s 2
7 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 0 8 : 4 0 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP :
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 48966 dstp 5001 , seq 0 ,
ack 0 , f l a g s 2
8 v i o l a t e s :
9 > Rule : Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2 prot
TCP
From the transcript we can observe the TCP packet being sent trough
device 1 to device 2, and the sdn_dump detecting the transmission as
violating behaviour.
Unwanted behaviour
The implementation of this experiment did however create some unwanted
behaviour. During the automation operation mode, we observed network
violations being created, not by the network, but by the tool itself. If we
specified the policy to block a TCP connection both ways, such as this:
Listing 6.19: Policy that would create erroneous behaviour during automa-
tion
1 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block h1 to h2 prot TCP sport
41238 dport 5001
2 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block h2 to h1 prot TCP sport 5001
dport 41238
When the prototype then created packets to test both these rules and
send them to the controller, the controller would mark them both as
violating packets. And then view the two packets as violation network
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behaviour by specify it as a violating packet return to the first packet. This
only happens when a connection was specified with two policy rules, such
as shown above.
6.3.3 Create UDP packets
In this experiment we use the tool to test a blocked UDP connection to and
from a specific host, but using the automatic creation of UDP packets. The
policy example is:
Listing 6.20: Example Policy: Create ICMP Packets
1 host1 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
2 host2 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2
3
4 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host2 prot UDP
The experiment will try to create violating behaviour by reading the
rule and creating a UDP packet to test it. The expected result is that the
automator will create a packet from host2 and send it to an imaginary IP
address. Again we expect to see a violation to occur with Question A.
Listing 6.21: Create TCP Packet - File: auto-tcp-forward.txt
1 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =2
−−mode=3
2 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
3 Sun 1 7 : 1 1 : 2 6 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 UDP: pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 >
1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 0 0 : srcp 48966 dstp 5001
4 Sun 1 7 : 1 1 : 2 6 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 UDP: pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 >
1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 0 0 : srcp 48966 dstp 5001
5 ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET FORWARDING ##
6 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 1 1 : 2 6 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 UDP:
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 > 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 0 0 : srcp 48966 dstp 5001
7 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 1 1 : 2 6 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 UDP:
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 > 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 0 0 : srcp 48966 dstp 5001
8 v i o l a t e s :
9 > Rule : Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host2 prot UDP
Again as expected, we see the UDP packet being created, sent across the
network and sdn_dump detecting it as a violation.
6.4 Case: Firewall Policy
How does the tool work with behaviour altering controller applications?
The experiments here try to answer this question. We don’t expect to see
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violations occurring when mac_blocker or blocker is correctly blocking
TCP traffic as specified in a policy.
6.4.1 Run sdn_dump with a firewall
The POX mac_blocker or blocker, is a tool that comes with POX. It blocks
specific TCP ports which are given as parameters. Then experiment will
then run sdn_dump in operation mode 3, where it will try to create a TCP
packet with destination port 5001. Based on the policy this should be blocked
and set as a violation if allowed to be forwarded across the network.
Listing 6.22: Policy during firewall test
1 host1 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
2 host2 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2
3
4 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2 prot TCP
sport 41238 dport 5001
We will run this on a two host and two switch network and see if
the packet will create a forwarding violation without the firewall and no
violation with the firewall.
Run without blocker.py
If we firstly run the controller application without the firewall blocker.py,
we expect to see a violation to occur based on the policy we have written.
Listing 6.23: Run sdn_dump.py without a firewall - file: without-
firewall.txt
1 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =2
−−mode=3
2 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
3 Sun 1 7 : 4 3 : 1 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP : pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 41238 dstp 5001 , seq 0 , ack 0 , f l a g s
2
4 Sun 1 7 : 4 3 : 1 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP : pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 41238 dstp 5001 , seq 0 , ack 0 , f l a g s
2
5 ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET FORWARDING ##
6 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 4 3 : 1 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP :
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 41238 dstp 5001 , seq 0 ,
ack 0 , f l a g s 2
7 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 4 3 : 1 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP :
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
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1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 41238 dstp 5001 , seq 0 ,
ack 0 , f l a g s 2
8 v i o l a t e s :
9 > Rule : Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2 prot
TCP sport 41238 dport 5001
As expected without running the firewall in order to stop the created
packet from being forwarded, sdn_dump will warn the user of a violation
that has occurred.
Run with blocker.py
When we run the same experiment with the blocker we expect sdn_dump
to create a TCP packet, send it to a device, but not see any violation occur.
The blocker will ensure that the packet is dropped, and thereby the policy
hasn’t been violated.
Listing 6.24: Run sdn_dump with a firewall - file: with-firewall.txt
1 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =2
−−mode=3 pox . forwarding . b locker −−ports =5001
2 . . . t r a n s c r i p t shortened . . .
3 Sun 1 7 : 4 4 : 1 6 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP : pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 41238 dstp 5001 , seq 0 , ack 0 , f l a g s
2
With this we know that sdn_dump does not find violations if the policy
is upheld by the actual network behaviour.
6.5 Overall Analysis
Overall the experiments show that the prototype does as expected. It mon-
itors network behaviour, it finds and points out violation behaviour using
the policy description, it has the ability to automate testing of policy rules,
and it shows the user what switch flows and ports are part of the network
problem. However, we also found unexpected results in Question D. These
results pointed out that the timing and the time taken to process events for
different controller applications was the most obvious culprit.
With the issue of timing and irregular results, we could note the following:
The irregularity doesn’t necessarily mean that the solution is wrong, we
need a way to delay the request of flow stats after l2_learning has finished
processing the packetIn event and created a flow entry to the device. The is-
sue of no flow tables registered was also seen when using operation mode
3. The packets were sent with "ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff" mac, since we don’t assign
mac addresses in the policy. It was unclear if we don’t see flows from these
packets because of the same timing issue we see with normal packets, or
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that no flows are created for the broadcasting mac address by l2_learning.





The following chapter will address the purpose and choices taken during
the approach, design and implementation phase of the thesis. Simultane-
ously, it will discuss the results derived from this approach, including an
attempt to gauge the challenges faced and their impact. A final conclusion
will be delivered in the next chapter.
7.1 Evaluating the Prototype
We set out to automate Heller’s model for using the layered structure of
SDN to troubleshoot a network. Heller delivered a decision tree which we
could systematically follow, and there by automate.
7.1.1 Question A
Question A: Does the actual network behaviour match the policy? The goal
was to design and implement a solution to this answer with automation.
By the end of Question A, we expected to find what behaviour (packet and
packet path) and rule were violating our policy. We specified that three
parts are needed for this to be fully automated; detection of network be-
haviour, checking actual behaviour against intended and finally create test-
ing network behaviour. We showed with the prototype and results that this
could be implemented. We showed that we could describe intended net-
work behaviour, and both check traffic we created manually ourselves, as
well as allowed the tool itself to create testing traffic through automated
packets from the rule description. However, we do need to note some lim-
itations with the prototype as a result of our experiments. The developed
descriptive policy language covered a small sample of the policy domain.
We covered Time, Date and Data specific rules, but there are so many more
thing we can cover under what constitutes a network policy.
We also saw a bug here while using operation mode 3. If we described
a connection with two policy rules, one for the request and one for the re-
ply, it would create packets for both and send them. The controller would
then see this as a violation created by the network rather than the proto-
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type itself. This could be solved in numerous ways, but the easiest solution
would be for the prototype to see during parsing that both rules are cov-
ering the same connection, and that only one test packet is needed for the
two rules.
7.1.2 Question B
Question B: Does the device state match policy? Here we needed to find
common reachability problems such as forwarding loops, black holes and
disconnectivity issues. The implementation handled loops using the span-
ning tree provided by POX, and found disconnected devices by counting
the connections OpenFlow kept of the connected network devices. We
could have solved forwarding loops problem even better if there was a way
for us to start the spanning tree once we are troubleshooting at Question B,
rather then at launch. And have an ability to extract a yes or no answer
from it when it was finished in order to use this information in the decision
making process after Question B. We could also have expanded the idea
of disconnectivity issues by having a better description in the policy, i.e.
what is connected to what port on what device. This would allow for an
expanded ability to check if both devices, hosts and all ports are correctly
connected.
The biggest limitation on implementation of this question, was that a so-
lution to black holes wasn’t researched. In the beginning the goal was to
use capabilities of Hassel[26] to solve all three of these issues, but the tech-
nical difficulties and time allocated to research a way to incorporate the tool
Hassel turned the approach in another direction.
7.1.3 Question D
Question D: Does the device state match hardware? By the end of this
equivalence check the user should know what behaviour, policy rule, de-
vices, device inport and outport are creating a violation. The implementation
showed that this could be done, but that the result was unreliable because
of timing. The initial idea was to print and filter out packets based on the
last violating packet received, but that design proved itself as challenging.
A flow entry is created and set on a switch by a l2_learning or l3_learning
controller application delivered with POX. Once a packetIn event is sent to
the controller, each controller application listening to that event will pro-
cess and handle it. So while sdn_dump and violation_checker are reading
and checking a packet for violation, the l2_learning application will pro-
cess the same packet and create a related flow entry for that specific device
which created the event. This causes a timing issues. Depending on which
process will finished first, often sdn_dump would find a violation, solve
Question B, request flow entries for Question D and print out these flow
entries before the flow for the violation packet was created and sent to the
device by l2_learning. Without a reliable way to test the filter, it was re-
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moved and we printed out each flow entry on the device. To solve this,
the tool needs a way to time this correctly and request flow entries from
a violating device after the violating flow has been created. Until then we
risk to request flow entries for empty flow tables at these devices.
Another issue discovered on this level was that packets created by the au-
tomator.py would not create flow entries. We need the mac address to
create flow entries on the switches, whereas the policy describing language
only assigned IP addresses to host. To rectify this, we used the general
mac broadcasting address "ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff" when creating the Ethernet pay-
load at the automator.py before sending the packet. This issue could also
be solved by assigning the mac together with the IP address on the policy
description, but it was discovered too late with too little time allocated for
fixing the bug.
7.1.4 Overall Troubleshooting
With the timing right at Question D we could tell the user violating policy
rule, packets, packet path, devices, ports and flows, but the timing issue at
requesting flow made displaying the violating flows unreliable.
The prototype can be used by network operators to monitor network wide
traffic; to see if certain constraints and conditions are true, such as connec-
tions restricted by time or date, or that hosts don’t transmit or receive more
data then allowed by the policy. The source code is provided at a pub-
lic Github repo: https://github.com/HarisSistek/public_sdntroubleshoot
and also found in the appendix.
With time, difficulties with the approach was discovered, which resulted
in a change from the original approach. As it often is with new technolo-
gies and tools, the access to documentation and proper use, in the form
as wikies and online API resources, are lacking. The technical difficulties
of learning a new API and using other SDN troubleshooting tools without
much documentation to help, forced me to scale down the ambition and
scope of the thesis.
7.2 Limitations
There was too little time allocated to look into equivalence checks for Ques-
tion C and E. Checking if physical view matches device state or logical
view matches physical view, would be great additions to the thesis, and
would expand the usability of the prototype. We also covered a very small
sample size of what constitutes a network policy. The prototype only cov-
ers conditions and constraints related to time, date and data. Expanding
the descriptive policy language to cover more policy domains would have
strengthened the thesis in this regard.
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The technical difficulty in both learning and modifying tools such as ATPG
and Hassel, without any documentation was a too big hurdle to overcome.
With time, this changed the approach, scope and ambition of the thesis.
The prototype wasn’t tested on mixed network. Knowing how the pro-
totype would react when run on a virtual network interfacing with a phys-
ical.
7.3 Further Work
In order to complement, or build upon the work and results achieved in
this thesis, there are a number of aspects which could be covered for fur-
ther work. I have listed some below:
Expanding the descriptive policy language to handle a bigger sample of
the policy domain. Policy rules that cover VLANs, topology, routing, etc.
Expanding the policy description of hosts to also contain mac address, port
number and network device to better automate packet creation and send-
ing. Research and implement a better way to time the extraction of flow
entries for Question D. As stated before, we need to find a way to extract
flow stats after the other controller applications have finished processing
their event. Incorporate the use of Hassel to help solve Question B search
for black holes, loops and disconnectivity issues. Expanding the prototype
to contain equivalence checks for Question C and E. With these questions
added and researched, we would have completed Heller’s troubleshoot-
ing decision tree. Finally, testing the prototype on mixed networks. Ex-
periment how sdn_dump would react when we have one part virtual and




The main goal of this thesis work was to use the programmability of SDN
and Heller’s systematic approach to troubleshoot software defined net-
work, in practice to automate the troubleshooting of a network. Based on
the above mentioned goal, the problem statement was defined as: How
can we automatically troubleshoot networks using the layered structure of SDN?
We address it by developing a prototype that automatically moves down
Heller’s decision tree, while it is creating it’s own testing behaviour.
The results showed that by the end of a troubleshooting search, the user
would know what violating packet, packet path, policy rule, devices, flow
entries and ports were the cause of the network problem. The results also
showed that the automation of network behaviour could cause unexpected
behaviour and that the issue of timing between different controller appli-
cations created instances with incomplete troubleshooting results.
The prototype showed that we could see network wide traffic and find pol-
icy violations, but that certain aspects remain to be addressed. Expanding
the prototype to include Questions C and E, and expanding the scope of
the descriptive language should be a priority as future work of this thesis,
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1 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =2
−−mode=2
2 POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) / Copyright 2011−2013 James McCauley ,
e t a l .
3 Number of switches expected : 2
4 Searching for forwarding loops with spanning t r e e . . .
5 ### S t a g e 1 : S t a r t e d ###
6 Searching Question A: ’ Does po l i cy match a c t u a l
behaviour ? ’
7 INFO : core :POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) i s up .
8 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−02 1] connected
9 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 2] connected
10 Mon 1 5 : 4 0 : 3 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ARP: pkt e2 : 7 9 :
a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw e2 : 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f
: 8 2 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
11 Mon 1 5 : 4 0 : 3 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ARP: pkt e2 : 7 9 :
a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw e2 : 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f
: 8 2 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
12 Mon 1 5 : 4 0 : 3 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ARP: pkt 8 6 : 0 4 :
a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 : a f > e2 : 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 , hw 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 :
a f > e2 : 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 : 2 :REPLY
13 Mon 1 5 : 4 0 : 3 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ARP: pkt 8 6 : 0 4 :
a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 : a f > e2 : 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 , hw 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 :
a f > e2 : 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 : 2 :REPLY
14 Mon 1 5 : 4 0 : 3 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt e2 : 7 9 :
a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 > 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 : af , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
15 Mon 1 5 : 4 0 : 3 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP : pkt e2 : 7 9 :
a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 > 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 : af , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
16 ## P o l i c y V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET FORWARDING ##
97
17 > Packet : Mon 1 5 : 4 0 : 3 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP :
pkt e2 : 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 > 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 : af , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
18 > Packet : Mon 1 5 : 4 0 : 3 9 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP :
pkt e2 : 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 > 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 : af , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
19 v i o l a t e s :
20 > Rule : Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2
21
22 ### S t a g e 2 : S t a r t e d ###
23 Question A: No, Po l i cy does not match a c t u a l behaviour
24 Searching Question B : ’ Does po l i cy match device s t a t e ?
’
25 Checking switch c o n n e c t i v i t y :
26 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−01 2] i s a l i v e
27 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−02 1] i s a l i v e
28 0 device ( s ) unaccounted for
29 ### S t a g e 3 : S t a r t e d ###
30 Question B : Yes , Device s t a t e matches Pol i cy .
31 Searching Question D: ’ Does device s t a t e match
hardware ? ’
32 Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from device
[00−00−00−00−00−01 2]
33 Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from device
[00−00−00−00−00−02 1]
34 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 2 ##
35 > Entry 1 Match :
36 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ARP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l _ s r c ’ :
’ 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 : a f ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 2 , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ e2
: 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ :
IPAddr ( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 ’ ) , ’ in_por t ’ : 1 }
37 >> Entry Action
38 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : 2 } ]
39 >> Byte Count
40 42
41 > Entry 2 Match :
42 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP ’ , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
43 >> Entry Action
44 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER ’ } ]
45 >> Byte Count
46 0
47 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 1 ##
48 > Entry 1 Match :
49 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ARP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l _ s r c ’ :
’ 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 : a f ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 2 , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ e2
: 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ :
IPAddr ( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 ’ ) , ’ in_por t ’ : 2 }
98
50 >> Entry Action
51 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : 1 } ]
52 >> Byte Count
53 42
54 > Entry 2 Match :
55 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP ’ , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
56 >> Entry Action
57 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER ’ } ]
58 >> Byte Count
59 0
60 > Entry 3 Match :
61 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ IP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l _ s r c ’ : ’
e2 : 7 9 : a7 : 6 7 : c f : 8 2 ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 1 , ’ nw_tos ’ : 0 , ’
tp_dst ’ : 0 , ’ t p _ s r c ’ : 8 , ’ d l_ds t ’ : ’ 8 6 : 0 4 : a1 : 7 2 : 2 2 :
a f ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ : IPAddr ( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ )
, ’ in_por t ’ : 1 }
62 >> Entry Action
63 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : 2 } ]
64 >> Byte Count
65 98
66 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−02.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−01.2
67 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−01.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−02.2
68 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 4 ports changed
B.2 tcp-date-violation-found.txt
1 INFO : core :Down.
2 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =2
−−mode=2
3 POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) / Copyright 2011−2013 James McCauley ,
e t a l .
4 Number of switches expected : 2
5 Searching for forwarding loops with spanning t r e e . . .
6 ### S t a g e 1 : S t a r t e d ###
7 Searching Question A: ’ Does po l i cy match a c t u a l
behaviour ? ’
8 INFO : core :POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) i s up .
9 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−02 1] connected
10 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 2] connected
11 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−02.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−01.2
12 Sun 1 6 : 5 3 : 4 4 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP : pkt aa : 4 6 :
cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 58421 dstp 5001 , seq 697520508 , ack
99
0 , f l a g s 2
13 Sun 1 6 : 5 3 : 4 4 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP : pkt aa : 4 6 :
cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 58421 dstp 5001 , seq 697520508 , ack
0 , f l a g s 2
14 ## P o l i c y V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET FORWARDING ##
15 > Packet : Sun 1 6 : 5 3 : 4 4 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP :
pkt aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 58421 dstp 5001 , seq
697520508 , ack 0 , f l a g s 2
16 > Packet : Sun 1 6 : 5 3 : 4 4 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP :
pkt aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 58421 dstp 5001 , seq
697520508 , ack 0 , f l a g s 2
17 v i o l a t e s :
18 > Rule : Date MON to SUN block host1 to host2
19
20 ### S t a g e 2 : S t a r t e d ###
21 Question A: No, Po l i cy does not match a c t u a l behaviour
22 Searching Question B : ’ Does po l i cy match device s t a t e ?
’
23 Checking switch c o n n e c t i v i t y :
24 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−01 2] i s a l i v e
25 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−02 1] i s a l i v e
26 0 device ( s ) unaccounted for
27 ### S t a g e 3 : S t a r t e d ###
28 Question B : Yes , Device s t a t e matches Pol i cy .
29 Searching Question D: ’ Does device s t a t e match
hardware ? ’
30 Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from device
[00−00−00−00−00−01 2]
31 Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from device
[00−00−00−00−00−02 1]
32 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 2 ##
33 > Entry 1 Match :
34 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP ’ , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
35 >> Entry Action
36 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER ’ } ]
37 >> Byte Count
38 0
39 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 1 ##
40 > Entry 1 Match :
41 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP ’ , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
42 >> Entry Action
43 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER ’ } ]




1 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =2
−−mode=2
2 POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) / Copyright 2011−2013 James McCauley ,
e t a l .
3 Number of switches expected : 2
4 Searching for forwarding loops with spanning t r e e . . .
5 ### S t a g e 1 : S t a r t e d ###
6 Searching Question A: ’ Does po l i cy match a c t u a l
behaviour ? ’
7 INFO : core :POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) i s up .
8 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−02 1] connected
9 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 2] connected
10 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−02.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−01.2
11 Sun 1 6 : 5 6 : 1 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt aa : 4 6 :
cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
12 Sun 1 6 : 5 6 : 1 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP : pkt aa : 4 6 :
cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
13 Sun 1 6 : 5 6 : 1 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP : pkt c6
: 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 > aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
14 Sun 1 6 : 5 6 : 1 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt c6
: 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 > aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
15 Sun 1 6 : 5 6 : 1 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt aa : 4 6 :
cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
16 ## P o l i c y V i o l a t i o n Found : SENDING TO MUCH DATA ##
17 > IP : 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 address sent : 21503948 bytes
18 > IP : 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 can only send : 1000 bytes
19 v i o l a t e s :
20 > Rule : Data 1000 b from host2
21
22 ### S t a g e 2 : S t a r t e d ###
23 Question A: No, Po l i cy does not match a c t u a l behaviour
24 Searching Question B : ’ Does po l i cy match device s t a t e ?
’
25 Checking switch c o n n e c t i v i t y :
26 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−01 2] i s a l i v e
27 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−02 1] i s a l i v e
28 0 device ( s ) unaccounted for
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29 ### S t a g e 3 : S t a r t e d ###
30 Question B : Yes , Device s t a t e matches Pol i cy .
31 Searching Question D: ’ Does device s t a t e match
hardware ? ’
32 Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from device
[00−00−00−00−00−01 2]
33 Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from device
[00−00−00−00−00−02 1]
34 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 2 ##
35 > Entry 1 Match :
36 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP ’ , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
37 >> Entry Action
38 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER ’ } ]
39 >> Byte Count
40 0
41 > Entry 2 Match :
42 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ IP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l _ s r c ’ : ’
c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 1 , ’ nw_tos ’ : 0 , ’
tp_dst ’ : 0 , ’ t p _ s r c ’ : 0 , ’ d l_ds t ’ : ’ aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d :
c9 ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ : IPAddr ( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 ’ )
, ’ in_por t ’ : 1 }
43 >> Entry Action
44 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : 2 } ]
45 >> Byte Count
46 98
47 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−01.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−02.2
48 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 4 ports changed
49 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 1 ##
50 > Entry 1 Match :
51 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP ’ , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
52 >> Entry Action
53 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER ’ } ]
54 >> Byte Count
55 41
56 > Entry 2 Match :
57 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ IP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l _ s r c ’ : ’
c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 1 , ’ nw_tos ’ : 0 , ’
tp_dst ’ : 0 , ’ t p _ s r c ’ : 0 , ’ d l_ds t ’ : ’ aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d :
c9 ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ : IPAddr ( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 ’ )
, ’ in_por t ’ : 2 }
58 >> Entry Action
59 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : 1 } ]
60 >> Byte Count
61 196
62 > Entry 3 Match :
102
63 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ IP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l _ s r c ’ : ’
aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 1 , ’ nw_tos ’ : 0 , ’
tp_dst ’ : 0 , ’ t p _ s r c ’ : 8 , ’ d l_ds t ’ : ’ c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2
: 7 9 ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ : IPAddr ( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’
) , ’ in_por t ’ : 1 }
64 >> Entry Action
65 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : 2 } ]
66 >> Byte Count
67 98
68 ^CINFO : core : Going down . . .
69 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 2] disconnected
70 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−02 1] disconnected
71 INFO : core :Down.
B.4 ping-date-violation-found.txt
1 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =2
−−mode=2
2 POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) / Copyright 2011−2013 James McCauley ,
e t a l .
3 Number of switches expected : 2
4 Searching for forwarding loops with spanning t r e e . . .
5 ### S t a g e 1 : S t a r t e d ###
6 Searching Question A: ’ Does po l i cy match a c t u a l
behaviour ? ’
7 INFO : core :POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) i s up .
8 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−02 1] connected
9 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 2] connected
10 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−02.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−01.2
11 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet c6
: 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9
12 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet c6
: 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9
13 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet aa : 4 6 : cb :
d3 : 9 d : c9
14 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet aa : 4 6 : cb :
d3 : 9 d : c9
15 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−01.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−02.2
16 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 4 ports changed
17 Sun 1 6 : 5 2 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ARP: pkt aa : 4 6 :
cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d :
c9 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
18 Sun 1 6 : 5 2 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ARP: pkt aa : 4 6 :
cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d :
c9 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
103
19 Sun 1 6 : 5 2 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ARP: pkt c6
: 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 > aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 , hw c6
: 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 > aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 : 2 :REPLY
20 Sun 1 6 : 5 2 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ARP: pkt c6
: 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 > aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 , hw c6
: 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 > aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 : 2 :REPLY
21 Sun 1 6 : 5 2 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt aa : 4 6 :
cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
22 Sun 1 6 : 5 2 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP : pkt aa : 4 6 :
cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
23 ## P o l i c y V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET FORWARDING ##
24 > Packet : Sun 1 6 : 5 2 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP :
pkt aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
25 > Packet : Sun 1 6 : 5 2 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP :
pkt aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 > c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
26 v i o l a t e s :
27 > Rule : Date MON to SUN block host1 to host2
28
29 ### S t a g e 2 : S t a r t e d ###
30 Question A: No, Po l i cy does not match a c t u a l behaviour
31 Searching Question B : ’ Does po l i cy match device s t a t e ?
’
32 Checking switch c o n n e c t i v i t y :
33 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−01 2] i s a l i v e
34 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−02 1] i s a l i v e
35 0 device ( s ) unaccounted for
36 ### S t a g e 3 : S t a r t e d ###
37 Question B : Yes , Device s t a t e matches Pol i cy .
38 Searching Question D: ’ Does device s t a t e match
hardware ? ’
39 Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from device
[00−00−00−00−00−01 2]
40 Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from device
[00−00−00−00−00−02 1]
41 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 2 ##
42 > Entry 1 Match :
43 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ARP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l _ s r c ’ :
’ c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 2 , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ aa
: 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ :
IPAddr ( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 ’ ) , ’ in_por t ’ : 1 }
44 >> Entry Action
45 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : 2 } ]
46 >> Byte Count
47 42
104
48 > Entry 2 Match :
49 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP ’ , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
50 >> Entry Action
51 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER ’ } ]
52 >> Byte Count
53 41
54 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 1 ##
55 > Entry 1 Match :
56 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ARP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l _ s r c ’ :
’ c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2 : 7 9 ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 2 , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ aa
: 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ :
IPAddr ( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 ’ ) , ’ in_por t ’ : 2 }
57 >> Entry Action
58 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : 1 } ]
59 >> Byte Count
60 42
61 > Entry 2 Match :
62 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP ’ , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
63 >> Entry Action
64 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER ’ } ]
65 >> Byte Count
66 123
67 > Entry 3 Match :
68 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ IP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l _ s r c ’ : ’
aa : 4 6 : cb : d3 : 9 d : c9 ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 1 , ’ nw_tos ’ : 0 , ’
tp_dst ’ : 0 , ’ t p _ s r c ’ : 8 , ’ d l_ds t ’ : ’ c6 : 8 0 : 1 6 : 1 3 : f2
: 7 9 ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ : IPAddr ( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’
) , ’ in_por t ’ : 1 }
69 >> Entry Action
70 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : 2 } ]
71 >> Byte Count
72 98
B.5 auto-ping-reply.txt
1 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =1
−−mode=3
2 POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) / Copyright 2011−2013 James McCauley ,
e t a l .
3 Number of switches expected : 1
4 Searching for forwarding loops with spanning t r e e . . .
5 match1
6 ### S t a g e 1 : S t a r t e d ###
7 Searching Question A: ’ Does po l i cy match a c t u a l
behaviour ? ’
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8 INFO : core :POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) i s up .
9 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 1] connected
10 Sun 1 7 : 0 7 : 1 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
11 Sun 1 7 : 0 7 : 1 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ARP: pkt f e : 6 7 :
e8 : 4 c : 2 e : 1 2 > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw f e : 6 7 : e8 : 4 c : 2 e
: 1 2 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
12 Sun 1 7 : 0 7 : 1 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ARP: pkt 4e : ce
: 2 0 : 5 4 : 1 b : 9 a > f e : 6 7 : e8 : 4 c : 2 e : 1 2 , hw 4e : ce : 2 0 : 5 4 : 1 b
: 9 a > f e : 6 7 : e8 : 4 c : 2 e : 1 2 : 2 :REPLY
13 Sun 1 7 : 0 7 : 1 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt f e : 6 7 :
e8 : 4 c : 2 e : 1 2 > 4e : ce : 2 0 : 5 4 : 1 b : 9 a , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
14 ## P o l i c y V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET RETURN ##
15 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 0 7 : 1 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP :
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
16 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 0 7 : 1 2 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP :
pkt f e : 6 7 : e8 : 4 c : 2 e : 1 2 > 4e : ce : 2 0 : 5 4 : 1 b : 9 a , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
17 v i o l a t e s :
18 > Rule : Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2
19
20 ### S t a g e 2 : S t a r t e d ###
21 Question A: No, Po l i cy does not match a c t u a l behaviour
22 Searching Question B : ’ Does po l i cy match device s t a t e ?
’
23 Checking switch c o n n e c t i v i t y :
24 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−01 1] i s a l i v e
25 0 device ( s ) unaccounted for
26 ### S t a g e 3 : S t a r t e d ###
27 Question B : Yes , Device s t a t e matches Pol i cy .
28 Searching Question D: ’ Does device s t a t e match
hardware ? ’
29 Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from device
[00−00−00−00−00−01 1]
30 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 1 ##
31 > Entry 1 Match :
32 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’ARP ’ , ’ nw_dst ’ : ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 / 3 2 ’ , ’ d l _ s r c ’ :
’ 4e : ce : 2 0 : 5 4 : 1 b : 9 a ’ , ’ nw_proto ’ : 2 , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ f e
: 6 7 : e8 : 4 c : 2 e : 1 2 ’ , ’ dl_vlan ’ : 65535 , ’ nw_src ’ :
IPAddr ( ’ 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ ) , ’ in_por t ’ : 1 }
33 >> Entry Action
34 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 0 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : 2 } ]
35 >> Byte Count
36 42
37 > Entry 2 Match :
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38 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP ’ , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
39 >> Entry Action
40 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER ’ } ]
41 >> Byte Count
42 0
B.6 auto-tcp-forward.txt
1 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =2
−−mode=3
2 POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) / Copyright 2011−2013 James McCauley ,
e t a l .
3 Number of switches expected : 2
4 Searching for forwarding loops with spanning t r e e . . .
5 match1
6 ### S t a g e 1 : S t a r t e d ###
7 Searching Question A: ’ Does po l i cy match a c t u a l
behaviour ? ’
8 INFO : core :POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) i s up .
9 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−02 1] connected
10 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 2] connected
11 Sun 1 7 : 0 8 : 4 0 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP : pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 48966 dstp 5001 , seq 0 , ack 0 , f l a g s
2
12 Sun 1 7 : 0 8 : 4 0 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP : pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 48966 dstp 5001 , seq 0 , ack 0 , f l a g s
2
13 ## P o l i c y V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET FORWARDING ##
14 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 0 8 : 4 0 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP :
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 48966 dstp 5001 , seq 0 ,
ack 0 , f l a g s 2
15 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 0 8 : 4 0 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP :
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 48966 dstp 5001 , seq 0 ,
ack 0 , f l a g s 2
16 v i o l a t e s :
17 > Rule : Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2 prot
TCP
18
19 ### S t a g e 2 : S t a r t e d ###
20 Question A: No, Po l i cy does not match a c t u a l behaviour
21 Searching Question B : ’ Does po l i cy match device s t a t e ?
’
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22 Checking switch c o n n e c t i v i t y :
23 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−01 2] i s a l i v e
24 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−02 1] i s a l i v e
25 0 device ( s ) unaccounted for
26 ### S t a g e 3 : S t a r t e d ###
27 Question B : Yes , Device s t a t e matches Pol i cy .
28 Searching Question D: ’ Does device s t a t e match
hardware ? ’
29 Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from device
[00−00−00−00−00−01 2]
30 Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from device
[00−00−00−00−00−02 1]
31 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 2 ##
32 > Entry 1 Match :
33 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP ’ , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
34 >> Entry Action
35 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER ’ } ]
36 >> Byte Count
37 0
38 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 1 ##
39 > Entry 1 Match :
40 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP ’ , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
41 >> Entry Action
42 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER ’ } ]
43 >> Byte Count
44 0
45 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−02.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−01.2
46 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−01.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−02.2
47 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 4 ports changed
48 ^CINFO : core : Going down . . .
49 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 2] disconnected
50 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−02 1] disconnected
51 INFO : core :Down.
B.7 without-firewall.txt
1 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =2
−−mode=3
2 POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) / Copyright 2011−2013 James McCauley ,
e t a l .
3 Number of switches expected : 2
4 Searching for forwarding loops with spanning t r e e . . .
5 match1
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6 ### S t a g e 1 : S t a r t e d ###
7 Searching Question A: ’ Does po l i cy match a c t u a l
behaviour ? ’
8 INFO : core :POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) i s up .
9 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−02 1] connected
10 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 2] connected
11 Sun 1 7 : 4 3 : 1 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP : pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 41238 dstp 5001 , seq 0 , ack 0 , f l a g s
2
12 Sun 1 7 : 4 3 : 1 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP : pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 41238 dstp 5001 , seq 0 , ack 0 , f l a g s
2
13 ## P o l i c y V i o l a t i o n Found : PACKET FORWARDING ##
14 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 4 3 : 1 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP :
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 41238 dstp 5001 , seq 0 ,
ack 0 , f l a g s 2
15 > Packet : Sun 1 7 : 4 3 : 1 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 TCP :
pkt f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 > 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 41238 dstp 5001 , seq 0 ,
ack 0 , f l a g s 2
16 v i o l a t e s :
17 > Rule : Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2 prot
TCP sport 41238 dport 5001
18
19 ### S t a g e 2 : S t a r t e d ###
20 Question A: No, Po l i cy does not match a c t u a l behaviour
21 Searching Question B : ’ Does po l i cy match device s t a t e ?
’
22 Checking switch c o n n e c t i v i t y :
23 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−01 2] i s a l i v e
24 Switch [00−00−00−00−00−02 1] i s a l i v e
25 0 device ( s ) unaccounted for
26 ### S t a g e 3 : S t a r t e d ###
27 Question B : Yes , Device s t a t e matches Pol i cy .
28 Searching Question D: ’ Does device s t a t e match
hardware ? ’
29 Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from device
[00−00−00−00−00−01 2]
30 Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from device
[00−00−00−00−00−02 1]
31 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 2 ##
32 > Entry 1 Match :
33 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP ’ , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
34 >> Entry Action
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35 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER ’ } ]
36 >> Byte Count
37 0
38 ## Flow T a b l e f o r De ivc e : 1 ##
39 > Entry 1 Match :
40 { ’ dl_type ’ : ’LLDP ’ , ’ d l_dst ’ : ’ 0 1 : 2 3 : 2 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 ’ }
41 >> Entry Action
42 [ { ’ max_len ’ : 65535 , ’ type ’ : ’OFPAT_OUTPUT ’ , ’ port ’ : ’
OFPP_CONTROLLER ’ } ]
43 >> Byte Count
44 0
45 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−02.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−01.2
46 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−01.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−02.2
47 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 4 ports changed
48 ^CINFO : core : Going down . . .
49 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 2] disconnected
50 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−02 1] disconnected
51 INFO : core :Down.
B.8 with-firewall.txt
1 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch =2
−−mode=3 pox . forwarding . b locker −−ports =5001
2 POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) / Copyright 2011−2013 James McCauley ,
e t a l .
3 Number of switches expected : 2
4 Searching for forwarding loops with spanning t r e e . . .
5 match1
6 ### S t a g e 1 : S t a r t e d ###
7 Searching Question A: ’ Does po l i cy match a c t u a l
behaviour ? ’
8 INFO : core :POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) i s up .
9 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−02 1] connected
10 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 2] connected
11 Sun 1 7 : 4 4 : 1 6 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 TCP : pkt f f : f f :
f f : f f : f f : f f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 : srcp 41238 dstp 5001 , seq 0 , ack 0 , f l a g s
2
12 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−02.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−01.2
13 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−01.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−02.2
14 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 4 ports changed
15 ^CINFO : core : Going down . . .
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16 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 2] disconnected
17 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−02 1] disconnected
18 INFO : core :Down.
B.9 mode1-10switch-ping.txt
1 mininet@mininet−vm:~/ pox$ ./ pox . py pox . forwarding .
l 2 _ l e a r n i n g pox . sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump −−switch
=10 −−mode=1
2 POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) / Copyright 2011−2013 James McCauley ,
e t a l .
3 Number of switches expected : 10
4 Searching for forwarding loops with spanning t r e e . . .
5 ### S t a g e 1 : S t a r t e d ###
6 Searching Question A: ’ Does po l i cy match a c t u a l
behaviour ? ’
7 INFO : core :POX 0 . 2 . 0 ( carp ) i s up .
8 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−08 3] connected
9 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−09 4] connected
10 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−02 2] connected
11 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 5] connected
12 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−05 1] connected
13 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−03 6] connected
14 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−04 7] connected
15 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−07 8] connected
16 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−06 9] connected
17 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−0a 10] connected
18 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−08.3 −> 00−00−00−00−00−09.2
19 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−08.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−07.3
20 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−09.3 −> 00−00−00−00−00−0a . 2
21 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6a : 5 1 : 7 9 :
b4 : 2 2 : e0
22 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6a : 5 1 : 7 9 :
b4 : 2 2 : e0
23 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6a : 5 1 : 7 9 :
b4 : 2 2 : e0
24 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6a : 5 1 : 7 9 :
b4 : 2 2 : e0
25 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6a : 5 1 : 7 9 :
b4 : 2 2 : e0
26 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−09.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−08.3
27 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 6 ports changed
28 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6a : 5 1 : 7 9 :
b4 : 2 2 : e0
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29 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6a : 5 1 : 7 9 :
b4 : 2 2 : e0
30 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6a : 5 1 : 7 9 :
b4 : 2 2 : e0
31 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6a : 5 1 : 7 9 :
b4 : 2 2 : e0
32 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f
33 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f
34 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f
35 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f
36 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f
37 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f
38 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f
39 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f
40 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f
41 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 7 6 : 8 b : e8 :
c4 : 7 e : ec
42 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 7 6 : 8 b : e8 :
c4 : 7 e : ec
43 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 7 6 : 8 b : e8 :
c4 : 7 e : ec
44 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 7 6 : 8 b : e8 :
c4 : 7 e : ec
45 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−02.3 −> 00−00−00−00−00−03.2
46 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 7 6 : 8 b : e8 :
c4 : 7 e : ec
47 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 7 6 : 8 b : e8 :
c4 : 7 e : ec
48 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 7 6 : 8 b : e8 :
c4 : 7 e : ec
49 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 7 6 : 8 b : e8 :
c4 : 7 e : ec
50 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 7 6 : 8 b : e8 :
c4 : 7 e : ec
51 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6a : 4 a : fb :
c9 : 9 b : 4 e
52 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−02.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−01.2
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53 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6a : 4 a : fb :
c9 : 9 b : 4 e
54 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 4a : 7 f
: 7 8 : 2 d : 7 d : fa
55 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 4a : 7 f
: 7 8 : 2 d : 7 d : fa
56 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 4a : 7 f
: 7 8 : 2 d : 7 d : fa
57 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 4a : 7 f
: 7 8 : 2 d : 7 d : fa
58 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 4a : 7 f
: 7 8 : 2 d : 7 d : fa
59 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 4a : 7 f
: 7 8 : 2 d : 7 d : fa
60 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 4a : 7 f
: 7 8 : 2 d : 7 d : fa
61 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 4a : 7 f
: 7 8 : 2 d : 7 d : fa
62 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 4a : 7 f
: 7 8 : 2 d : 7 d : fa
63 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6 6 : 9 c : 7 f
: 1 6 : 8 e : 3 8
64 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6 6 : 9 c : 7 f
: 1 6 : 8 e : 3 8
65 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6 6 : 9 c : 7 f
: 1 6 : 8 e : 3 8
66 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6 6 : 9 c : 7 f
: 1 6 : 8 e : 3 8
67 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6 6 : 9 c : 7 f
: 1 6 : 8 e : 3 8
68 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6 6 : 9 c : 7 f
: 1 6 : 8 e : 3 8
69 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6 6 : 9 c : 7 f
: 1 6 : 8 e : 3 8
70 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6 6 : 9 c : 7 f
: 1 6 : 8 e : 3 8
71 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6 6 : 9 c : 7 f
: 1 6 : 8 e : 3 8
72 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6a : 2 4 : fd :
a5 : 1 6 : 0 d
73 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 6a : 2 4 : fd :
a5 : 1 6 : 0 d
74 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 8e : c8 : 2 d
: 4 0 : 5 e : b6
75 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 7 2 : 7 5 : cc :
e8 : 5 6 : 7 6
76 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 8e : c8 : 2 d
: 4 0 : 5 e : b6
113
77 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 7 2 : 7 5 : cc :
e8 : 5 6 : 7 6
78 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 8e : c8 : 2 d
: 4 0 : 5 e : b6
79 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 8e : c8 : 2 d
: 4 0 : 5 e : b6
80 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 8e : c8 : 2 d
: 4 0 : 5 e : b6
81 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 7 2 : 7 5 : cc :
e8 : 5 6 : 7 6
82 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 8e : c8 : 2 d
: 4 0 : 5 e : b6
83 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 8e : c8 : 2 d
: 4 0 : 5 e : b6
84 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 8e : c8 : 2 d
: 4 0 : 5 e : b6
85 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 8e : c8 : 2 d
: 4 0 : 5 e : b6
86 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−01.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−02.2
87 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 5 ports changed
88 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 5e : 9 a
: 3 4 : 1 e : c6 : b8
89 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 5e : 9 a
: 3 4 : 1 e : c6 : b8
90 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 5e : 9 a
: 3 4 : 1 e : c6 : b8
91 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 5e : 9 a
: 3 4 : 1 e : c6 : b8
92 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 5e : 9 a
: 3 4 : 1 e : c6 : b8
93 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 5e : 9 a
: 3 4 : 1 e : c6 : b8
94 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 5e : 9 a
: 3 4 : 1 e : c6 : b8
95 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 5e : 9 a
: 3 4 : 1 e : c6 : b8
96 INFO : sdntroubleshoot . sdn_dump :UNKNOWN packet 5e : 9 a
: 3 4 : 1 e : c6 : b8
97 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−05.3 −> 00−00−00−00−00−06.2
98 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−05.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−04.3
99 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−03.3 −> 00−00−00−00−00−04.2
100 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−03.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−02.3
101 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 4 ports changed
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102 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−04.3 −> 00−00−00−00−00−05.2
103 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 6 ports changed
104 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−04.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−03.3
105 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−07.3 −> 00−00−00−00−00−08.2
106 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 6 ports changed
107 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−07.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−06.3
108 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 1 ports changed
109 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−06.3 −> 00−00−00−00−00−07.2
110 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 4 ports changed
111 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−06.2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−05.3
112 INFO : openflow . discovery : l i n k detec ted :
00−00−00−00−00−0a . 2 −> 00−00−00−00−00−09.3
113 INFO : openflow . spanning_tree : 5 ports changed
114 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
115 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
116 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−03 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
117 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−04 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
118 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−05 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
119 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−06 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
120 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−07 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
121 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−08 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
122 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−09 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
123 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−0a ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
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: 0 2 : 8 f > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
124 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−0a ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f : 2 :REPLY
125 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−09 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f : 2 :REPLY
126 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−08 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f : 2 :REPLY
127 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−07 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f : 2 :REPLY
128 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−06 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f : 2 :REPLY
129 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−05 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f : 2 :REPLY
130 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−04 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f : 2 :REPLY
131 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−03 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f : 2 :REPLY
132 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f : 2 :REPLY
133 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f : 2 :REPLY
134 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
135 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP : pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
136 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−03 ICMP : pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
137 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−04 ICMP : pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
138 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−05 ICMP : pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
139 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−06 ICMP : pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
116
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
140 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 7 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−07 ICMP : pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
141 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−08 ICMP : pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
142 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−09 ICMP : pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
143 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−0a ICMP : pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 : 8 :ECHO_REQUEST
144 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−0a ICMP : pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
145 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−09 ICMP : pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
146 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−08 ICMP : pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
147 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−07 ICMP : pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
148 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−06 ICMP : pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
149 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−05 ICMP : pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
150 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−04 ICMP : pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
151 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−03 ICMP : pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
152 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ICMP : pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
153 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 8 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ICMP : pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , ip 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 >
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 0 :ECHO_REPY
154 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−0a ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
155 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−09 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
117
: 5 6 : 7 6 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
156 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−08 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
157 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−07 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
158 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−06 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
159 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−05 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
160 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−04 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
161 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−03 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
162 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
163 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ARP: pkt 7 2 : 7 5 :
cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 > b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f , hw 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8
: 5 6 : 7 6 > 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 :REQUEST
164 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−01 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 : 2 :REPLY
165 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−02 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 : 2 :REPLY
166 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−03 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 : 2 :REPLY
167 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−04 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 : 2 :REPLY
168 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−05 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 : 2 :REPLY
169 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−06 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 : 2 :REPLY
170 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−07 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 : 2 :REPLY
171 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−08 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
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: 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 : 2 :REPLY
172 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−09 ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 : 2 :REPLY
173 Sun 1 4 : 5 3 : 4 3 DevID : 00−00−00−00−00−0a ARP: pkt b6
: 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e : 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 , hw b6 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 5 e
: 0 2 : 8 f > 7 2 : 7 5 : cc : e8 : 5 6 : 7 6 : 2 :REPLY
174 ^CINFO : core : Going down . . .
175 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−01 5] disconnected
176 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−02 2] disconnected
177 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−03 6] disconnected
178 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−04 7] disconnected
179 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−05 1] disconnected
180 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−06 9] disconnected
181 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−07 8] disconnected
182 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−08 3] disconnected
183 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−09 4] disconnected
184 INFO : openflow . of_01 :[00−00−00−00−00−0a 10]
disconnected







2 # Network wide tcpdump
3 # @Author Har i s S i s t e k
4 # ########################################
5
6 from pox . core import core
7 import pox . openflow . l ibopenflow_01 as of
8 from pox . l i b . u t i l import dpid_to_s t r
9 import pox . l i b . packet as packet
10 import datetime , time
11 from pox . openflow . o f _ j s o n import *
12 import re
13 import v i o l a t i o n _ c h e c k e r as vc # s e e f i l e
v i o l a t i o n _ c h e c k e r . py
14
15 # spanning t r e e p r o t o c o l from pox
16 import pox . openflow . discovery as discov
17 import pox . openflow . spanning_tree as spanning_tree
18
19 log = core . getLogger ( )
20
21 # Layer 1 Vars :
22 checker = None # v i o l a t i o n _ c h e c k e r c l a s s var , d e c l a r e d
in l aunch ( )
23 l a y e r 1 _ c o r r e c t = True # Helps us d e c i d e what l a y e r we
s h o u l d s e a r c h on
24 l a s t _ p a c k e t = None # The p a c k e t t h a t t r i g g e r e d t h e
v i o l a t i o n
25
26 # Por t s t a t v a r s :
27 count = 0
28 dev_port_ip = { }
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29 known_maps = [ ]
30
31 # Remember number o f b y t e s s e n t :
32 i p_ by t es _ se n t = { }
33 ip_packets_sent = { }
34 ip_bytes_recv = { }
35 ip_packets_recv = { }
36
37 # Layer 2 Vars :
38 yet_to_do = True
39 switch_count = 0
40
41 ’ ’ ’
42 Wil l map IP to port/dev r e l a t i o n s h i p
43 ’ ’ ’
44 def add_host ( dev , port , ip ) :
45 global dev_port_ip
46 global known_maps
47 i f ip in known_maps :
48 return
49
50 i f dev_port_ip . get ( dev ) :
51 i n f o = dev_port_ip . get ( dev )
52 i n f o [ ip ] = port
53 i n f o [ port ] = ip
54 dev_port_ip [ dev ] = i n f o
55 known_maps . append ( ip ) # j u s t map once
56 return
57
58 i n f o = { }
59 i n f o [ ip ] = port
60 i n f o [ port ] = ip
61 dev_port_ip [ dev ] = i n f o
62 known_maps . append ( ip ) # j u s t map once
63
64 ’ ’ ’
65 Update l a t e s port s t a t s given from network devices ,
map to IP
66 ’ ’ ’
67 def add_port_entry ( ip , bsent , brecv , psent , precv ) :





73 i p_ by t es _ se n t [ ip ] = bsent
74 ip_bytes_recv [ ip ] = brecv
75 ip_packets_sent [ ip ] = psent
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76 ip_packets_recv [ ip ] = precv
77
78
79 def h a n d l e _ p o r t _ s t a t s ( event ) :
80 s t a t s = event . s t a t s
81 for s t a t in s t a t s :
82 i f dev_port_ip . get ( dpid_to_s t r ( event . dpid ) ) : # i f
e n t r y e x i s t s
83 i f dev_port_ip . get ( dpid_to_s t r ( event . dpid ) ) .
get ( s t a t . port_no ) : # i f e n t r y e x i s t s
84 add_port_entry ( dev_port_ip [ dpid_to_s t r ( event
. dpid ) ] [ s t a t . port_no ] , s t a t . tx_bytes ,
85 s t a t . rx_bytes , s t a t .
tx_packets , s t a t .
rx_packets )
86 i f l a y e r 1 _ c o r r e c t :
87 i f checker :








90 decider ( v i o l a t i o n , None )
91
92 def handle_f low_requests ( event ) :
93 s t a t s = f l o w _ s t a t s _ t o _ l i s t ( event . s t a t s )
94 ips = None
95 ports = None
96 i f l a s t _ p a c k e t :
97 match = re . search ( r ’ ip\s +(?P<ip_src > .+)\s+>\s
+(?P<ip_dst > .+) :\ s+ ’ , l a s t _ p a c k e t )
98 i f match :
99 ips = match . groupdict ( )
100
101 match2 = re . search ( r ’ srcp\s +(?P<sport >\d+)\s+
dstp\s +(?P<dport >\d+) ’ , l a s t _ p a c k e t )
102 i f match2 :
103 ports = match2 . groupdict ( )
104
105
106 print " ## Flow Table f o r Deivce : " , event . dpid , " ##
"
107 entry = 1
108 for s t a t in s t a t s :
109 print "> Entry %d Match : " % entry
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110 print s t a t [ " match " ]
111 print ">> Entry Action "
112 print s t a t [ " a c t i o n s " ]
113 print ">> Byte Count "
114 print s t a t [ " byte_count " ]
115 entry = entry + 1
116
117
118 def check_swi tch_connec t iv i ty ( ) :
119 count = 0
120 print " Checking switch c o n n e c t i v i t y : "
121 for con in core . openflow . _connect ions . values ( ) :
122 print " Switch " , con , " i s a l i v e "
123 count = count + 1
124 print switch_count − count , " device ( s ) unaccounted
f o r "
125 return count == switch_count
126
127 def s t a r t _ s p a n n i n g _ t r e e ( ) :
128 global yet_to_do
129 i f yet_to_do :
130 print " Searching f o r forwarding loops with
spanning t r e e . . . "
131 # pox . o p e n f l o w . d i s c o v e r y
132 discov . launch ( )
133 # pox . o p e n f l o w . s p a n n i n g _ t r e e −−no−f l o o d −−ho ld−
down
134 spanning_tree . launch ( )
135 yet_to_do = Fa lse
136
137 # Get t imes tamp in f o r m a t o f HH:MM: SS = 2 3 : 1 3 : 2 0
138 def timestamp ( ) :
139 stamp = time . time ( ) # s e e i f i have t o s e t t h e
l o c a l e on t h e t ime so t h a t i t d o e s n t c o n f u e s e
norwegian and e n g l i s h
140 return datetime . datetime . fromtimestamp ( stamp ) .
s t r f t i m e ( ’%a %H:%M:%S ’ )
141
142 def decider ( bool_val , packet ) :
143 global l a y e r 1 _ c o r r e c t
144 global l a s t _ p a c k e t
145
146 i f bool_val :
147 l a s t _ p a c k e t = packet
148 print " ### Stage 2 : S t a r t e d ### "
149 print " Question A: No, Po l i cy does not match
a c t u a l behaviour "
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150 print " Searching Question B : ’ Does po l i cy match
device s t a t e ? ’ "
151 l a y e r 1 _ c o r r e c t = Fa l se
152 # S e a t c h d e e p e r on d e v i c e s t a t e ( Layer 2 )
153 # s t a r t _ s p a n n i n g _ t r e e ( )
154 con_check = check_swi tch_connec t iv i ty ( )
155
156 # R e q u e s t f l o w s t a t s ( Layer 3 Ques t i on D)
157 i f con_check : # i f Yes on q u e s t i o n B
158 print " ### Stage 3 : S t a r t e d ### "
159 print " Question B : Yes , Device s t a t e matches
Pol i cy . "
160 print " Searching Question D: ’ Does device
s t a t e match hardware ? ’ "
161 for con in core . openflow . _connect ions . values ( )
:
162 print " Requesting flow t a b l e e n t r i e s from
device " , con
163 con . send ( of . o f p _ s t a t s _ r e q u e s t ( body=of .
o f p _ f l o w _ s t a t s _ r e q u e s t ( ) ) )
164 e lse :
165 print " ### Stage 3 : S t a r t e d "
166 print " Question B : No, Device s t a t e doesn ’ t
match Pol i cy . "
167 print " Searching Question C: ’ Does phys ica l




171 # D i f f e r e n t p a c k e t h a n d l i n g :
172 # ###########################
173 def handle_arp ( dev_id , packet ) :
174 arp_packet = packet . payload
175 hwsrc = arp_packet . hwsrc
176 hwdst = arp_packet . hwdst
177 opcode = arp_packet . opcode
178 i f opcode == 1 :
179 opcode = " 1 :REQUEST"
180 e l i f opcode == 2 :
181 opcode = " 2 :REPLY"
182 e l i f opcode == 3 :
183 opcode = " 3 :REV_REQUEST"
184 e l i f opcode == 4 :
185 opcode = " 4 :REV_REPLY"
186 e lse :
187 opcode = " x :UNSET"
188 # l o g . i n f o ("%s DevID : %s ARP: p k t %s > %s , hw %s > %s
: %s " , t imes tamp ( ) , dev_ id , p a c k e t . s r c , p a c k e t .
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dst , hwsrc , hwdst , o p c o d e )
189 x = "%s DevID : %s ARP: pkt %s > %s , hw %s > %s : %s "
% ( timestamp ( ) , dev_id , packet . src , packet . dst ,
hwsrc , hwdst , opcode )
190 i f l a y e r 1 _ c o r r e c t :
191 print x
192 i f checker :
193 checker . c h e c k _ i f _ l e g a l ( x )
194
195 # ######################
196 # Handle t h e i p p a c k e t s
197 # ######################
198
199 def handle_icmp ( dev_id , packet , ip_packet , s rc ip ,
ds t ip ) :
200 icmp_packet = ip_packet . payload
201 ping_type = icmp_packet . type
202 ping_code = icmp_packet . code
203 ping_csum = icmp_packet . csum
204 i f ping_type == 0 :
205 ping_type = " 0 :ECHO_REPY"
206 e l i f ping_type == 3 :
207 ping_type = " 3 :DEST_UNREACH"
208 e l i f ping_type == 4 :
209 ping_type = " 4 :SRC_QUENCH"
210 e l i f ping_type == 5 :
211 ping_type = " 5 : REDIRECT"
212 e l i f ping_type == 8 :
213 ping_type = " 8 :ECHO_REQUEST"
214 e l i f ping_type == 1 1 :
215 ping_type = " 1 1 :TIME_EXCEED"
216 e lse :
217 pass
218 # l o g . i n f o ("%s DevID : %s ICMP : p k t %s > %s , i p %s > %
s : %s " , t imes tamp ( ) , dev_ id , p a c k e t . s r c , p a c k e t .
ds t , s r c i p , d s t i p , p i n g _ t y p e )
219 x = "%s DevID : %s ICMP : pkt %s > %s , ip %s > %s : %s
" % ( timestamp ( ) , dev_id , packet . src , packet . dst ,
s rc ip , dst ip , ping_type )
220 i f l a y e r 1 _ c o r r e c t :
221 print x
222 i f checker :
223 v i o l a t i o n = checker . c h e c k _ i f _ l e g a l ( x )
224 decider ( v i o l a t i o n , x )
225
226 def handle_tcp ( dev_id , packet , ip_packet , s rc ip , ds t ip
) :
227 tcp = ip_packet . payload
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228 s r c p o r t = tcp . s r c p o r t
229 dstpor t = tcp . ds tpor t
230 seq = tcp . seq
231 ack = tcp . ack
232 f l a g s = tcp . f l a g s
233 x = "%s DevID : %s TCP : pkt %s > %s , ip %s > %s :
srcp %s dstp %s , seq %s , ack %s , f l a g s %s " % (
timestamp ( ) , dev_id , packet . src , packet . dst ,
s rc ip , dst ip , s rcpor t , dstport , seq , ack , f l a g s )
234 i f l a y e r 1 _ c o r r e c t :
235 print x
236 i f checker :
237 v i o l a t i o n = checker . c h e c k _ i f _ l e g a l ( x )
238 decider ( v i o l a t i o n , x )
239
240 def handle_udp ( dev_id , packet , ip_packet , s rc ip , ds t ip
) :
241 udp = ip_packet . payload
242 s r c p o r t = udp . s r c p o r t
243 dstpor t = udp . ds tpor t
244 x = "%s DevID : %s UDP: pkt %s > %s , ip %s > %s :
srcp %s dstp %s " % ( timestamp ( ) , dev_id , packet .
src , packet . dst , s rc ip , dst ip , srcpor t , ds tpor t )
245 i f l a y e r 1 _ c o r r e c t :
246 print x
247 i f checker :
248 v i o l a t i o n = checker . c h e c k _ i f _ l e g a l ( x )
249 decider ( v i o l a t i o n , x )
250
251 def handle_ip ( dev_id , port , packet ) :
252 ip_packet = packet . payload
253 s r c i p = ip_packet . s r c i p
254 ds t ip = ip_packet . ds t ip
255
256 add_host ( dev_id , port , s r c i p )
257
258 i f ip_packet . f ind ( " icmp " ) :
259 handle_icmp ( dev_id , packet , ip_packet , s rc ip ,
ds t ip )
260 e l i f ip_packet . f ind ( " tcp " ) :
261 handle_tcp ( dev_id , packet , ip_packet , s rc ip , ds t ip
)
262 e l i f ip_packet . f ind ( "udp" ) :




266 def _handle_PacketIn ( event ) :
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267 global count
268 packet = event . parsed
269 i f packet . f ind ( " arp " ) :
270 handle_arp ( dpid_to_s t r ( event . dpid ) , packet )
271 e l i f packet . f ind ( " ipv4 " ) :
272 handle_ip ( dpid_to_s t r ( event . dpid ) , event . port ,
packet )
273 e lse :
274 log . i n f o ( "UNKNOWN packet %s " , packet . s r c )
275
276 count = count + 1
277 i f count == 5 : # e v e r y 5 p a c k e t s r e c e v i e d c h e c k d a t a
s t a t s / s m a l l number f o r t e s t i n g
278 send_requests ( )
279 count = 0
280
281 def send_requests ( ) :
282 for con in core . openflow . _connect ions . values ( ) :
283 con . send ( of . o f p _ s t a t s _ r e q u e s t ( body=of .
o f p _ p o r t _ s t a t s _ r e q u e s t ( ) ) )
284
285 def launch ( switch = " " , mode= " " ) :
286 global checker
287 global switch_count
288 print "Number of switches expected : " , switch
289 switch_count = i n t ( switch )
290 s t a r t _ s p a n n i n g _ t r e e ( )
291 i f " 2 " in mode or " 3 " in mode :
292 checker = vc . Violat ion_Checker ( switch , mode)
293 core . openflow . addListenerByName ( " PacketIn " ,
_handle_PacketIn )
294 core . openflow . addListenerByName ( " Por tS ta t sRece ived " ,
h a n d l e _ p o r t _ s t a t s )
295 core . openflow . addListenerByName ( " FlowStatsReceived " ,
handle_f low_requests )
296 print " ### Stage 1 : S t a r t e d ### "
297 print " Searching Question A: ’ Does po l i cy match
a c t u a l behaviour ? ’ "
C.2 Violation_checker.py
1 # Checks i f p a c k e t s v i o l a t e t h e network p o l i c y
2 # @ Author Har i s S i s t e k
3 import os
4 import re
5 import time , datetime
6 import automator as auto
7
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8 c l a s s Violat ion_Checker ( object ) :
9 ’ ’ ’
10 I n t e r p r e t a l l p o s s i b l e opt ions given by a r u l e add
the to a d i c t
11 Returns a d i c t with option v a r i a b l e s , or None i f no
options are found
12 ’ ’ ’
13 def i n t e r p r e t _ o p t i o n s ( s e l f , r u l e ) :
14 match = re . search ( r ’ spor t\s +(?P<sport > .+)\s+dport\
s +(?P<dport > .+) ’ , r u l e )
15 i f match :
16 return match . groupdict ( )
17 e lse :
18 jus t_sport_match = re . search ( r ’ spor t\s +(?P<sport
> .+) ’ , r u l e )
19 i f jus t_sport_match :
20 return jus t_sport_match . groupdict ( )
21 e lse :
22 just_dport_match = re . search ( r ’ dport\s +(?P<
dport > .+) ’ , r u l e )
23 i f just_dport_match :
24 return just_dport_match . groupdict ( )
25 e lse :
26 return None
27
28 ’ ’ ’
29 Use to merge the r u l e d i c t s t h a t are e x t r a c t e d from
the r u l e s .
30 prot = d i c t with the protoco l name
31 t y p e _ d i c t = values e x t r a c t e d from Time , Date or Vlan
r u l e s
32 opt ions = values e x t r a c t e d from " i n t e r p r e t _ o p t i o n s "
33 ’ ’ ’
34 def merge_dicts ( s e l f , prot , type_dic t , opt ions ) :
35 r e t _ d i c t = { }
36 i f options :
37 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( prot . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
t y p e _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t ( opt ions . i tems ( ) ) )
38 e lse :
39 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( prot . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
t y p e _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) )
40 return r e t _ d i c t
41
42
43 ’ ’ ’
44 E x t r a c t a l l data needed to i n t e r p e t " Data " rules ,
re turns d i c t of the data s tored
45 ’ ’ ’
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46 def i n t e r p r e t _ d a t a _ r u l e ( s e l f , prot , r u l e ) :
47 r e t _ d i c t = { }
48 r e t _ d i c t [ " rule_type " ] = " Data "
49 r e t _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ] = r u l e
50 r e t _ d i c t [ " lim " ] = r u l e # j u s t s i m p l e s e a r c h l a t e r ,
e a s i e r t h e t o s p l i t up t h e l i n e atm
51 match = re . search ( r ’^Data\s +(?P<lim >.+)\s +(?P<
notat ion >.+)\s+from\s +(?P<from >.+) ’ , r u l e )
52 i f match :
53 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( r e t _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
match . groupdict ( ) . i tems ( ) ) )
54 return s e l f . merge_dicts ( prot , r e t _ d i c t , { } )
55 e lse :
56 match = re . search ( r ’^Data\s +(?P<lim >.+)\s +(?P<
notat ion >.+)\s+to\s +(?P<to > .+) ’ , r u l e )
57 i f match :
58 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( r e t _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
match . groupdict ( ) . i tems ( ) ) )
59 return s e l f . merge_dicts ( prot , r e t _ d i c t , { } )
60 e lse :
61 return None
62
63 ’ ’ ’
64 Helps us convert the po l i cy data s i z e nota t ion i n t o
bytes , because t h i s i s what
65 openflow port s t a t request i s re turning
66 ’ ’ ’
67 def conv er t_no ta t ion _ to_byt es ( s e l f , lim , nota t ion ) :
68 nota t ion = nota t ion . upper ( )
69 i f nota t ion == "B" :
70 return i n t ( lim )
71 e l i f nota t ion == "KB" :
72 return i n t ( lim ) * 1024
73 e l i f nota t ion == "MB" :
74 return i n t ( lim ) * 1024 * 1024
75 e l i f nota t ion == "GB" :
76 return i n t ( lim ) * 1024 * 1024 * 1024
77 e l i f nota t ion == "TB" :
78 return i n t ( lim ) * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024
79 e lse :
80 return 0
81
82 ’ ’ ’
83 E x t r a c t a l l the data needed from " Time " rule , re turn
a d i c t of t h a t data
84 ’ ’ ’
85 def i n t e r p r e t _ t i m e _ r u l e ( s e l f , prot , r u l e ) :
86 r e t _ d i c t = { }
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87 r e t _ d i c t [ " rule_type " ] = " Time "
88 r e t _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ] = r u l e
89 match = re . search ( r ’^Time\s +(?P< s t a r t _ t i m e >.+)\s+
to\s +(?P<end_time >.+)\s+block\s +(?P<from >.+)\s+
to\s +(?P<to >\S+)\s+ ’ , r u l e )
90 i f match :
91 print " match1 "
92 opt ions = s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ o p t i o n s ( r u l e )
93 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( r e t _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
match . groupdict ( ) . i tems ( ) ) )
94 return s e l f . merge_dicts ( prot , r e t _ d i c t , opt ions )
95 e lse :
96 match = re . search ( r ’^Time\s +(?P< s t a r t _ t i m e >.+)\s
+to\s +(?P<end_time >.+)\s+block\s +(?P<from>\S
+)\s+ ’ , r u l e )
97 i f match :
98 opt ions = s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ o p t i o n s ( r u l e )
99 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( r e t _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
match . groupdict ( ) . i tems ( ) ) )
100 return s e l f . merge_dicts ( prot , r e t _ d i c t ,
opt ions )
101 e lse :
102 return None
103
104 ’ ’ ’
105 E x t r a c t a l l the data from " Date " rule , re turn a d i c t
of t h a t data
106 ’ ’ ’
107 def i n t e r p r e t _ d a t e _ r u l e ( s e l f , prot , r u l e ) :
108 r e t _ d i c t = { }
109 r e t _ d i c t [ " rule_type " ] = " Date "
110 r e t _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ] = r u l e
111 match = re . search ( r ’^Date\s +(?P< s t a r t _ d a t e > .+)\s+
to\s +(?P<end_date > .+)\s+block\s +(?P<from >.+)\s+
to\s +(?P<to >\S+)\s+ ’ , r u l e )
112 i f match :
113 opt ions = s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ o p t i o n s ( r u l e )
114 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( r e t _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
match . groupdict ( ) . i tems ( ) ) )
115 return s e l f . merge_dicts ( prot , r e t _ d i c t , opt ions )
116 e lse :
117 match = re . search ( r ’^Date\s +(?P< s t a r t _ d a t e > .+)\s
+to\s +(?P<end_date > .+)\s+block\s +(?P<from>\S
+) ’ , r u l e )
118 i f match :
119 opt ions = s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ o p t i o n s ( r u l e )
120 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( r e t _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
match . groupdict ( ) . i tems ( ) ) )
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121 return s e l f . merge_dicts ( prot , r e t _ d i c t ,
opt ions )
122 e lse : # s p e c i d i c c a l a n d e r d a t e :
123 match = re . search ( r ’^Date\s +(?P< s t a r t _ d a t e > .+)
\s+block\s +(?P<from>\S+)\s+to\s +(?P<to >\S+)
\s+ ’ , r u l e )
124 i f match :
125 opt ions = s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ o p t i o n s ( r u l e )
126 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( r e t _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) +
l i s t ( match . groupdict ( ) . i tems ( ) ) )
127 return s e l f . merge_dicts ( prot , r e t _ d i c t ,
opt ions )
128 e lse :
129 match = re . search ( r ’^Date\s +(?P< s t a r t _ d a t e
> .+)\s+block\s +(?P<from>\S+) ’ , r u l e )
130 i f match :
131 opt ions = s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ o p t i o n s ( r u l e )
132 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( r e t _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) +
l i s t ( match . groupdict ( ) . i tems ( ) ) )
133 return s e l f . merge_dicts ( prot , r e t _ d i c t ,
opt ions )
134 e lse :
135 return None
136
137 ’ ’ ’
138 E x t r a c t a l l the data from " Vlan " rule , re turn a d i c t
of t h a t data
139 ’ ’ ’
140 def i n t e r p r e t _ v l a n _ r u l e ( s e l f , prot , r u l e ) :
141 r e t _ d i c t = { }
142 r e t _ d i c t [ " rule_type " ] = "VLAN"
143 r e t _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ] = r u l e
144 r e t _ d i c t [ " hosts " ] = r u l e # j u s t s i m p l e s e a r c h
l a t e r , e a s i e r t h e t o s p l i t up t h e l i n e atm
145 match = re . search ( r ’^Vlan\s +(?P<vlan_id > .+)\s+has ’
, r u l e )
146 i f match :
147 r e t _ d i c t = d i c t ( l i s t ( r e t _ d i c t . i tems ( ) ) + l i s t (
match . groupdict ( ) . i tems ( ) ) )
148 return s e l f . merge_dicts ( prot , r e t _ d i c t , { } )
149 e lse :
150 return None
151
152 ’ ’ ’
153 Decide what kind of r u l e ( Date , Time or Vlan ) and
send to appropriate subfuntion
154 ’ ’ ’
155 def i n t e r p r e t _ p r i m i t i v e ( s e l f , prot , r u l e ) :
132
156 i f " Time " in r u l e :
157 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ t i m e _ r u l e ( prot , r u l e )
158 e l i f " Date " in r u l e :
159 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ d a t e _ r u l e ( prot , r u l e )
160 e l i f " Vlan " in r u l e :
161 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ v l a n _ r u l e ( prot , r u l e )
162 e l i f " Data " in r u l e :
163 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ d a t a _ r u l e ( prot , r u l e )
164 e lse :
165 pass
166
167 ’ ’ ’
168 This r u l e w i l l re turn a l l the date from a r u l e by
using the subfunct ions above .
169 I t s main task i s to decide what protoco l the r u l e i s
t a l k i n g about , i f non
170 i s s p e c i f i e d j u s t assume TCP, UDP and ICMP i s what
the user wants .
171 ’ ’ ’
172 def in terpre t_b lock_and_opt ions ( s e l f , r u l e ) :
173 prot = { }
174 i f " prot TCP" in r u l e :
175 prot [ " prot " ] = "TCP"
176 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ p r i m i t i v e ( prot , r u l e )
177 e l i f " prot UDP" in r u l e :
178 prot [ " prot " ] = "UDP"
179 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ p r i m i t i v e ( prot , r u l e )
180 e l i f " prot ARP" in r u l e :
181 prot [ " prot " ] = "ACK"
182 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ p r i m i t i v e ( prot , r u l e )
183 e l i f " prot ICMP" in r u l e :
184 prot [ " prot " ] = "ICMP"
185 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ p r i m i t i v e ( prot , r u l e )
186 e l i f " Vlan " in r u l e :
187 prot [ " prot " ] = "VLAN"
188 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ p r i m i t i v e ( prot , r u l e )
189 e l i f " Data " in r u l e :
190 prot [ " prot " ] = " Data "
191 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ p r i m i t i v e ( prot , r u l e )
192 e lse :
193 prot [ " prot " ] = "TCP/UDP/ICMP"
194 return s e l f . i n t e r p r e t _ p r i m i t i v e ( prot , r u l e )
195
196 ’ ’ ’
197 Reads a l l the po l i cy f i l e s , e x t r a c t s the pol i cy
v a r a i b l e s
198 ’ ’ ’
199 def r e a d _ p o l i c y _ f o l d e r ( s e l f , pol icy_path ) :
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200 for f i l e in os . l i s t d i r ( pol icy_path ) :
201 i f f i l e . endswith ( " . pol " ) :
202 with open ( os . path . j o i n ( pol icy_path , f i l e ) ) as f
:
203 l i n e s = f . r e a d l i n e s ( )
204 for l i n e in l i n e s :
205 i f re . match ( r ’ ^.+\ s+=\s +.+ ’ , l i n e ) : #
i n t e r p r e t h o s t s
206 match = re . match ( r ’ ^ ( . + ) \s+=\s + ( . + ) ’ ,
l i n e )
207 s e l f . p o l i c y _ h o s t s _ i p [ match . group ( 2 ) ] =
match . group ( 1 )
208 s e l f . policy_hosts_name [ match . group ( 1 ) ] =
match . group ( 2 )
209 e l i f re . match ( r ’^Date ’ , l i n e ) or re . match ( r
’ Time ’ , l i n e ) or re . match ( r ’^Vlan ’ , l i n e
) or re . match ( r ’^Data ’ , l i n e ) :
210 s e l f . p o l i c y _ r u l e s . append ( l i n e )
211 s e l f . p o l i c y _ r u l e s _ v a l u e s . append ( s e l f .
in terpre t_b lock_and_opt ions ( l i n e ) )
212
213 ’ ’ ’
214 Rules can conta in a " * " which s p e c i f i e s " any " .
Example s r c i p * would mean match r u l e with any
source ip
215 ’ ’ ’
216 def check_two_values ( s e l f , ru le_val , packet_val ) :
217 i f r u l e _ v a l == " * " or r u l e _ v a l == None :
218 return True
219 e lse :
220 return r u l e _ v a l == packet_val
221
222 ’ ’ ’
223 Compares r u l e s r c and dst a g a i n s t packet s r c and dst
224 Returns a boolean value
225 ’ ’ ’
226 def check_rule_and_packet ( s e l f , r_src , p_src , r_dst ,
p_dst ) :
227 r e t 1 = s e l f . check_two_values ( r_src , p_src )
228 r e t 2 = s e l f . check_two_values ( r_dst , p_dst )
229 i f r e t 1 and r e t 2 :
230 return r e t 1 and r e t 2
231 e lse :
232 r e t 1 = s e l f . check_two_values ( r_dst , p_src )
233 r e t 2 = s e l f . check_two_values ( r_src , p_dst )
234 return r e t 1 and r e t 2
235
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236 def check_ports ( s e l f , r_sport , p_sport , r_dport ,
p_dport ) :
237 r e t 1 = s e l f . check_two_values ( r_sport , p_sport )
238 r e t 2 = s e l f . check_two_values ( r_dport , p_dport )
239 return r e t 1 and r e t 2
240
241 ’ ’ ’
242 F i n a l l y checks i f packet v i o l a t e s a r u l e by looking
at the p r i m i t i v e ( time , date , vlan )
243 Returns True i f there i s a v i o l a t i o n , f a l s e i f not
244 ’ ’ ’
245 def check_time_or_date ( s e l f , rule , packet ,
p a c k e t _ s t r i n g ) :
246 match = re . search ( r ’ ^(?P<date >\S+)\s +(?P<time >\S+)
\s+ ’ , p a c k e t _ s t r i n g ) # e x t r a c t d a t e and t ime
from p a c k e t t imes tamp
247 i f r u l e [ " rule_type " ] == " Time " :
248 i f match :
249 mdict = match . groupdict ( )
250 packet_time = time . s t rpt ime ( mdict . get ( " time " ) ,
"%H:%M:%S " ) # t e s t t h i s
251 r u l e _ s t a r t _ t i m e = time . s t rpt ime ( r u l e . get ( "
s t a r t _ t i m e " ) , "%H:%M" ) # t e s t t h i s
252 rule_end_time = time . s t rpt ime ( r u l e . get ( "
end_time " ) , "%H:%M" ) # t e s t t h i s
253
254 i f packet_time >= r u l e _ s t a r t _ t i m e and
packet_time <= rule_end_time :
255 return True
256 e lse :
257 return Fa lse
258 e l i f r u l e [ " rule_type " ] == " Date " :
259 i f match :
260 mdict = match . groupdict ( )
261 packet_date = time . s t rpt ime ( mdict . get ( " date " ) ,
"%a " ) # t e s t t h i s
262 r u l e _ s t a r t _ d a t e = time . s t rpt ime ( r u l e . get ( "
s t a r t _ d a t e " ) , "%a " ) # t e s t t h i s
263 rule_end_date = time . s t rpt ime ( r u l e . get ( "
end_date " ) , "%a " ) # t e s t t h i s
264
265 i f packet_date >= r u l e _ s t a r t _ d a t e and
packet_date <= rule_end_date :
266 return True
267 e lse :
268 return Fa lse
269 e lse :
270 print " vlan "
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272 ’ ’ ’
273 Main method f o r checking icmp packets , e x t r a c t r u l e
s r c and dst , packet s r c and dst , check i f i t there
i s match
274 forward matching r u l e and packet to next method so
to check i f values match on other parameters .
275 L a s t l y p r i n t out v i o l a t i o n i f any and return a
boolean value . True i f a v i o l a t i o n , f a l s e i f not .
276 ’ ’ ’
277 def check_icmp ( s e l f , packet_dic t , p a c k e t _ s t r i n g ) :
278 for r u l e _ d i c t in s e l f . p o l i c y _ r u l e s _ v a l u e s :
279 i f "ICMP" in r u l e _ d i c t [ " prot " ] : # r u l e may miss
t h e s e keys , t h e r e f o r use g e t −> w i l l r e t u r n
None i f k ey i s non e x i s t e n t
280 r _ s r c = None # a t some p o i n t r u l e s c o n t a i n s
IPs and not h o s t names
281 r_ds t = None
282 match = re . match ( r ’\d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d
{ 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } ’ , r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " from " ) )
283 i f match :
284 r _ s r c = r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " from " )
285 e lse :
286 r _ s r c = s e l f . policy_hosts_name . get ( r u l e _ d i c t
. get ( " from " ) )
287 i f r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " ) :
288 match = re . match ( r ’\d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d
{ 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } ’ , r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " ) )
289 i f match :
290 r_ds t = r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " )
291 e lse :
292 r_ds t = s e l f . policy_hosts_name . get (
r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " ) )
293
294 i f s e l f . check_rule_and_packet ( r_src ,
295 p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
i p s r c " ] ,
r_dst ,
p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
ipds t " ] ) :
296
297 r e t = s e l f . check_time_or_date ( r u l e _ d i c t ,
packet_dic t , p a c k e t _ s t r i n g )
298
299 i f r e t :
300 return r u l e _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ]
301
302 def check_udp ( s e l f , packet_dic t , p a c k e t _ s t r i n g ) :
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303 for r u l e _ d i c t in s e l f . p o l i c y _ r u l e s _ v a l u e s :
304 i f "UDP" in r u l e _ d i c t [ " prot " ] : # r u l e may miss
t h e s e keys , t h e r e f o r use g e t −> w i l l r e t u r n
None i f k ey i s non e x i s t e n t
305 r _ s r c = None
306 r_ds t = None
307 match = re . match ( r ’\d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d
{ 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } ’ , r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " from " ) )
308 i f match :
309 r _ s r c = r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " from " )
310 e lse :
311 r _ s r c = s e l f . policy_hosts_name . get ( r u l e _ d i c t
. get ( " from " ) )
312 i f r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " ) :
313 match = re . match ( r ’\d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d
{ 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } ’ , r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " ) )
314 i f match :
315 r_ds t = r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " )
316 e lse :
317 r_ds t = s e l f . policy_hosts_name . get (
r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " ) )
318
319 i f s e l f . check_rule_and_packet ( r_src ,
320 p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
i p s r c " ] ,
r_dst ,
p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
ipds t " ] ) :
321
322 i f s e l f . check_ports ( r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " spor t " ) ,
323 p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " s r c _ p o r t " ] ,
r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " dport
" ) , p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
ds t_por t " ] ) :
324
325 r e t = s e l f . check_time_or_date ( r u l e _ d i c t ,
packet_dic t , p a c k e t _ s t r i n g )
326
327 i f r e t :
328 return r u l e _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ]
329
330 def check_tcp ( s e l f , packet_dic t , p a c k e t _ s t r i n g ) :
331 for r u l e _ d i c t in s e l f . p o l i c y _ r u l e s _ v a l u e s :
332 i f "TCP" in r u l e _ d i c t [ " prot " ] : # r u l e may miss
t h e s e keys , t h e r e f o r use g e t −> w i l l r e t u r n
None i f k ey i s non e x i s t e n t
333 r _ s r c = None
334 r_ds t = None
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335 match = re . match ( r ’\d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d
{ 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } ’ , r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " from " ) )
336 i f match :
337 r _ s r c = r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " from " )
338 e lse :
339 r _ s r c = s e l f . policy_hosts_name . get ( r u l e _ d i c t
. get ( " from " ) )
340 i f r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " ) :
341 match = re . match ( r ’\d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d
{ 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } ’ , r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " ) )
342 i f match :
343 r_ds t = r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " )
344 e lse :
345 r_ds t = s e l f . policy_hosts_name . get (
r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " to " ) )
346
347 i f s e l f . check_rule_and_packet ( r_src ,
348 p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
i p s r c " ] ,
r_dst ,
p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
ipds t " ] ) :
349
350 i f s e l f . check_ports ( r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " spor t " ) ,
351 p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " s r c _ p o r t " ] ,
r u l e _ d i c t . get ( " dport
" ) , p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
ds t_por t " ] ) :
352
353 r e t = s e l f . check_time_or_date ( r u l e _ d i c t ,
packet_dic t , p a c k e t _ s t r i n g )
354
355 i f r e t :
356 return r u l e _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ]
357
358
359 def c h e c k _ f o r _ v i o l a t i o n ( s e l f , p a c k e t _ d i c t ) :
360 for vpacket in s e l f . v_packets : # f o r v i o l a t i n g
p a c k e t in v i o l a t i o n l i s t
361 i f vpacket [ " prot " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " prot " ] :
362 i f vpacket [ " devID " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " devID " ] : #
p a c k e t r e p l y on same d e v i c e
363 i f vpacket [ " i p s r c " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " ipds t " ]
and vpacket [ " ipds t " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
i p s r c " ] : # i s i t a r e p l y
364 i f vpacket [ " prot " ] == "ICMP" :
365 i f " 8 " in vpacket [ " ping_type " ] and " 0 "
in p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " ping_type " ] : # ping
138
t y p e i s a r e p l y
366 print " ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found :
PACKET RETURN ## "
367 print "> Packet : " , vpacket [ "
p a c k e t _ s t r i n g " ]
368 print "> Packet : " , p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
p a c k e t _ s t r i n g " ]
369 print " v i o l a t e s : "
370 print "> Rule : " , vpacket [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g "
]
371 i f vpacket in s e l f . v_packets :
372 s e l f . v_packets . remove ( vpacket )
373 i f p a c k e t _ d i c t in s e l f . v_packets :
374 s e l f . v_packets . remove ( p a c k e t _ d i c t )
375 return True
376 e lse :
377 i f vpacket [ " ds t_por t " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
s r c _ p o r t " ] and vpacket [ " s r c _ p o r t " ] ==
p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " ds t_por t " ] :
378 print " ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found :
PACKET RETURN ## "
379 print "> Packet : " , vpacket [ "
p a c k e t _ s t r i n g " ]
380 print "> Packet : " , p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
p a c k e t _ s t r i n g " ]
381 print " v i o l a t e s : "
382 print "> Rule : " , vpacket [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g "
]
383 i f vpacket in s e l f . v_packets :
384 s e l f . v_packets . remove ( vpacket )
385 i f p a c k e t _ d i c t in s e l f . v_packets :
386 s e l f . v_packets . remove ( p a c k e t _ d i c t )
387 return True
388 e lse : # p a c k e t i s on a n o t h e r d e v i c e
389 i f vpacket [ " i p s r c " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " i p s r c " ]
and vpacket [ " ipds t " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
ipds t " ] : # p a c k e t has be en f o r w a r d e d
390 i f vpacket [ " prot " ] == "ICMP" :
391 i f vpacket [ " ping_type " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
ping_type " ] : # ping t y p e i s a r e p l y
o f a n o t h e r
392 print " ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found :
PACKET FORWARDING ## "
393 print "> Packet : " , vpacket [ "
p a c k e t _ s t r i n g " ]
394 print "> Packet : " , p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
p a c k e t _ s t r i n g " ]
395 print " v i o l a t e s : "
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396 print "> Rule : " , vpacket [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g "
]
397 i f vpacket in s e l f . v_packets :
398 s e l f . v_packets . remove ( vpacket )
399 i f p a c k e t _ d i c t in s e l f . v_packets :
400 s e l f . v_packets . remove ( p a c k e t _ d i c t )
401 return True
402 e lse :
403 i f vpacket [ " ds t_por t " ] == p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
ds t_por t " ] and vpacket [ " s r c _ p o r t " ] ==
p a c k e t _ d i c t [ " s r c _ p o r t " ] :
404 print " ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found :
PACKET FORWARDING ## "
405 print "> Packet : " , vpacket [ "
p a c k e t _ s t r i n g " ]
406 print "> Packet : " , p a c k e t _ d i c t [ "
p a c k e t _ s t r i n g " ]
407 print " v i o l a t e s : "
408 print "> Rule : " , vpacket [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g "
]
409 i f vpacket in s e l f . v_packets :
410 s e l f . v_packets . remove ( vpacket )
411 i f p a c k e t _ d i c t in s e l f . v_packets :
412 s e l f . v_packets . remove ( p a c k e t _ d i c t )
413 return True
414 return Fa lse
415
416 ’ ’ ’
417 Recieves a s t r i n g from the sdn_dump , check a g a i n s t
po l i cy and return boolean value
418 True , i f approved
419 False , i f there i s a po l i cy v i o l a t i o n
420 ’ ’ ’
421 def c h e c k _ i f _ l e g a l ( s e l f , dump_string ) :
422 # p r i n t dump_str ing # s h o u l d c h e c k t h i s s t r i n g f o r
e r r o r f l a g s
423 i f "ICMP" in dump_string :
424 match = re . match ( r ’ ^.+\ s+DevID :\ s +(?P<devID >.+)\
s +(?P<prot > .+) :\ s+pkt\s +(?P<pktsrc > .+)\s+>\s
+(?P<pktdst > .+) ,\ s+ip\s +(?P<ipsrc > .+)\s+>\s
+(?P<ipdst > .+) :\ s +(?P<ping_type >.+) ’ ,
dump_string )
425 match_dict = match . groupdict ( )
426 # p r i n t m a t c h _ d i c t
427 # p r i n t m a t c h _ d i c t
428 v i o l a t i o n = s e l f . check_icmp ( match_dict ,
dump_string )
429 i f v i o l a t i o n :
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430 s t r i n g _ d i c t = { }
431 s t r i n g _ d i c t [ " p a c k e t _ s t r i n g " ] = dump_string
432 r u l e _ d i c t = { }
433 r u l e _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ] = v i o l a t i o n
434 r e s _ d i c t = s e l f . merge_dicts ( match_dict ,
s t r i n g _ d i c t , r u l e _ d i c t )
435 s e l f . v_packets . append ( r e s _ d i c t )
436 i f s e l f . c h e c k _ f o r _ v i o l a t i o n ( r e s _ d i c t ) :
437 return True
438 return Fa lse
439 # now match them somehow
440 e l i f "UDP" in dump_string :
441 match = re . match ( r ’ ^.+\ s+DevID :\ s +(?P<devID >.+)\
s +(?P<prot > .+) :\ s+pkt\s +(?P<pktsrc > .+)\s+>\s
+(?P<pktdst > .+) ,\ s+ip\s +(?P<ipsrc > .+)\s+>\s
+(?P<ipdst > .+) :\ s+srcp\s +(?P<src_port > .+)\s+
dstp\s +(?P<dst_port > .+) ’ , dump_string )
442 match_dict = match . groupdict ( )
443 # p r i n t m a t c h _ d i c t
444 v i o l a t i o n = s e l f . check_udp ( match_dict ,
dump_string )
445 i f v i o l a t i o n :
446 s t r i n g _ d i c t = { }
447 s t r i n g _ d i c t [ " p a c k e t _ s t r i n g " ] = dump_string
448 r u l e _ d i c t = { }
449 r u l e _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ] = v i o l a t i o n
450 r e s _ d i c t = s e l f . merge_dicts ( match_dict ,
s t r i n g _ d i c t , r u l e _ d i c t )
451 s e l f . v_packets . append ( r e s _ d i c t )
452 i f s e l f . c h e c k _ f o r _ v i o l a t i o n ( r e s _ d i c t ) :
453 return True
454 return Fa lse
455 e l i f "ARP" in dump_string : # a s k i f t h i s w i l l be
needed , i s n i c e t o have f o r now
456 match = re . match ( r ’ ^.+ARP:\ s+pkt\s +(?P<pktsrc
> .+)\s+>\s +(?P<pktdst > .+) ,\ s+hw\s +(?P<hwsrc
> .+)\s+>\s +(?P<hwdst > .+) :\ s +(?P<arp_type >.+) ’
, dump_string )
457 match_dict = match . groupdict ( )
458 # p r i n t m a t c h _ d i c t
459 e l i f "TCP" in dump_string :
460 match = re . match ( r ’ ^.+\ s+DevID :\ s +(?P<devID >.+)\
s +(?P<prot > .+) :\ s+pkt\s +(?P<pktsrc > .+)\s+>\s
+(?P<pktdst > .+) ,\ s+ip\s +(?P<ipsrc > .+)\s+>\s
+(?P<ipdst > .+) :\ s+srcp\s +(?P<src_port > .+)\s+
dstp\s +(?P<dst_port > .+) ,\ s+seq ( ? P<seq >.+) ,\ s
+ack\s +(?P<ack >.+)\s+ f l a g s \s +(?P<f l a g s > .+) ’ ,
dump_string )
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461 match_dict = match . groupdict ( )
462 # p r i n t m a t c h _ d i c t
463 v i o l a t i o n = s e l f . check_tcp ( match_dict ,
dump_string )
464 i f v i o l a t i o n :
465 s t r i n g _ d i c t = { }
466 s t r i n g _ d i c t [ " p a c k e t _ s t r i n g " ] = dump_string
467 r u l e _ d i c t = { }
468 r u l e _ d i c t [ " r u l e _ s t r i n g " ] = v i o l a t i o n
469 r e s _ d i c t = s e l f . merge_dicts ( match_dict ,
s t r i n g _ d i c t , r u l e _ d i c t )
470 s e l f . v_packets . append ( r e s _ d i c t )
471 i f s e l f . c h e c k _ f o r _ v i o l a t i o n ( r e s _ d i c t ) :
472 return True
473 return Fa lse
474
475 def c h e c k _ i f _ p o r t s _ l e g a l ( s e l f , bsent , brecv , psent ,
precv ) :
476 r u l e _ i p = None
477 for r u l e in s e l f . p o l i c y _ r u l e s _ v a l u e s :
478 i f " Data " in r u l e [ " rule_type " ] :
479 i f " to " in r u l e : # what t h e IP can r e c v
480 match = re . match ( r ’\d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d
{ 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } ’ , r u l e . get ( " to " ) )
481 i f match :
482 r u l e _ i p = r u l e . get ( " to " )
483 e lse :
484 r u l e _ i p = s e l f . policy_hosts_name . get ( r u l e .
get ( " to " ) )
485 # We now know t h e r u l e IP , l e t s match i t
a g a i s n t a c t u a l p o r t s t a t s
486 for r e c v _ s t a t in brecv :
487 i f r e c v _ s t a t == r u l e _ i p :
488 r u l e _ b y t e s = s e l f .
con ver t_no ta t ion _ to_by tes ( r u l e . get ( "
lim " ) , r u l e . get ( " nota t ion " ) )
489 i f i n t ( r u l e _ b y t e s ) < i n t ( brecv [ r e c v _ s t a t
] ) :
490 print " ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found :
RECEIVED TO MUCH DATA ## "
491 print "> IP : " , rule_ ip , " address
rece ived : " , i n t ( brecv [ r e c v _ s t a t ] )
, " bytes "
492 print "> IP : " , rule_ ip , " can only
r e c e i v e : " , i n t ( r u l e _ b y t e s ) , " bytes
"
493 print " v i o l a t e s : "
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494 print "> Rule : " , r u l e . get ( "
r u l e _ s t r i n g " )
495 return True
496 e l i f " from " in r u l e : # what t h e IP can send
497 match = re . match ( r ’\d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d
{ 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } ’ , r u l e . get ( " from " ) )
498 i f match :
499 r u l e _ i p = r u l e . get ( " from " )
500 e lse :
501 r u l e _ i p = s e l f . policy_hosts_name . get ( r u l e .
get ( " from " ) )
502 # We now know t h e r u l e IP , l e t s match i t
a g a i s n t a c t u a l p o r t s t a t s
503 for r e c v _ s t a t in brecv :
504 i f r e c v _ s t a t == r u l e _ i p :
505 r u l e _ b y t e s = s e l f .
conv er t_no ta t ion _ to_byt es ( r u l e . get ( "
lim " ) , r u l e . get ( " nota t ion " ) )
506 i f i n t ( r u l e _ b y t e s ) < i n t ( brecv [ r e c v _ s t a t
] ) :
507 print " ## Pol i cy V i o l a t i o n Found :
SENDING TO MUCH DATA ## "
508 print "> IP : " , rule_ ip , " address sent
: " , i n t ( brecv [ r e c v _ s t a t ] ) , " bytes
"
509 print "> IP : " , rule_ ip , " can only
send : " , i n t ( r u l e _ b y t e s ) , " bytes "
510 print " v i o l a t e s : "
511 print "> Rule : " , r u l e . get ( "
r u l e _ s t r i n g " )
512 return True
513 e lse :
514 pass
515 return Fa lse
516
517 def _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , switch , mode) :
518 s e l f . p o l i c y _ h o s t s _ i p = { }
519 s e l f . policy_hosts_name = { }
520 s e l f . p o l i c y _ r u l e s = [ ]
521 s e l f . p o l i c y _ r u l e s _ v a l u e s = [ ]
522 s e l f . v_packets = [ ]
523 s e l f . r e a d _ p o l i c y _ f o l d e r ( os . path . dirname ( os . path .
rea lp a th ( _ _ f i l e _ _ ) ) + "/ p o l i c i e s " )
524 i f " 3 " in mode :
525 automator = auto . Automator ( s e l f . p o l i c y _ r u l e s ,
s e l f . po l i cy_ru les_va lues ,
526 s e l f . po l i cy_hos ts_ ip ,





1 from pox . core import core
2 import pox
3
4 from pox . l i b . u t i l import dpid_to_s t r
5 from pox . l i b . packet . e t h e r n e t import e t h e r n e t
6 import pox . openflow . l ibopenflow_01 as of
7 import pox . l i b . packet as pkt






14 c l a s s Automator ( object ) :
15
16 def _handle_ConnectionUp ( s e l f , event ) :
17 s e l f . switch_count += 1
18 i f s e l f . switch_count == s e l f . s w i t c h _ l i m i t :
19 s e l f . type_decider ( event )
20
21 def _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , ru les , ru les_values , host_ips ,
host_names , switch ) :
22 s e l f . r u l e s = r u l e s
23 s e l f . r u l e s _ v a l u e s = r u l e s _ v a l u e s
24 s e l f . hos t_ ips = hos t_ ips
25 s e l f . host_names = host_names
26 s e l f . switch_count = 0
27 s e l f . s w i t c h _ l i m i t = i n t ( switch )
28 core . openflow . addListenerByName ( " ConnectionUp "
, s e l f . _handle_ConnectionUp )
29 # c o r e . o p e n f l o w . addLis tenerByName ("
F l o w S t a t s R e c e i v e d " , s e l f .
_ h a n d l e _ s w i t c h _ f l o w _ s t a t s )
30 # c o r e . o p e n f l o w . addLis tenerByName ("
P o r t S t a t s R e c e i v e d " , s e l f .
_ h a n d l e _ s w i t c h _ s t a t s )
31
32 def hostname_to_ip_for_from ( s e l f , r u l e ) :
33 match = re . match ( r ’\d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d
{ 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } ’ , r u l e . get ( " from " ) )
34 r _ s r c = None
35 i f match :
36 r _ s r c = r u l e . get ( " from " )
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37 e lse :
38 r _ s r c = s e l f . host_names . get ( r u l e . get ( " from " )
)
39 return r _ s r c
40
41 def hostname_to_ip_for_to ( s e l f , r u l e ) :
42 i f r u l e . get ( " to " ) : # i f t h e r u l e has s p e c i f i e d
a d e s t i n a t i o n
43 match = re . match ( r ’\d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } \ . \ d
{ 1 , 3 } \ . \ d { 1 , 3 } ’ , r u l e . get ( " to " ) )
44 r_ds t = None
45 i f match :
46 r_ds t = r u l e . get ( " to " )
47 e lse :
48 r_ds t = s e l f . host_names . get ( r u l e . get ( "
to " ) )
49 return r_ds t
50 e lse :
51 i f s e l f . hostname_to_ip_for_from ( r u l e ) == "
1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 0 0 " :
52 return " 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 0 1 "
53 e lse :
54 return " 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 0 0 "
55
56 def g e t _ s r c _ p o r t ( s e l f , r u l e ) :
57 i f r u l e . get ( " spor t " ) :
58 return r u l e . get ( " spor t " )
59 e lse :
60 return " 48966 " # found by do ing i p e r f on
m i n i n e t
61
62 def get_ds t_por t ( s e l f , r u l e ) :
63 i f r u l e . get ( " dport " ) :
64 return r u l e . get ( " dport " )
65 e lse :
66 return " 5001 " # found by do ing i p e r f on
m i n i n e t
67
68 def type_decider ( s e l f , event ) :
69 for r u l e in s e l f . r u l e s _ v a l u e s :
70 i f "ICMP" in r u l e [ " prot " ] :
71 # p r i n t " icmp "
72 s r c = s e l f . hostname_to_ip_for_from (
r u l e )
73 dst = s e l f . hostname_to_ip_for_to ( r u l e
)
74 ping = s e l f . c rea te_ping ( src , dst )
75 s e l f . send_packets ( event , ping )
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76 # ping = s e l f . c r e a t e _ p i n g ( ds t , s r c )
77 # s e l f . s e n d _ p a c k e t s ( event , p ing )
78 e l i f "UDP" in r u l e [ " prot " ] :
79 # p r i n t "udp"
80 s r c = s e l f . hostname_to_ip_for_from (
r u l e )
81 dst = s e l f . hostname_to_ip_for_to ( r u l e
)
82 sport = s e l f . g e t _ s r c _ p o r t ( r u l e )
83 dport = s e l f . ge t_ds t_por t ( r u l e )
84 udp = s e l f . create_udp ( src , dst , sport ,
dport )
85 s e l f . send_packets ( event , udp )
86 e l i f "TCP" in r u l e [ " prot " ] :
87 # p r i n t " t c p "
88 s r c = s e l f . hostname_to_ip_for_from (
r u l e )
89 dst = s e l f . hostname_to_ip_for_to ( r u l e
)
90 sport = s e l f . g e t _ s r c _ p o r t ( r u l e )
91 dport = s e l f . ge t_ds t_por t ( r u l e )
92 tcp = s e l f . c r e a t e _ t c p ( src , dst , sport ,
dport )
93 s e l f . send_packets ( event , tcp )
94 e lse :
95 pass
96
97 def create_udp ( s e l f , src , dst , sport , dport ) :
98 # C r e a t e UDP p a c k e t :
99 udp = pkt . udp ( )
100 udp . s r c p o r t = i n t ( spor t )
101 udp . ds tpor t = i n t ( dport )
102 # p r i n t " t h i s i s t h e udp " , udp
103 # C r e a t e t h e IP :
104 ip = pkt . ipv4 ( )
105 ip . protoco l = ip .UDP_PROTOCOL
106 ip . s r c i p = IPAddr ( s r c )
107 ip . ds t ip = IPAddr ( dst )
108 ip . payload = udp
109 # p r i n t "THis i s t h e i p " , i p
110 return ip
111
112 def c r e a t e _ t c p ( s e l f , src , dst , sport , dport ) :
113 # C r e a t e TCP :
114 tcp = pkt . tcp ( )
115 tcp . s r c p o r t = i n t ( spor t )
116 tcp . ds tpor t = i n t ( dport )
117 tcp . _ s e t f l a g ( tcp . SYN_flag , 1 )
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118 tcp . seq = 0
119 tcp . ack = 0
120 tcp . win = 1
121 tcp . o f f = 5
122 # p r i n t t c p
123
124 # C r e a t e t h e IP :
125 ip = pkt . ipv4 ( )
126 ip . protoco l = ip .TCP_PROTOCOL
127 ip . s r c i p = IPAddr ( s r c )
128 ip . ds t ip = IPAddr ( dst )
129 ip . payload = tcp
130 # p r i n t i p
131 return ip
132
133 def create_ping ( s e l f , src , dst ) :
134 # Make a p ing r e q u e s t :
135 icmp = pkt . icmp ( )
136 icmp . type = pkt . TYPE_ECHO_REQUEST
137 echo = pkt . ICMP . echo ( payload = " 0123456789 " )
138 icmp . payload = echo
139 # p r i n t "THis i s t h e p ing : " , icmp
140
141 # C r e a t e IP p a c k e t
142 ip = pkt . ipv4 ( )
143 ip . protoco l = ip . ICMP_PROTOCOL
144 ip . s r c i p = IPAddr ( s r c )
145 ip . ds t ip = IPAddr ( dst )
146 ip . payload = icmp
147 # p r i n t "THis i s t h e i p " , i p
148 return ip
149
150 def send_packets ( s e l f , event , ip_packet ) :
151 # C r e a t e E t h e r n e t Pay load
152 eth = e t h e r n e t ( )
153 eth . s r c = EthAddr ( " f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f " )
154 eth . dst = EthAddr ( " f f : f f : f f : f f : f f : f f " )
155 eth . type = eth . IP_TYPE
156 eth . payload = ip_packet
157 # p r i n t " Th i s i s t h e e t h e n r e t " , e t h
158
159 msg = of . ofp_packet_out ( )
160 #msg . a c t i o n s . append ( o f . o f p _ a c t i o n _ o u t p u t ( p o r t
= 1) )
161 msg . data = eth . pack ( )
162 msg . in_port = of .OFPP_NONE
163 # f o r i in range ( 5 ) : # send p a c k e t u n t i l l 5
p o r t r a n g e s
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164 #msg . a c t i o n s . append ( o f . o f p _ a c t i o n _ o u t p u t (
p o r t = i + 1) )
165 msg . a c t i o n s . append ( of . ofp_act ion_output ( port =
of .OFPP_CONTROLLER) )
166 event . connect ion . send (msg)
167 # c o r e . o p e n f l o w . g e t C o n n e c t i o n ( e v e n t . dp id ) .
s end ( msg )
C.4 __init__.py
1 # Module f i l e
C.5 Example policy
1 # Hosts
2 host1 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
3 host2 = 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2
4
5 # Time blocks
6 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 to host2
7 Time 10 :00 to 23 :00 block host1 prot TCP
8
9 # Date blocks
10 Date MON to SUN block host1 to host2
11 Date MON to FRI block 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 0 0
12 Date MON to FRI block host2
13 Date MON to FRI block host1 to 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 3
14
15
16 # Data r u l e
17 Data 1 KB to host1
18 Data 1000 b from host2
19 Data 10 KB to 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 0
20
21 # Vlans
22 Vlan 10 has h1 , h2
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